The technical, logical definition of a substance is a subject of predication, but is itself not a predicate of anything else. (For example, in the statement "the blind old dog," "blind" and "old" are predicates attributed to "dog," but not the reverse.) In more concrete terms, a physical substance is a unitary entity having a particular "nature" (
physis), or innate principle that describes and directs all of its activities. Each physical substance is a composite—a complex unity of definition or "form" (
eidos) and content or "matter" (
hyle), which respectively manifest its "actuality" (
energeia), or present reality and pattern of activity, and "potentiality" (
dynamis), or latent capacity and power for alternative activities.
The form–matter relation is thus not just one of a determinate container to its indeterminate contents (e.g., of a glass to water), but rather one of defining characteristics for patterns of action (e.g., of the actual programming of a given computer to other possible ways of programming it). Together, the form and nature express the essence, called to ti en einai (literally, "what it is to be") or the necessary, primary defining features of a substance that determine its characteristic patterns of activity. All the activities of a substance are directed toward the ultimate purpose or goal (telos) of complete and perfect realization (entelecheia) of its essence.
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