Consequentialism
As a name for any ethical theory or for the class of ethical theories that evaluate actions by the value of the consequences of the actions, "consequentialism" thus refers to classical utilitarianism and other theories that share this characteristic.
Classical utilitarianism, in the philosophies of Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick, was consequentialist, judging actions right in proportion as they tended to produce happiness, wrong as they tended to produce pain. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries much of the criticism of utilitarianism was directed at the hedonistic value theory on which the ethical theory was founded. Some philosophers, such as G. E. Moore, agreed with the claim of utilitarianism that acts are right insofar as they produce good consequences, wrong as they produce bad consequences, but put forward a richer theory of value, claiming that other things besides pleasure and pain are of intrinsic value and disvalue. Such theories were sometimes labeled ideal utilitarianism. The term consequentialism is now used in a generic sense to include both hedonistic and nonhedonistic theories.
The term was probably introduced into usage by Elizabeth Anscombe in "Modern Moral Philosophy" (1958), an essay in which she claims that there is little difference between strictly consequentialist theories and other moral theories from Sidgwick on that permit forbidden acts to be overridden by consequentialist considerations. For example, W. D. Ross, who was an intuitionist in opposition to utilitarianism, even "ideal" utilitarianism, believed that a prima facie wrong action, such as the deliberately unjust punishment of an innocent person, could be outweighed by some consequentialist consideration such as the national interest. One contrast with consequentialism, then, is absolutism, the claim that there are some actions that are never right, whatever the consequences.
In the most usual usage of consequentialism as a term for ethical theories, however, it is contrasted, not only to absolutism, but to any theory, such as Kantianism, intuitionism, virtue ethics, rights theories, and so on, that does not in some way make consequences the determinant of right and wrong. The consequences may be considered indirectly. Distinctions have been made between act utilitarianism, which judges acts right or wrong according to the consequences of the particular act, case by case, rule utilitarianism, which judges acts right or wrong according to whether the acts are in accord with or in violation of a useful rule—that is, a rule whose general practice would have good consequences (or better consequences than any feasible alternative rule)—and motive utilitarianism, which judges acts right or wrong if stemming from a motive that, as a motive for action, generally has good consequences. These distinctions carry over to consequentialism as a generic category of ethical theories, and one can speak of act consequentialism, rule consequentialism, and so on. Consequentialist theories can also have a place for virtues and for rights, if the inculcation of certain virtues or the respect for certain rights has good consequences. But for the consequentialist the virtues or rights are not ultimate. Their value is dependent upon their contribution to good consequences.
Abstracting from the alternative theories of value, there are still important controversies regarding consequentialist theories. Some are problems of measuring consequences or making interpersonal comparisons, whatever the theory of value, but these cannot be addressed in the abstract. Another is the theory of responsibility. One prominent criticism of consequentialism, stated, for example, by Bernard Williams (1973), is that it does not adequately distinguish between positive and negative responsibility. The claim is that consequentialism is indifferent between states of affairs that are produced by what an agent does and those that occur because of what someone else would do that the agent could prevent. It becomes an agent's responsibility to prevent someone else from doing harm as well as not to do harm oneself. Related to this is the claim that consequentialism undermines agent integrity. For example, someone opposed to research in chemical and biological warfare might be required to engage in such research to prevent someone else from doing it more zealously. Another criticism is that if it is formulated as a "maximizing" theory, requiring the maximization of best consequences, consequentialism goes beyond the limits of obligation. For example, one would be morally obligated to spend one's wealth and income on others as long as there is anyone who could benefit more than oneself.
There are four basic kinds of responses that the consequentialist can make to these criticisms. One is to stick to the theory, saying that these things are morally demanded, even if not generally recognized in our selfish and self-centered society, as Peter Singer (1971–1972) argues concerning famine relief. Another is to challenge the implications of the examples, claiming that for moral agents to focus energy and attention on their own lives with integrity to their own principles has better consequences than doing otherwise. A third strategy for a nonhedonist is to attempt to avoid some of these objections by enriching the theory of value, such as to claim that integrity is something that is intrinsically valuable. A fourth strategy is to modify the structure of the theory. Michael Slote (1984) has argued in favor of a "satisficing" rather than a maximizing theory. Samuel Scheffler (1982) has proposed a "hybrid" theory that permits an agent either to maximize best consequences or to pursue the "agent-centered prerogative" of not always doing so.
Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret; Bentham, Jeremy; Deontological Ethics; Hedonism; Metaethics; Mill, John Stuart; Moore, George Edward; Rights; Ross, William David; Sidgwick, Henry; Utilitarianism; Virtue Ethics.
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