The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 6. eBook

The Memoirs of General Ulysses S. Grant, Part 6. by Ulysses S. Grant

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Table of Contents

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CHAPTER LXII.

Sherman’s march north—­Sheridan ordered to Lynchburg—­Canby ordered to move against Mobile—­movements of Schofield and Thomas—­capture of Columbia, south Carolina—­Sherman in the Carolinas.

When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the North, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him.  Among others who went was the Secretary of War, who seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign.  Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of New York, who was with Mr. Stanton’s party, was put in charge of the public property that had been abandoned and captured.  Savannah was then turned over to General Foster’s command to hold, so that Sherman might have his own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future.  I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac (General Barnard) with letters to General Sherman.  He remained some time with the general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which contained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought to be done in co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march northward.

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea originally of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to North Carolina.  The season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except such an army as he had, and I should not have thought of ordering such a move.  I had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to carry Sherman and his army around to the James River by water, and so informed him.  On receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north through the Carolinas.  I was only too happy to approve this; for if successful, it promised every advantage.  His march through Georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that State, and had completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of it.  If North and South Carolina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for feeding Lee’s army was concerned, the Confederate garrison at Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies, to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and, although that section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of both forage and food.  I approved Sherman’s suggestion therefore at once.

The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance.  Sherman would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the sea.  Besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now become of such vast importance to the very existence of the Confederate army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to save it.

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Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that part of the navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, and General Foster, commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the sea coast, which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of Charleston.

This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast, in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward progress.  He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of his movement farther north.  This letter was brought to City Point by General Barnard at a time when I happened to be going to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of January.  I cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operate with Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by giving my reply to this letter.

Headquarters armies of the united states, Washington, D. C., Jan. 21, 1865.

Major-general W. T. Sherman, Commanding Mill Div. of the Mississippi.

General:—­Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at City Point, and read with interest.  Not having them with me, however, I cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommendation.  As I arrived here at one P.M., and must leave at six P.M., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the Secretary and General Halleck, I must be brief.  Before your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, Md., with his corps.  The advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati.  The corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men.  I was induced to do this because I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring.  His pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns.  The command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far behind.  When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport.  He is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is not good on a pursuit.  He also reported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up.  This report and a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere.

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selma under an energetic leader.  He has been telegraphed to, to know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select.  No reply is yet received.  Canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior, towards Montgomery and Selma.  Thomas’s forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to Canby.  Without further reinforcements Canby will have a moving column of twenty thousand men.

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Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured.  We have a force there of eight thousand effective.  At New Bern about half the number.  It is rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has fallen.  I am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington.

If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there.  If not, he will be sent to New Bern.  In either event, all the surplus forces at the two points will move to the interior toward Goldsboro’ in co-operation with your movements.  From either point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads.

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee’s army south.  Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if Wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about two thousand.

All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication with them.  They will be so instructed.  From about Richmond I will watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in.  In the meantime, should you be brought to a halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about Richmond.

To resume:  Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf.  A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful.  A force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from New Bern or Wilmington, or both.  You can call for reinforcements.

This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will return with any message you may have for me.  If there is anything I can do for you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it.

Yours truly, U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General.

I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving him the news of the battle of Nashville.  He was much pleased at the result, although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at Thomas for permitting Hood to cross the Tennessee River and nearly the whole State of Tennessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked there.  He, however, as I had done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.

On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to Sherman and his army passed by Congress were approved.

Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up, commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river, and taking up all obstructions.  He had then intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a small garrison.  By the middle of January all his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movement with.

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He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east, threatening Charleston.  He commenced the advance by moving his right wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to Pocotaligo by water.  This column, in moving north, threatened Charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first that they would have a force visit Charleston.  South Carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the South for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it, that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and also largely entertained by people of the South, that the State of South Carolina, and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a heavy hand laid upon them.  In fact, nothing but the decisive results that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from condemning the movement, because Charleston had been left out.  To pass into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the city, and its possession by the navy and Foster’s troops.  It is so situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out.  Sherman therefore passed it by.

By the first of February all preparations were completed for the final march, Columbia, South Carolina, being the first objective; Fayetteville, North Carolina, the second; and Goldsboro, or neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be determined upon.  The right wing went from Pocotaligo, and the left from about Hardeeville on the Savannah River, both columns taking a pretty direct route for Columbia.  The cavalry, however, were to threaten Charleston on the right, and Augusta on the left.

