24–34, 48–51, and 68–86, and also the published exchanges between Carnap and Goodman to which reference is made on p. 86). Third, he made advances, explicitly in the form of a discussion of a
theory of projection, toward the solution of some of the problems thus delineated. Where
induction is construed narrowly as inference about future cases on the basis of examined cases,
projection is, by contrast, inference about any unexamined cases on the basis of examined ones. We will consider each of these three aspects of his contribution in turn.
The "Problem of Induction"
Goodman argues that the so-called problem of induction, when it is construed as the problem of justifying induction, is one that may be "dissolved" as soon as we see what is at issue. Moreover, this "dissolution" highlights all the more clearly the bona fide problem that he calls the new riddle of induction. As he sees it the problem is not to justify induction but to be able to distinguish valid from invalid inductions. On Goodman's view the dissolution of the old problem of induction, that is, of the problem of justifying induction, is accomplished when we come to understand that a genetic or descriptive account of our inductive behavior, such as the one that David Hume almost brought ff, furnishes the basis of such a justification.
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