It cannot, at least, be denied, that your lordships have all the power of your ancestors; and since every law was once new, it is certain they were far from imagining that there was always a necessity of inquiring after precedents.  If the argument drawn from the want of precedents be now of any force, let it be proved that its force was less in any former reign; and let it be considered how our government could have attained its present excellence, had this house, instead of applying to every grievance its proper remedy, been amused with turning over journals, and looking upon every new emergence for precedents, of which it is certain that there must have been a time in which they were not to be found.

In all regulations established by the legislature, it is sufficient that they do not produce confusion by being inconsistent with former laws, that they unite easily with our constitution, and do not tend to the embarrassment of the machine of government.  This consideration, my lords, has been in a very remarkable manner regarded by those who drew up the bill before us; a bill of which the noble duke has proved, that it will be so far from perplexing our judicial proceedings, that it will reconcile the law to itself, and free us from the necessity of obeying one precept by the neglect of another.

The arguments of the noble duke are such as, in my opinion, cannot be answered, or heard impartially without conviction.  The maxims quoted by him are each of them incontestably true; they are, on this occasion, incompatible; and this is the only method by which they can be reconciled.

Nor has he only shown the propriety of the bill by irrefragable reasons, but has proved, likewise, that it is consistent, not only with the constitution of our government, but with the practice of our ancestors; he has shown, that it may be supported not only by reason, but by bills of the same kind, enacted on occasions of far less importance.

He has proved, my lords, all that the most scrupulous inquirer can wish; he has made it evident, that the bill would be proper, though it were unprecedented; he has produced many precedents in support of it, and has thereby evinced, that the only present question is, whether it is just?  To the precedents alleged by him, it has been objected, that they differ in some particulars.  But when, my lords, did any two actions, however common, agree in every circumstance?  Relations may be complicated without end, and every new complication produces new appearances, which, however, are always to be disregarded, while the constituent principles remain unvaried.

If we consider the difficulties in which the opponents of the bill have involved themselves, it will not be easy to think well of a cause, which gives birth to such wild assertions, and extravagant opinions.  They have first, by requiring precedents, determined, that our constitution must be henceforward for ever at a stand; and then, by declaring that no precedents are of any weight, in which every circumstance is not parallel to the case in debate, have debarred us from the repetition of any occasional law; they have declared, almost in plain terms, themselves useless, and destroyed that authority at once, which they seem so much afraid of communicating to the commons.