On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, news of which Sherman had received before starting out on his march.  We already had New Bern and had soon Wilmington, whose fall followed that of Fort Fisher; as did other points on the sea coast, where the National troops were now in readiness to co-operate with Sherman’s advance when he had passed Fayetteville.

On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in command at New Orleans, to move against Mobile, Montgomery and Selma, Alabama, for the purpose of destroying roads, machine shops, etc.  On the 8th of February I ordered Sheridan, who was in the Valley of Virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit and strike the canal west of Richmond at or about Lynchburg; and on the 20th I made the order to go to Lynchburg as soon as the roads would permit, saying:  “As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone.  From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. * * * This additional raid, with one

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On the 27th of February, more than a month after Canby had received his orders, I again wrote to him, saying that I was extremely anxious to hear of his being in Alabama.  I notified him, also, that I had sent Grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient officer.  I further suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi, and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it would be difficult to get by.  I still further informed him that Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into Mississippi on the 20th of February, or as soon as possible thereafter.  This force did not get off however.

All these movements were designed to be in support of Sherman’s march, the object being to keep the Confederate troops in the West from leaving there.  But neither Canby nor Thomas could be got off in time.  I had some time before depleted Thomas’s army to reinforce Canby, for the reason that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do something.  Canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his movements.  I ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under another officer.  General Granger had got down to New Orleans, in some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must not put him in command of troops.  In spite of this he asked the War Department to assign Granger to the command of a corps.

Almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in that quarter, I said to Canby:  “I am in receipt of a dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of railroad.  I have directed that none be sent.  Thomas’s army has been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the enemy had in the West.  If there had been any idea of repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the North, where we already had the troops.  I expected your movements to be co-operative with Sherman’s last.  This has now entirely failed.  I wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them.  Take Mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior—­to Montgomery and to Selma.  Destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such positions as can be supplied by water.  By this means alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy’s roads in the interior can be kept broken.”

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Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any service in the direction for which they were designed.

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of Hardee’s troops and Wheeler’s cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all; but frantic efforts were being made in Richmond, as I was sure would be the case, to retard Sherman’s movements.  Everything possible was being done to raise troops in the South.  Lee dispatched against Sherman the troops which had been sent to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured, to fourteen thousand men.  After Thomas’s victory at Nashville what remained, of Hood’s army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally, General Joseph E. Johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the South though not in favor with the administration (or at least with Mr. Davis), was put in command of all the troops in North and South Carolina.

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part of January, but before sending his troops to North Carolina I went with him down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as I could give fuller directions after being on the ground than I could very well have given without.  We soon returned, and the troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River.  Both New Bern and Wilmington are connected with Raleigh by railroads which unite at Goldsboro.  Schofield was to land troops at Smithville, near the mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and move up to secure the Wilmington and Charlotteville Railroad.  This column took their pontoon bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of the city of Wilmington.  A large body was sent by the north side to co-operate with them.  They succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of February.  I took the precaution to provide for Sherman’s army, in case he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching North Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march.  I also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in Virginia.  The gauge of the North Carolina railroads being the same as the Virginia railroads had been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there without any change.

On the 31st of January I countermanded the orders given to Thomas to move south to Alabama and Georgia. (I had previously reduced his force by sending a portion of it to Terry.) I directed in lieu of this movement, that he should send Stoneman through East Tennessee, and push him well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, in support of Sherman.  Thomas did not get Stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary,

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Goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from Savannah.  Sherman’s march was without much incident until he entered Columbia, on the 17th of February.  He was detained in his progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges.  There was constant skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the advance of the infantry.  Four days, also, were lost in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south of Columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road.  A formidable river had to be crossed near Columbia, and that in the face of a small garrison under General Wade Hampton.  There was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high water in the stream.  Hampton left as Sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire.

There has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions of the question as to who set Columbia on fire.  Sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and Hampton denies it on the part of the Confederates.  One thing is certain:  as soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best of their ability with the limited means at hand.  In any case, the example set by the Confederates in burning the village of Chambersburg, Pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of the act of firing the seat of government of the State most responsible for the conflict then raging, not imperative.

