Definition
The problems of definition are constantly recurring in philosophical discussion, although there is a widespread tendency to assume that they have been solved. Practically every book on logic has a section on definition in which rules are set down and exercises prescribed for applying the rules, as if the problems were all settled. And yet, paradoxically, no problems of knowledge are less settled than those of definition, and no subject is more in need of a fresh approach. Definition plays a crucial role in every field of inquiry, yet there are few if any philosophical questions about definition (what sort of thing it is, what standards it should satisfy, what kind of knowledge, if any, it conveys) on which logicians and philosophers agree. In view of the importance of the topic and the scope of the disagreement concerning it, an extensive reexamination is justified. In carrying out this conceptual reexamination, this article will summarize the main views of definition that have been advanced, indicate why none of these views does full justice to its subject, and then attempt to show how the partial insights of each might be combined in a new approach.
All the views of definition that have been proposed can be subsumed under three general types of positions, with, needless to say, many different varieties within each type.
