The sublime self-assertion, addressed by Prometheus to Zeus, under whose sentence he was groaning, has never before been put into such plain English.[7] Mr Mill’s declaration reminds us also of Hippolytus, the chaste and pure youth, whose tragic fate is so beautifully described by Euripides.  Hippolytus is exemplary in his devotions to the Goddess Artemis; but he dissents from all his countrymen, and determines for himself, in refusing to bestow the smallest mark of honour or worship upon Aphrodite, because he considers her to be a very bad Goddess.[8] In this refusal he persists with inflexible principle (even after having received, from an anxious attendant, warning of the certain ruin which it will bring upon him), until the insulted Aphrodite involves him, along with the unhappy Phaedra and Theseus himself, in one common abyss of misery.  In like manner Mr Mill’s declaration stands in marked contrast with the more cautious proceeding of men like Herodotus.  That historian, alike pious and prudent, is quite aware that all the Gods are envious and mischief-making, and expressly declares them to be so.[9] Yet, far from refusing to worship them on that account, he is assiduous in prayer and sacrifice—­perhaps, indeed, all the more assiduous in consequence of what he believes about their attributes;[10] being persuaded (like the attendant who warned Hippolytus) that his only chance of mollifying their ungentle dispositions in regard to himself is, by honorific tribute in words and offerings.

When, however, after appreciating as we are bound to do Mr Mill’s declaration of subjective sentiment, we pass to its logical bearing on the controversy between him and Mr Mansel, we are obliged to confess that in this point of view it has little objective relevancy.  The problem was, how to reconcile the actual evil and suffering in the universe (which is recited as a fact by Mr Mansel, though in terms conveying a most inadequate idea of its real magnitude) with the goodness of God.  Mr Mill repudiates the explanatory hypothesis tendered by Mr Mansel, as a solution, but without suggesting any better hypothesis of his own.  For ourselves, we are far from endorsing Mr Mansel’s solution as satisfactory; yet we can hardly be surprised if he considers it less unsatisfactory than no solution at all.  And when we reflect how frequently and familiarly predicates applicable to man are applied to the Supreme Being, when they cannot possibly be understood about Him in the same sense—­we see no ground for treating the proceeding as disingenuous, which Mr Mill is disposed to do.  Indeed, it cannot easily be avoided:  and Mr Mill himself furnishes us with some examples in the present volume.  At page 491, he says:—­

     ’It would be difficult to find a stronger argument in favour
     of Theism, than that the eye must have been made by one who
     sees, and the ear by one who hears.’

In the words here employed, seeing and hearing are predicted of God.