Bay of Pigs Invasion

President John F. Kennedy's sanctioning of the Bay of Pigs operation had a significant impact on contemporary popular perceptions of his administration. For the majority, Kennedy's actions proved that he was willing to actively confront the perceived "communist threat" in Central and South America. However, his action also disillusioned student radicals who had supported Kennedy during his election campaign and accelerated the politicization of student protest in the United States.

In the early hours of April 17, 1961, a force consisting of 1400 Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, in an attempt to overthrow the revolutionary government headed by Fidel Castro. From the beginning, this "invasion" was marred by poor planning and poor execution. The force, which had been secretly trained and armed in Guatemala by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was too large to engage in effective covert operations, yet too small to realistically challenge Castro in a military confrontation without additional support from the United States. Most significantly, the popular uprising upon which the invasion plan had been predicated did not occur. After three days of fighting, the insurgent force, which was running short of ammunition and other supplies, had been effectively subdued by Castro's forces. In a futile effort to avoid capture, the insurgents dispersed into the Zapata swamp and along the coast. Cuban forces quickly rounded up 1,189 prisoners, while a few escaped to waiting U.S. ships; 114 were killed.

Although the Bay of Pigs operation had initially been intended to be carried out in a manner that would allow America to deny involvement, it was readily apparent that the United States government was largely responsible for the invasion. Months before the Bay of Pigs operation commenced, American newspapers ran stories which revealed the supposedly covert training operations both in Miami and Guatemala. Consequently, when the invasion began, the official cover story that it was a spontaneous insurrection led by defecting Cuban forces was quickly discredited. Revelations concerning the United States' role in the attack served to weaken its stature in Latin America and significantly undermined its foreign policy position. After the collapse of the operation, a New York Times columnist commented that the invasion made the United States look like "fools to our friends, rascals to our enemies, and incompetents to the rest." However, domestic political protest was allayed by President John F. Kennedy who, although he had been in office for less than one hundred days, assumed full responsibility for the fiasco. According to Kennedy biographer Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy's decisive action avoided uncontrolled leaks and eliminated the possibility of partisan investigations.

The operation which resulted in the Bay of Pigs disaster had initially been conceived in January 1960 under the Eisenhower Administration. Originally, this operation was envisioned as constituting the covert landing of a small, highly-trained force that would engage in guerrilla activities in order to facilitate a popular uprising. Over the ensuing fifteen months, the CIA systematically increased the scale of the proposed operation. According to both Sorensen and biographer Arthur M. Schlesinger, Kennedy, upon assuming office, had little choice but to approve the continuance of the operation. Its importance had been stressed by former president Dwight D. Eisenhower, it was supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by influential advisors such as John Foster Dulles. Further, as noted historian John L. Gaddis argued in Now We Know: Rethinking Cold War History (1997), Kennedy believed that "underlying historical forces gave Marxism-Leninism the advantage in the 'third world"' and viewed Cuba as a clear example of the threat that Communism posed in Latin America. As a result, Kennedy was predisposed to take action against Castro. Unfortunately, due to inaccurate and ineffective communication between planning and operational personnel, the significant changes that had been instituted within the operation were not sufficiently emphasized to Kennedy. Consequently, according to Sorensen, Kennedy "had in fact approved a plan bearing little resemblance to what he thought he had approved." Leaders of the Cuban exiles were given the impression that they would receive direct military support once they had established a beach head, and an underlying assumption of CIA planning was that the United States would inevitably intervene. However, Kennedy steadfastly refused to sanction overt military involvement.

The impact of the Bay of Pigs invasion on American public opinion was sharply divided. According to Thomas C. Reeves, Kennedy's public support of and sympathy for the Cuban exiles rallied the public in support of their "firm, courageous, self-critical, and compassionate chief executive." A poll conducted in early May indicated sixty-five percent support for Kennedy and his actions. Conversely, the Bay of Pigs invasion also served to spark student protests. Initially, students had been enchanted by Kennedy's vision of a transformed American society and by the idealism embodied by programs such as the Peace Corps. However, students, particularly those within the New Left, were disillusioned by Kennedy's involvement with the invasion. On the day of the landings, 1,000 students held a protest rally at Berkeley, and on April 22, 2,000 students demonstrated in San Francisco's Union Square. This disillusionment spawned a distrust of the Kennedy Administration and undoubtedly accelerated the political divisions that developed within American society during the 1960s.

Internationally, the Bay of Pigs invasion provided Castro with evidence of what he characterized as American imperialism, and this enabled him to consolidate his position within Cuba. Ultimately, the invasion drove Castro toward a closer alliance with the Soviet Unionand significantly increased both regional and global political tensions. The failure of the invasion also convinced Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev that Kennedy was weak and indecisive. This impression undoubtedly contributed to Khrushchev's decision to place nuclear missiles in Cuba and to the confrontation that developed during the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). However, sympathetic biographers have argued that "failure in Cuba in 1961 contributed to success in Cuba in 1962," because the experience forced Kennedy to break with his military advisors and, consequently, enabled him to avoid a military clash with the Soviet Union.

Bates, Stephen, and Joshua L. Rosenbloom. Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs. Boston, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1983.

Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997.

Higgins, Trumbull. The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs. New York, W.W. Norton, 1987.

Lader, Lawrence. Power on the Left: American Radical Movements Since 1946. New York, W.W. Norton, 1979.

Reeves, Thomas C. A Question of Character: A Life of John F. Kennedy. Rocklin, California, Prima Publishing, 1992.

Schlesinger, Arthur M. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1965.

Sorensen, Theodore C. Kennedy. New York, Harper & Row, 1965.

Vickers, George R. The Formation of the New Left: The Early Years. Lexington, Lexington Books, 1975.

Wyden, Petre. Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story. London, Jonathan Cape, 1979.

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