Ib. p. 203.

And as to know his works and actions, is not yet rightly to know the Gospel, (for thereby we know not as yet that he hath overcome sin death and the Devil); even so likewise, it is not as yet to know the Gospel, when we know such doctrine and commandments, but when the voice soundeth, which saith, Christ is thine own with life, with doctrine, with works, death, resurrection, and with all that he hath, doth and may do.

Most true.

Ib. p. 205.

  The ancient Fathers said:  ’Distingue tempora et concordabis
  Scripturas’; distinguish the times; then may we easily reconcile the
  Scriptures together.

Yea! and not only so, but we shall reconcile truths, that seem to repeal this or that passage of Scripture, with the Scriptures.  For Christ is with his Church even to the end.

Ib.

  I verily believe, (said Luther) it (the abolition of the Law) vexed to
  the heart the beloved St. Paul himself before his conversion.

How dearly Martin Luther loved St. Paul!  How dearly would St. Paul have loved Martin Luther!  And how impossible, that either should not have done so!

Ib.

  In this case, touching the distinguishing the Law from the Gospel, we
  must utterly expel all human and natural wisdom, reason, and
  understanding.

All reason is above nature.  Therefore by reason in Luther, or rather in his translator, you must understand the reasoning faculty:—­that is, the logical intellect, or the intellectual understanding.  For the understanding is in all respects a medial and mediate faculty, and has therefore two extremities or poles, the sensual, in which form it is St. Paul’s [Greek:  phronaema sarkos]; and the intellectual pole, or the hemisphere (as it were) turned towards the reason.  Now the reason (’lux idealis seu spiritualis’) shines down into the understanding, which recognizes the light, ’id est, lumen a luce spirituali quasi alienigenum aliquid’, which it can only comprehend or describe to itself by attributes opposite to its own essential properties.  Now these latter being contingency, and (for though the immediate objects of the understanding are ‘genera et species’, still they are particular ’genera et species’) particularity, it distinguishes the formal light (’lumen’) (not the substantial light, ‘lux’) of reason by the attributes of the necessary and the universal; and by irradiation of this ‘lumen’ or ‘shine’ the understanding becomes a conclusive or logical faculty.  As such it is [Greek:  Logos anthropinos].

Ib. 206.