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[Footnote 1:  Like Vais’e@sika, Caraka does not know the threefold division of inference (anumana) as purvavat, s’e@savat and samanyatod@r@s@ta.]

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further allusion elsewhere.  The Vais’e@sika sutras as we have already seen had argued only against the Mima@msa, and ultimately agreed with them on most points.  The dispute with Mima@msa in the Nyaya sutras is the same as in the Vais’e@sika over the question of the doctrine of the eternality of sound.  The question of the self-validity of knowledge (svata@h prama@nyavada)and the akhyati doctrine of illusion of the Mima@msists, which form the two chief points of discussion between later Mima@msa and later Nyaya, are never alluded to in the Nyaya sutras.  The advocacy of Yoga methods (Nyaya sutras, IV.ii.38-42 and 46) seems also to be an alien element; these are not found in Vais’e@sika and are not in keeping with the general tendency of the Nyaya sutras, and the Japanese tradition that Mirok added them later on as Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprasada S’astri has pointed out [Footnote ref l] is not improbable.

The Vais’e@sika sutras, III.i.18 and III.ii.1, describe perceptional knowledge as produced by the close proximity of the self (atman), the senses and the objects of sense, and they also adhere to the doctrine, that colour can only be perceived under special conditions of sa@mskara (conglomeration etc.).  The reason for inferring the existence of manas from the non-simultaneity (ayaugapadya) of knowledge and efforts is almost the same with Vais’e@sika as with Nyaya.  The Nyaya sutras give a more technical definition of perception, but do not bring in the questions of sa@mskara or udbhutarupavattva which Vais’e@sika does.  On the question of inference Nyaya gives three classifications as purvavat, s’e@savat and samanyatod@r@s@ta, but no definition.  The Vais’e@sika sutras do not know of these classifications, and give only particular types or instances of inference (V.S.  III. i. 7-17, IX. ii. 1-2, 4-5).  Inference is said to be made when a thing is in contact with another, or when it is in a relation of inherence in it, or when it inheres in a third thing; one kind of effect may lead to the inference of another kind of effect, and so on.  These are but mere collections of specific instances of inference without reaching a general theory.  The doctrine of vyapti (concomitance of hetu (reason) and sadhya (probandum)) which became so important in later Nyaya has never been properly formulated either in the Nyaya sutras or in the Vais’e@sika. Vais’e@sika sutra, III. i. 24, no doubt assumes the knowledge of concomitance between hetu and sadhya (prasiddhipurvakatvat apades’asya),

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[Footnote 1:  J.A.S.B. 1905.]