method could be devised by such a minister himself, to do the job more excellent than this?  For who can doubt that (guard it how you will) the queen of Hungary might be induced, in the condition in which she now stands, to accept a million, and to give a receipt in full for the whole sum?  How could you prevent an understanding of this kind between two courts? and how easy, therefore, might it be to sink 500,000 l. out of so vast a grant?  Sir, I will suspect no minister, but I will trust none in this degree; and I wonder other gentlemen do not suspect, if I do not.  From hence, therefore, I consider this as a proposition both fallacious and unsafe; for though it be a fact, that the same sum of money might maintain in Austria double the number of troops; yet, if no more than half that money should be applied (as I have shown great reason to believe that it would not) to the uses of the war, it is evident that you would deceive yourselves, and would have but an equal number of raw, irregular, undisciplined, and much worse troops for it.

But, sir, there is yet a stronger argument against the supply in money only.  What are our views in supporting the queen of Hungary?  Our views are general and particular; general, to save the house of Austria, and to preserve a balance of power; particular, to prevent the French from making any farther acquisitions on this side of Flanders.  The first might possibly be answered in a good degree, by giving that princess an equivalent in money; but the second cannot be securely provided against, without an army on this side of Europe in the British pay.  Sir, is it not natural for every one of us to guard our vital parts, rather than our more remote members?  Would not the queen of Hungary (stipulate and condition with her as you please) apply the greatest part of these subsidies in defence of her dominions in the heart of Germany?  Might it not even induce her to enlarge her views, and to think of conquests and equivalents for what she has already lost, which it might be vain and ruinous for us to support her in?  Would she not leave Flanders to shift for itself, or still to be taken care of by the Dutch and Britain?  In such a case, if France should find it no longer possible to make any impression on her territories on the German side, what must we expect to be the consequence?  I think it very visible she would on a sudden quit her expensive and destructive projects on that quarter, and there only carry on a defensive war, while she fell with the greater part of her force at once upon the Low Countries, which would by this measure be wholly unprovided; and she might there acquire in one campaign, before any possibility of making head against her, (which the Dutch would hardly attempt, and could certainly not alone be able to effect,) all that she has been endeavouring for the last century to obtain, and what no union of powers could be ever capable of regaining from her.  All this will be effectually prevented