fashion, and only by meeting obstacles are driven to the concentration necessary to attain the ends.  He illustrates this by the case of the intellectual faculty seeking to satisfy the desire of knowledge, and not succeeding until it concentrates on a single point its scattered energies.  This spontaneous concentration is the first manifestation of Will, but is proved to be not natural from the feeling of constraint always experienced, and the glad rebound, after effort, to tho indeterminate condition.  One fact, too, remains even after every thing possible has been done, viz., that the satisfaction of the primitive tendencies is never quite complete.

When, however, such satisfaction as may be, has been attained, there arises pleasure; and pain, when our faculties fail to attain the good or end they sought.  There could be action, successful and unsuccessful, and so good and evil, without any sensibility, wherefore good and evil are not to be confounded with pain and pleasure; but constituted as we are, there is a sensible echo that varies according as the result of action is attained or not.  Pleasure is, then, the consequence, and, as it were, the sign of the realization of good, and pain of its privation.

He next distinguishes Secondary passions from the great primary tendencies and passions.  These arise apropos of external objects, as they are found to further or oppose the satisfaction of the fundamental tendencies.  Such objects are then called useful or pernicious.  Finally, he completes his account of the infantile or primitive condition of man, by remarking that some of our natural tendencies, like Sympathy, are entirely disinterested in seeking the good of others.  The main feature of the whole primitive state is the exclusive domination of passion.  The will already exists, but there is no liberty; the present passion triumphs over the future, the stronger over the weaker.

He now passes to consider the double transformation of this original state, that takes place when reason appears.  Reason is the faculty of comprehending, which is different from knowing, and is peculiar to man.  As soon as it awakes in man, it comprehends, and penetrates to the meaning of, the whole spectacle of human activity.  It first forms the general idea of Good as the resultant of the satisfaction of all the primary tendencies, and as the true End of man.  Then, comprehending the actual situation of man, it resolves this idea into the idea of the greatest possible good.  All that conduces to the attainment of this good, it includes under the general idea of the Useful; and finally, it constructs the general idea of Happiness out of all that is common to the agreeable sensations that follow upon the satisfaction of the primary tendencies.