But, by none of their arts of subtle distinction, my lords, have they been able to evade the argument which arises from the conformity of this bill to the common practice of our courts; an argument, which has produced no other answer than loud declamations; against the indecency of comparing with pickpockets and highwaymen, a noble person, a minister of acknowledged merit, long graced with the favour of his sovereign, and long invested with the highest trust.

I, my lords, am very far from pleasing myself with licentious or indecent language; I am far from envying any man that exaltation which he obtains either by good or by bad actions; and have no inclination of levelling the person, whose conduct I desire to see examined, with the profligate or infamous.  Yet I cannot forbear to observe, that high rank is an aggravation of villany; that to have enjoyed the favour of his sovereign, is no defence of him that has abused it; and that high trust is an honour only to that man, who, when he lays down his office, dares stand an inquiry.

Had there been no precedent in our judicial proceedings, my lords, which bore any resemblance to this bill, there would not from thence have arisen any just objection.  Common proceedings are established for common occasions; and it seems to have been the principle of our ancestors, that it is better to give ten guilty persons an opportunity of escaping justice, than to punish one innocent person by an unjust sentence.  A principle which, perhaps, might not be erroneous in common cases, in which only one individual was injured by another, or when the trial was, by the law, committed to a common jury, who might easily be misled.

They might likewise imagine, my lords, that a criminal, encouraged by a fortunate escape to a repetition of his guilt, would undoubtedly some time fall into the hands of the law, though not extended on purpose to seize him; and, therefore, they constituted their proceedings in such a manner, that innocence might at least not be entrapped, though guilt should sometimes gain a reprieve.

But in the present case, my lords, every circumstance requires a different conduct.  By the crimes which this bill is intended to detect, not single persons, or private families, but whole nations, and all orders of men have long been injured and oppressed; and oppressed with such success, that the criminal has no temptation to renew his practices; nor is there any danger of an erroneous sentence, because the trial will be heard by this house, by persons whose integrity sets them above corruption, and whose wisdom will not be deceived by false appearances.

This consideration, my lords, affords an unanswerable reply to those who represent the bill as ill-concerted, because the evidence to be procured by it, is the testimony of men, partners, by their own confession, in the crimes which they reveal.

Every court, my lords, examines the credibility of a witness; and the known corruption of these men may be properly pleaded at the trial, where your lordships will balance every circumstance with your known impartiality, and examine how far every assertion is invalidated by the character of the witness, and how far it is confirmed by a corroboratory concurrence of known events, or supported by other testimonies not liable to the same exception.