Of course, positions vary dramatically regarding what constitutes treating people impartially. For example, Kantians regard impartiality as treating people as ends in themselves and never merely as means, whereas for Utilitarians it requires neutrality concerning different people's interests when maximizing the good.
Although all plausible moral theories are committed to equality as universality and impartiality, equality as comparability reflects a deeper commitment to equality. Equality as comparability is concerned with how people fare relative to others. This is a distinctive substantive view that rivals nonegalitarian positions such as Utilitarianism and libertarianism.
Another important distinction is between instrumental egalitarianism, according to which equality is valuable only insofar as it promotes some other valuable ideal, and noninstrumental egalitarianism, which holds that equality is sometimes valuable in itself, beyond the extent to which it promotes other ideals. On noninstrumental egalitarianism, any complete account of the moral realm must allow for equality's value.
Many who favor significant redistribution from the wealthy to the poor are instrumental egalitarians; they favor such redistribution only as a way of reducing suffering, aiding the worst off, fostering solidarity, or strengthening democratic institutions. Such reasons are morally significant and compatible with equality as universality and impartiality.
This is a free page. This page contains 190 words. This
article contains 2,274 words (approx. 8 pages at 300
words per page).
Read the rest of this Article with our Equality, Moral and Social [addendum] Access Pass.
