At the time that Ibn Rushd was working, the philosophical curriculum was largely Neoplatonic, and this is because the Greek tradition of philosophy was transmitted to the Islamic world via the Neoplatonic tradition. But some thinkers like Ibn Rushd were perceptive enough to realize that there were discrepancies between Aristotle—very much his hero—and the Neoplatonists, who were represented at the time by the thought of Ibn Sīnā. In his defense of philosophy in the Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, for instance, Ibn Rushd not only seeks to refute al-Ghazālī's attack on philosophy, but he also tries to argue with Ibn Sīnā's particular Neoplatonic philosophy. In fact, he manages to link al-Ghazālī, the critic of philosophy, with Ibn Sīnā, its main representative. Al-Ghazālī argues that causality is nothing more than the way in which people interpret God's bringing things into existence, and therefore they should not think of causal connections as being necessary. Ibn Sīnā does identify necessity and causality, but also, for him, something has to actualize essences. Ibn Rushd criticizes both of these views; he argued that existence is linked with essence—that is, what is meant by cotton is something that bursts into flames when it is touched by fire (other things being equal). The properties of cotton are not just an incidental feature of the cotton; they are an essential aspect of it.
The views of Ibn Rushd came to have a radicalizing influence on European thought when they were translated into Hebrew and Latin. They were often taken to imply that philosophical and religious truths could be in opposition to each other, and yet still both be true. This is not what Ibn Rushd himself argued; he was too good of a thinker to believe that contradictory propositions could both be true. However, he did argue that there are different routes to the truth—routes that are appropriate to different audiences. For those capable of understanding rigorous logical arguments there is philosophy, and for those disinclined or unable to appreciate such arguments there are argument forms of lesser rigor. Ibn Rushd sees the syllogism as being the basis of all uses of language. Thus while the philosopher employs the demonstrative syllogism, the politician will use rhetoric and sophistry, the prophet sometimes uses poetry, and the theologian dialectic. All of these are reasoning processes, but only demonstration—according to Ibn Rushd—reaches the highest standards of reason.
That does not mean, however, that there is anything wrong with the other methods of reasoning; they simply are not so secure as demonstration. The other methods may, nonetheless, be able to express what philosophers can discover through demonstration in ways that are accessible to more people. Because God made everyone different, Ibn Rushd believes it is appropriate that God make everyone capable of understanding some method of argument—although not everyone should be expected to employ the same method.
It is worth pointing to the radical nature of this doctrine. For one thing, Ibn Rushd's doctrine suggests that the philosophers as a group are the best able to understand the language of any text, even difficult scriptural passages. After all, philosophers can operate at the level of demonstration and so are skilled in working with the highest levels of reason. The theologians and lawyers are only used to dialectic, in which they start with propositions that are generally accepted as true, but might not be. Ibn Rushd disparages their efforts as compared with those of the philosophers. Ordinary people are in an even worse position. On the one hand they have to rely on language and on arguments that rely on imagery and persuasion, and thus they are a long way from demonstrative rigor. On the other hand, what they believe is perfectly valid because there is a demonstrative proof for it, but not a proof they themselves can grasp. They do not believe anything false, but they do not appreciate the entire basis of their beliefs. Ibn Rushd gives the analogy of going to a physician or a lawyer with a problem. He suggests that if a person had the expertise of the lawyer and the physician, there would be no need to consult them (even though when lawyer and physician are consulted, what they suggest may not be understood by client or patient). If the advice were understood, there would be no need for the doctor or lawyer in the first place. And yet, there is nothing wrong with people's reliance upon doctors and lawyers because it is assumed that they understand why they make the suggestions they do—and thus if people are wise they will accept and follow those suggestions.
This approach is not a doctrine of double truth, but it is a radical doctrine that relegates religion to a relatively lowly role in the hierarchy of human pursuits. Religion is certainly inferior to reason as a way of finding out truth, because religious language is to be understood primarily by examining it philosophically. One of the features of Ibn Rushd's thought that differentiates him from other Islamic philosophers is his supreme indifference to mysticism. Mysticism, or taṣawwuf, was of overriding significance for most of his contemporaries and predecessors—and indeed successors—but not for him. For Ibn Rushd, the meaning of the world is firmly in the world, and not something behind it. In this way he sought to establish a purified form of Aristotelianism shorn as far as possible from its Neoplatonic accessories and excesses.
It is not surprising that Averroism came to be regarded as a challenging doctrine in the Middle Ages and beyond, and it may well have played a role in displacing traditional religion from its established role in intellectual and social life. Within the Islamic world, Ibn Rushd's views largely disappeared until the Islamic Renaissance, when they reemerged to argue for a division between religious and rational language. In modern times, Averroism has once again been used in the Arab world to argue for a new and enhanced respect for reason as compared with religion. It still appears to be a philosophy for the intellectual elite rather than the religious masses.
Some of Ibn Rushd's works now only exist in Hebrew or Latin, and some not at all. The most useful bibliography is "Ibn Rushd: A Catalogue of Editions and Scholarly Writings from 1821 onwards," edited by Phillip Rosemann, Bulletin de philosophie mediévale 30 (1988): 153–215.
Works by Averroes
"Long Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics." In Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics, edited by Charles Genequand. Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1984.
"Tahāfut al-Tahāfut" (The incoherence of the incoherence). In Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafut, edited and translated by S. Van den Bergh. London: Luzac, 1978.
Works About Averroes
Fakhry, Majid. Islamic Occasionalism and Its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas. London: Allen and Unwin, 1958.
Hourani, G., tr. Averroes on the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy. London: Luzac, 1976.
Kogan, Barry. Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985.
Leaman, Oliver. "Averroes." In Klassiker der Religionsphilosophie, edited by F. Niewöhner. Munich: C.H. Beck, 1995.
Leaman, Oliver. Averroes and His Philosophy. Richmond, Surrey, U.K.: Curzon, 1998.
Leaman, Oliver. "Averroes and the West." In Averroes and the Enlightenment, edited by M. Wahba and M. Abousenna. New York: Prometheus, 1996.
Leaman, Oliver. A Brief Introduction to Islamic Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000. Contains material on his philosophical arguments.
Leaman, Oliver. An Introduction to Classical Islamic Philosophy. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Contains material on his philosophical arguments.
Leaman, Oliver. "Was Averroes an Averroist?" In Averroismus im Mittelalter und in der Renaissance, edited by F. Niewöhner and L. Sturlese. Zurich: Spur Verlag, 1994.
Urvoy, Dominique. "Ibn Rushd." In History of Islamic Philosophy, edited by S. Nasr and O. Leaman. London: Routledge, 1996.
Urvoy, Dominique. Ibn Rushd (Averroes). Translated by O. Stewart. London: Routledge, 1991.
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