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but the technical vyapti is not known, and the connotation of the term prasiddhipurvakatva of Vais’e@sika seems to be more loose than the term vyapti as we know it in the later Nyaya.  The Vais’e@sika sutras do not count scriptures (s’abda) as a separate prama@na, but they tacitly admit the great validity of the Vedas.  With Nyaya sutras s’abda as a prama@na applies not only to the Vedas, but to the testimony of any trustworthy person, and Vatsyayana says that trustworthy persons may be of three kinds _@r@si, arya_ and mleccha (foreigners).  Upamana which is regarded as a means of right cognition in Nyaya is not even referred to in the Vais’e@sika sutras.  The Nyaya sutras know of other prama@nas, such as arthapatti, sambhava and aitihya, but include them within the prama@nas admitted by them, but the Vais’e@sika sutras do not seem to know them at all [Footnote ref 1].  The Vais’e@sika sutras believe in the perception of negation (abhava) through the perception of the locus to which such negation refers (IX. i. 1-10).  The Nyaya sutras (II. ii. 1, 2, 7-12) consider that abhava as non-existence or negation can be perceived; when one asks another to “bring the clothes which are not marked,” he finds that marks are absent in some clothes and brings them; so it is argued that absence or non-existence can be directly perceived [Footnote ref 2].  Though there is thus an agreement between the Nyaya and the Vais’e@sika sutras about the acceptance of abhava as being due to perception, yet their method of handling the matter is different.  The Nyaya sutras say nothing about the categories of dravya, gu@na, karma, vis’e@sa and samavaya which form the main subjects of Vais’e@ska discussions [Footnote ref 3].  The Nyaya sutras take much pains to prove the materiality of the senses.  But this question does not seem to have been important with Vais’e@sika.  The slight reference to this question in VIII. ii. 5-6 can hardly be regarded as sufficient.  The Vais’e@sika sutras do not mention the name of “Is’vara,” whereas the Nyaya sutras try to prove his existence on eschatological grounds.  The reasons given in support of the existence of self in the Nyaya sutras are mainly on the ground of the unity of sense-cognitions and the phenomenon of recognition, whereas the

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[Footnote 1:  The only old authority which knows these prama@nas is Caraka.  But he also gives an interpretation of sambhava which is different from Nyaya and calls arthapatti arthaprapti (Caraka III. viii.).]

[Footnote 2:  The details of this example are taken from Vatsyayana’s commentary.]

[Footnote 3:  The Nyaya sutra no doubt incidentally gives a definition of jati as “samanaprasavatmika jati@h” (II. ii. 71).]