These reasons, sir, prove invincibly to me, that if we are to assist the house of Austria by an army, we must, of prudence, nay, of necessity, in part, compose that army of the Hanoverian troops.
But yet there is another state of this question, an alternative of which some gentlemen seem very fond, whether it would not be better to assist the queen of Hungary with money only?
This opinion at first sight is extremely plausible; if the queen of Hungary has been able to do so much with an aid of 500,000 l. what might she not be able to do with a million more? Sir, a million more would by no means answer in the same proportion. When a sum is given her, which with the best economy can suffice barely to put her troops in motion, when the enemy is at her very gates, her all at an immediate stake, there can be no room for a misapplication of it. But a sum so immense as that of a million and a half, would dazzle the eyes of a court so little used to see such sums; and as an honourable gentleman, [Mr. Horace WALPOLE,] long versed in foreign affairs, and well acquainted with these matters, told you in a former debate, would be much of it squandered among the Austrian ministers and favourites. I make no scruple to add to this, that some small part might fall to the share of ministers elsewhere. But there is another danger which gentlemen who contend for this measure do not consider: can they who profess a distrust of all ministers, and particularly those who are now employed at home; they who have ever argued against all votes of credit, upon this principle, that it affords an opportunity to ministers of defrauding the service, and of putting large sums into the purse of the crown, or into their private pockets; can they now argue for this measure, which I may be bold to say, would be in effect the most enormous vote of credit that was ever given in the world? Gentlemen insinuate, that the taking the Hanoverian forces into British pay, is a criminal complaisance, calculated only to confirm an infant and a tottering administration. But how much greater means for such a purpose, would an alternative like this afford? Suppose a minister, unfirm in his new-acquired power, to ingratiate himself with his prince, should propose a scheme to replenish the coffers of an exhausted civil list, squandered in such vile purposes, that no man could have the hardiness to come to parliament, or dare to hope a supply for it by any regular application to this house? What


