Ib.
He (said Luther), that will dispute with the Devil, &c.
Queries.
I. Abstractedly from, and independently of, all sensible
substances, and
the bodies, wills, faculties,
and affections of men, has the Devil,
or would the Devil have, a
personal self-subsistence? Does he, or
can he, exist as a conscious
individual agent or person? Should the
answer to this query be in
the negative: then—
II. Do there exist finite and personal beings,
whether with composite
and decomponible bodies, that
is, embodied, or with simple and
indecomponible bodies, (which
is all that can be meant by
disembodied as applied to
finite creatures), so eminently wicked, or
wicked and mischievous in
so peculiar a kind, as to constitute a
distinct ‘genus’
of beings under the name of devils?
III. Is this second ‘hypothesis’
compatible with the acts and functions
attributed to the Devil in
Scripture? O! to have had these three
questions put by Melancthon
to Luther, and to have heard his reply!
Ib. p. 200.
If (said Luther) God should give unto us a strong and an unwavering faith, then we should he proud, yea also, we should at last contemn Him. Again, if he should give us the right knowledge of the law, then we should be dismayed and fainthearted, we should not know which way to wind ourselves.
The main reason is, because in this instance, the change in the relation constitutes the difference of the things. A. considered as acting ’ab extra’ on the selfish fears and desires of men is the Law: the same A: acting ‘ab intra’ as a new nature infused by grace, as the mind of Christ prompting to all obedience, is the Gospel. Yet what Luther says is likewise very true. Could we reduce the great spiritual truths or ideas of our faith to comprehensible conceptions, or (for the thing itself is impossible) fancy we had done so, we should inevitably be ‘proud vain asses.’


