Macarthur, Douglas

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(b. January 26, 1880; d. April 5, 1964) Commander of American forces in the Pacific during World War II, oversaw rebuilding of Japan, and led U.N. forces in Korean War.

Born in Little Rock, Arkansas, Douglas MacArthur, son of Arthur MacArthur (a Civil War hero), graduated from West Point in 1903, fought in World War I, and commanded American forces in the Pacific during World War II. As Supreme Allied Powers Commander in Japan from 1945 to 1950, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur remade that country. An Olympian figure, he forced the Japanese to accept such fundamental reforms as democratization, reduction of the emperor to a ceremonial role, and renunciation of force in international affairs (except in self-defense). MacArthur thus oversaw one of the most successful military transformations of an occupied country in history.

MacArthur's authority extended to the U.S. occupation of Korea south of the 38th parallel. On August 15, 1948, he proclaimed in Seoul the Republic of Korea (ROK) with Syngman Rhee as president. Despite the growing power and belligerence of the communist North Korean regime, MacArthur kept a tight leash on the ROK army and publicly hinted that South Korea was of only peripheral interest to the United States. He also allowed his occupation troops in Japan to lose their combat edge.

Thus, when North Korean forces struck south on June 25, 1950, they initially found easy going. After some hesitation, MacArthur ordered, without authorization from Washington, U.S. Air Force strikes at North Korean airfields. In a sharp reversal of his earlier stance, he recommended that the Truman administration commit U.S. ground troops under the aegis of the United Nations. Truman named MacArthur commander of the U.S. and U.N. forces.

Despite dispiriting defeats early in the conflict, MacArthur husbanded reinforcements for an amphibious landing at Inchon well behind enemy lines. Considering the severe natural obstacles, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed serious reservations, but MacArthur, in a masterful display of showmanship, sold his plan by arguing that the difficulties would make the surprise all the greater.

Operation Chromite proved to be a remarkable success, although MacArthur's determination to regain Seoul at the earliest opportunity cost him the chance to cut off the North Korean army now fleeing homeward.

MacArthur compounded this mistake by driving across the 38th parallel. He assured President Harry S. Truman at Wake Island on October 15 that Mao Tse-tung's China would not intervene and predicted an end to the war by Christmas.

His extemporized offensive proved ill-cast. Two widely separated columns moved up the east and west coasts after the fleeing North Korean troops. MacArthur ignored intelligence reports of a Chinese buildup and directly countermanded President Truman's orders that only South Korean troops approach the Yalu River border between North Korea and communist China. So sure was MacArthur of an early victory that he failed to requisition winter clothing for his men.

Once Beijing intervened, MacArthur swung from the heights of optimism to the darkest depression. Proclaiming "an entirely new war," he predicted the "final destruction" of his command unless he received large reinforcements. The Truman administration, fearing that the Korean conflict was part of a larger communist scheme to divert U.S. resources and attention from the more crucial European sphere, refused MacArthur's increasingly shrill pleas and ordered that he clear all public statements. Regardless, MacArthur criticized (to the press) restrictions on his command as "without precedent in military history." Believing broader war with the communist camp inevitable, MacArthur on December 24 secretly submitted a list of twenty-six "retaliation targets" for atomic weapons in China and North Korea.

Six days later, he proposed to Washington a set of much wider measures against communist China, to include its blockade and strikes by naval and air forces against its industry. Essentially endorsing a "Europe First" strategy, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall and the Joint Chiefs of Staff urged the president in the strongest terms not to become involved in a general war with China.

MacArthur then moved to undercut the strategic priorities of his superiors. On March 24, 1951, he publicly offered face-to-face meetings with the enemy commanders, failing which he threatened war against China. Truman calculated that such a course might well lead to war with the Soviet Union. Next, MacArthur issued, through Republican congressman Joseph W. Martin, a clarion call for the defeat of communism in Asia and a condemnation of Truman's policy as appeasement. In his memorable words, "There is no substitute for victory."

Faced with such rank insubordination, Truman, with the unanimous backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of Secretary Marshall, decided to relieve MacArthur, effective on April 11, 1951. MacArthur returned to a tumultuous public welcome and standing ovations in Congress. A storm of denunciation fell on Truman's head; unquestionably MacArthur's dismissal hurt the Democratic party badly in the 1952 elections. From the longer perspective afforded by history, it was clearly time for MacArthur to go. His fifty-two years of service in uniform could not counterbalance his egotism and sabotage of national policy. The MacArthur-Truman conflict tested the policy of civilian control of the military that George Washington had established by example when he surrendered his command of the Continental Army to Congress in 1783. Despite the political cost of dismissing the popular MacArthur, Truman sustained that policy.

Containment and Détente; Korea, Impact Of; Truman, Harry A.

Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953, revised edition. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983.

James, D. Clayton. The Years of MacArthur, vol. 3. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1985.

Schnabel, James F. Policy and Direction: The First Year. In the series United States Army in the Korean War. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1988.

Stueck, William. The Korean War: An International History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

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