Propositional Attitudes: Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology - Research Article from Macmillan Science Library: Plant Sciences

This encyclopedia article consists of approximately 19 pages of information about Propositional Attitudes: Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology.

Propositional Attitudes: Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology - Research Article from Macmillan Science Library: Plant Sciences

This encyclopedia article consists of approximately 19 pages of information about Propositional Attitudes: Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology.
This section contains 5,403 words
(approx. 19 pages at 300 words per page)
Buy the Propositional Attitudes: Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology Encyclopedia Article

This entry aims to characterize the philosophical issues surrounding the propositional attitudes. Particular attention is paid to the arguments philosophers have brought to bear when discussing the existence and nature of the attitudes.

Subject Matter and Philosophical Methodology

Discussions of the nature of mind typically distinguish between two fundamental kinds of mental states or properties. One kind of mental state or property involves states that are qualitative in nature: Examples include raw feels, sensations, tickles, and pains. The other kind of mental state or property involves states that are contentful in nature, "pointing to" or "representing" things beyond themselves: Examples include thoughts, desires, fears, and intentions. This distinction is not unproblematic, since it is not clear whether these two categories exhaust the domain of the mental, nor is it clear...

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This section contains 5,403 words
(approx. 19 pages at 300 words per page)
Buy the Propositional Attitudes: Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Psychology Encyclopedia Article
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