Metaphysics, Nature Of
Almost everything in metaphysics is controversial, and it is therefore not surprising that there is little agreement among those who call themselves metaphysicians about what precisely it is that they are attempting. In beginning a discussion of the nature and validation of metaphysical arguments and theories, the best course we can follow is to list some of the standing preoccupations and ambitions of metaphysicians. For this purpose we need to make the assumption that there is a distinct class of metaphysical philosophers, a class into which such thinkers as Plato, Thomas Aquinas, René Descartes, Benedict de Spinoza, and G. W. F. Hegel would fall and from which purely critical or analytic philosophers like the later G. E. Moore would be excluded. It has to be admitted, however, that the line between metaphysical and nonmetaphysical philosophy is exceedingly hard to draw, for many metaphysicians from Plato on have been expert in the supposedly nonmetaphysical pursuit of analyzing or clarifying ideas, while few self-styled analysts have contrived to stick to pure analysis without the open or covert advocacy of a metaphysical point of view.
Setting these difficulties aside, we may note three main features of metaphysics as traditionally practiced.
