and absolute justice.  Here follows the usual distinction of positive and natural law.  The sanction of law is punishment; the right of punishing, as was seen, depending on the idea of demerit.  Punishment is not mere vengeance, but the expiation by the criminal of violated justice; it is to be measured therefore chiefly by the demerit and not by the injury only.  Whether, in punishing, allowance should be made for correction and amelioration, is to put the same case over again of charity coming in after justice.

Here the philosopher stops on the threshold of the special science of politics.  But already the fixed and invariable principles of society and government have been given, and, even in the relative sphere of politics, the rule still holds that all forms and institutions are to be moulded as far as possible on the eternal principles supplied by philosophy.  The following is a summary of Cousin’s views:—­

I.—­The Standard is the judgment of good or evil in actions.  Cousin holds that good and evil are qualities of actions independent of our judgment, and having a sort of objective existence.

II.—­The Moral Faculty he analyzes into four judgments:  (1) good and evil; (2) obligation; (3) freedom of the will; and (4) merit and demerit.  The moral sentiment is the emotions connected with those judgments, and chiefly the feeling connected with the idea of merit. [This analysis is obviously redundant.  ‘Good’ and ‘evil’ apply to many things outside ethics, and to be at all appropriate, they must be qualified as moral (i.e., obligatory) good and evil.  The connexion between obligation and demerit has been previously explained.]

III.—­In regard to the Summum Bonum, Cousin considers that virtue must bring happiness here or hereafter, and vice, misery.

IV.—­He accepts the criterion of duties set forth by Kant.  He argues for the existence of duties towards ourselves.

V. and VI. require no remark.

THEODORE SIMON JOUFFROY. [1796-1842.]

In the Second Lecture of his unfinished Cours de Droit Naturel, Jouffroy gives a condensed exposition of the Moral Facts of human nature from his own point of view.

What distinguishes, he says, one being from another, is its Organization; and as having a special nature, every creature has a special end.  Its end or destination is its good, or its good consists in the accomplishment of its end.  Further, to have an end implies the possession of faculties wherewith to attain it; and all this is applicable also to man.  In man, as in other creatures, from the very first, his nature tends to its end, by means of purely instinctive movements, which may be called primitive and instinctive tendencies of human nature; later they are called passions.  Along with these tendencies, and under their influence, the intellectual faculties also awake and seek to procure for them satisfaction.  The faculties work, however, at first, in an indeterminate