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the National forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the protection of property, etc.  Sherman paid no attention at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any conditions whatever with its citizens.  He then, however, co-operated with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes.  When he left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement could be made for their future supplies.  He remained in Columbia until the roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could be useful to the enemy were destroyed.  While at Columbia, Sherman learned for the first time that what remained of Hood’s army was confronting him, under the command of General Beauregard.

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Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of February, and Foster garrisoned the place.  Wilmington was captured on the 22d.  Columbia and Cheraw farther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy people of Charleston and Augusta had sent much of their valuable property to these two points to be stored.  Among the goods sent there were valuable carpets, tons of old Madeira, silverware, and furniture.  I am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops.  There was found at Columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery, small-arms and fixed ammunition.  These, of course were among the articles destroyed.  While here, Sherman also learned of Johnston’s restoration to command.  The latter was given, as already stated, all troops in North and South Carolina.  After the completion of the destruction of public property about Columbia, Sherman proceeded on his march and reached Cheraw without any special opposition and without incident to relate.  The railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed on the way.  Sherman remained a day or two at Cheraw; and, finally, on the 6th of March crossed his troops over the Pedee and advanced straight for Fayetteville.  Hardee and Hampton were there, and barely escaped.  Sherman reached Fayetteville on the 11th of March.  He had dispatched scouts from Cheraw with letters to General Terry, at Wilmington, asking him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and other articles which he enumerated.  The scouts got through successfully, and a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which Sherman had asked as were in store at Wilmington; unfortunately, however, those stores did not contain clothing.

Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fayetteville for Goldsboro.  The march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he was approaching Lee’s army and nearing the country that still remained open to the enemy.  Besides, he was confronting all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what remained of Hood’s army.  Frantic appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe.  I presume, however, that Johnston did not have in all over 35,000 or 40,000 men.  The people had grown tired of the war, and desertions from the Confederate army were much more numerous than the voluntary accessions.

There was some fighting at Averysboro on the 16th between Johnston’s troops and Sherman’s, with some loss; and at Bentonville on the 19th and 21st of March, but Johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning of the 22d.  Sherman’s loss in these last engagements in killed, wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred.  Sherman’s troops at last reached Goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac; and there his men were destined to have a long rest.  Schofield was there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to Wilmington.

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Sherman was no longer in danger.  He had Johnston confronting him; but with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale.  He had Lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but I was holding Lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce Johnston, Sherman, with the reinforcements he now had from Schofield and Terry, would have been able to hold the Confederates at bay for an indefinite period.  He was near the sea-shore with his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors.  He had a railroad to both Wilmington and New Bern, and his flanks were thoroughly protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country and deepen as they approach the sea.  Then, too, Sherman knew that if Lee should escape me I would be on his heels, and he and Johnson together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand.  With the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether Lee’s army would have amounted to much as an army when it reached North Carolina.  Johnston’s army was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made an offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on duty.  The men of both Lee’s and Johnston’s armies were, like their brethren of the North, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it.

CHAPTER LXIII.

Arrival of the peace commissioners—­Lincoln and the peace commissioners
—­an anecdote of Lincoln—­the winter before Petersburg—­Sheridan destroys
the railroad—­Gordon carries the picket line—­Parke recaptures the line
—­the line of battle of white Oak road.

On the last of January, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-called Confederate States presented themselves on our lines around Petersburg, and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at City Point.  They proved to be Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, Judge Campbell, Assistant-Secretary of War, and R. M. T. Hunt, formerly United States Senator and then a member of the Confederate Senate.

It was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and I at once conducted them to the steam Mary Martin, a Hudson River boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers.  I at once communicated by telegraph with Washington and informed the Secretary of War and the President of the arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to negotiate terms of peace between he United States and, as they termed it, the Confederate Government.  I was instructed to

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I had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them well by reputation and through their public services, and I had been a particular admirer of Mr. Stephens.  I had always supposed that he was a very small man, but when I saw him in the dusk of the evening I was very much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be.  When he got down on to the boat I found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the South during the rebellion.  The cloth was thicker than anything of the kind I had ever seen, even in Canada.  The overcoat extended nearly to his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an average-sized man.  He took this off when he reached the cabin of the boat, and I was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and out of it.

