vyavaharika.  But just as the vyavaharika world is regarded as phenomenal modifications of the ajnana, as apart from our subjective experience and even before it, so the illusion (e.g. of silver in the conch-shell) is also regarded as a modification of avidya, an undefinable creation of the object of illusion, by the agency of the do@sa.  Thus in the case of the illusion of silver in the conch-shell, indefinable silver is created by the do@sa in association with the senses, which is called the creation of an indefinable (anirvacaniya) silver of illusion.  Here the cit underlying the conch-shell remains the same but the avidya of anta@hkara@na suffers modifications (pari@nama) on account of do@sa, and thus gives rise to the illusory creation.  The illusory silver is thus vivartta (appearance) from the point of view of the cit and pari@nama from the point of view of avidya, for the difference between vivartta and pari@nama is, that in the former the transformations have a different reality from the cause (cit is different from the appearance imposed on it), while in the latter case the transformations have the same reality as the transforming entity (appearance of silver has the same stuff as the avidya whose transformations it is).  But now a difficulty arises that if the illusory perception of silver is due to a coalescing of the cit underlying the anta@hkara@na-v@rtti as modified by do@sa and the object—­cit as underlying the “this” before me (in the illusion of “this is silver"), then I ought to have the experience that “I am silver” like “I am happy” and not that “this is silver”; the answer is, that as the coalescing takes place in connection with my previous notion as “this,” the form of the knowledge also is “this is silver,” whereas in the notion “I am happy,” the notion of happiness takes place in connection with a previous v@rtti of “I.”  Thus though the coalescing of the two “cits” is the same in both cases, yet in one case the

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knowledge takes the form of “I am,” and in another as “this is” according as the previous impression is “I” or “this.”  In dreams also the dream perceptions are the same as the illusory perception of silver in the conch-shell.  There the illusory creations are generated through the defects of sleep, and these creations are imposed upon the cit.  The dream experiences cannot be regarded merely as memory-products, for the perception in dream is in the form that “I see that I ride in the air on chariots, etc.” and not that “I remember the chariots.”  In the dream state all the senses are inactive, and therefore there is no separate objective cit there, but the whole dream experience with all characteristics of space, time, objects, etc. is imposed upon the cit.  The objection that since the imposition is on the pure cit the imposition ought to last even in waking stages, and that the dream experiences ought to continue even in waking life, does not hold; for