After a few days, about the 2d of February, I received a dispatch from Washington, directing me to send the commissioners to Hampton Roads to meet the President and a member of the cabinet.  Mr. Lincoln met them there and had an interview of short duration.  It was not a great while after they met that the President visited me at City Point.  He spoke of his having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would recognize, first:  that the Union as a whole must be forever preserved, and second:  that slavery must be abolished.  If they were willing to concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us in the Union and be one people.  He always showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and I never heard him abuse an enemy.  Some of the cruel things said about President Lincoln, particularly in the North, used to pierce him to the heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful disposition and I saw a great deal of him at City Point, for he seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the capital.

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Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Lincoln.  It was on the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace commissioners at Hampton Roads.  After a little conversation, he asked me if I had seen that overcoat of Stephens’s.  I replied that I had.  “Well,” said he, “did you see him take it off?” I said yes.  “Well,” said he, “didn’t you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you did see?” Long afterwards I told this story to the Confederate General J. B. Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate.  He repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heard afterwards, Stephens laughed immoderately at the simile of Mr. Lincoln.

The rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three little incidents.  On one occasion during this period, while I was visiting Washington City for the purpose of conferring with the administration, the enemy’s cavalry under General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to the south, got in east of us.  Before their presence was known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were grazing in that section.  It was a fair capture, and they were sufficiently needed by the Confederates.  It was only retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out of supplies taking what the Confederate army otherwise would have gotten.  As appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which were crossing the Mississippi River near Port Hudson on their way from Texas to supply the Confederate army in the East.

One of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion was the last few weeks before Petersburg.  I felt that the situation of the Confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and I was afraid, every morning, that I would awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line.  He had his railroad by the way of Danville south, and I was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for his immediate defence.  I knew he could move much more lightly and more rapidly than I, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another year.

I was led to this fear by the fact that I could not see how it was possible for the Confederates to hold out much longer where they were.  There is no doubt that Richmond would have been evacuated much sooner than it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called Confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very demoralizing effect upon the Confederate army.  When it was evacuated (as we shall see further on), the Confederacy at once began to crumble

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The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior reserves.  The latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear.  General Butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus “robbing both the cradle and the grave,” an expression which I afterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn.

It was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire army, by desertions alone.  Then by casualties of war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much heavier.  It was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going on.  Of course long before their army would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able to capture theirs.  Then too I knew from the great number of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in—­and as earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they were fighting—­had lost hope and become despondent.  Many of them were making application to be sent North where they might get employment until the war was over, when they could return to their Southern homes.

For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for the time to come when I could commence the spring campaign, which I thoroughly believed would close the war.

There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and which detained me.  One was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams.  It was necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy’s country.  The other consideration was that General Sheridan with the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was operating on the north side of the James River, having come down from the Shenandoah.  It was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me, and I was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the James River.

Let us now take account of what he was doing.

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On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan.  He had met Early between Staunton and Charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his entire command.  Early and some of his officers escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods.

On the 12th I heard from him again.  He had turned east, to come to White House.  He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen.  He had a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way across some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have to get over in going south as first ordered.

I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the depot there open until he arrived.  We had intended to abandon it because the James River had now become our base of supplies.

Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two divisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devin.  General Merritt was acting as chief of cavalry.  Sheridan moved very light, carrying only four days’ provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition.  They stopped at Charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward Lynchburg.  He also sent a division along the James River Canal to destroy locks, culverts etc.  All mills and factories along the lines of march of his troops were destroyed also.

Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march to White House was now somewhat hazardous.  He determined therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to Richmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked.  He did this, destroying the canal as far as Goochland, and the railroad to a point as near Richmond as he could get.  On the 10th he was at Columbia.  Negroes had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the canal.  His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage.  He had captured most of Early’s horses and picked up a good many others on the road.  When he reached Ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force.  He resisted their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the South and North Anna, going north, and reached White House safely on the 19th.

The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time he could get away from Goldsboro where he then was.  Supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he would pass.  I had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the neighborhood of Goldsboro on the 18th of April, the earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready.

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Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so.  I had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until Sheridan, who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind.  However, having arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to make my plans.

Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night before I was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into North Carolina to join with Johnston in attempting to crush out Sherman, I had, as early as the 1st of the month of March, given instructions to the troops around Petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was undertaken.

It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and General Lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about and Petersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as possible.  They, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it possible to move.

General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the Danville Road with greater security than he would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines around Petersburg.  The night of the 24th of March was fixed upon for this assault, and General Gordon was assigned to the execution of the plan.  The point between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected as the point of his attack.  The attack was to be made at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my lines.  Lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of escape.  The plan was well conceived and the execution of it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our line.

Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point at which they were to make their charge, and got possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than fifty yards.  For some time before the deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them, and this the Confederate general knew.  Taking advantage of this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through to ours as if to

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The charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemy passing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10.  Then turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them.  Continuing the charge, they also carried batteries Eleven and Twelve to our left, which they turned toward City Point.

Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in his line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters.  Parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to Meade’s headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back.  General Tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground between the lines very thoroughly.  Hartranft was soon out with his division, as also was Willcox.  Hartranft to the right of the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into Fort Stedman.  On the other side they were driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by Willcox early in the morning.

Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and batteries, and communication was once more established.  The artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the Confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to join them.  They all, therefore, fell captives into our hands.  This effort of Lee’s cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours.

After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates, our troops made a charge and carried the enemy’s intrenched picket line, which they strengthened and held.  This, in turn, gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days later.

The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th.  Ord, with three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie’s cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the James River and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away.  He left Weitzel with the rest of the Army of the James to hold Bermuda Hundred and the north of the James River.  The engineer brigade was to be left at City Point, and Parke’s corps in the lines about Petersburg. (42)

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Ord was at his place promptly.  Humphreys and Warren were then on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps.  They were directed on the arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to cross Hatcher’s Run and extend out west toward Five Forks, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the South Side Railroad and ultimately the Danville Railroad.  There was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the Army of the James had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe.

This was what was known as the Battle of White Oak Road.

CHAPTER LXIV.

Interview with Sheridan—­grand movement of the army of the Potomac —­Sheridan’s advance on five forks—­battle of five forks—­Parke and Wright Storm the enemy’s line—­battles before Petersburg.

Sheridan reached City Point on the 26th day of March.  His horses, of course, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes.  A few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for moving.  Immediately on General Sheridan’s arrival at City Point I prepared his instructions for the move which I had decided upon.  The movement was to commence on the 29th of the month.

After reading the instructions I had given him, Sheridan walked out of my tent, and I followed to have some conversation with him by himself —­not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff.  In preparing his instructions I contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing Five Forks, driving the enemy from Petersburg and Richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy.  But the Nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate except by compromise.  Knowing that unless my plan proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, I provided in these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon the country proceed south by the way of the Danville Railroad, or near it, across the Roanoke, get in the rear of Johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with Sherman in destroying Johnston; then with these combined forces to help carry out the instructions which Sherman already had received, to act in cooperation with the armies around Petersburg and Richmond.

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I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from the Army of the Potomac, and place himself between the two main armies of the enemy.  I said to him:  “General, this portion of your instructions I have put in merely as a blind;” and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore described.  I told him that, as a matter of fact, I intended to close the war right here, with this movement, and that he should go no farther.  His face at once brightened up, and slapping his hand on his leg he said:  “I am glad to hear it, and we can do it.”

Sheridan was not however to make his movement against Five Forks until he got further instructions from me.

One day, after the movement I am about to describe had commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south, Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, at Dabney’s Mills.  He met some of my staff officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would prove the final and successful effort.  Although my chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position about City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he asked Sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them.  Sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that Sheridan had what they considered important news, and suggested that I send for him.  I did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued.  Knowing as I did from experience, of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was, I determined to make a movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after I had started out the roads were still very heavy.  Orders were given accordingly.

Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately there having been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could move.  On that date I moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about Petersburg.  It soon set in raining again however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost so for cavalry.  Sometimes a horse or mule would be standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so common in that part of Virginia and other southern States.  It became necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon.  The army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly.  The next day, March 30th, we had made sufficient progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting Sheridan with his cavalry over by Dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading north-west to Five Forks, thus menacing the right of Lee’s line.

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This movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to the west as far as practicable towards the enemy’s extreme right, or Five Forks.  The column moving detached from the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small.  The forces in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank.  Warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but Humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between him and Five Forks.

My hope was that Sheridan would be able to carry Five Forks, get on the enemy’s right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to protect their right so that an assault in the centre might be successfully made.  General Wright’s corps had been designated to make this assault, which I intended to order as soon as information reached me of Sheridan’s success.  He was to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get.

It is natural to suppose that Lee would understand my design to be to get up to the South Side and ultimately to the Danville Railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th.  These roads were so important to his very existence while he remained in Richmond and Petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend them.  He did on the 30th send Pickett with five brigades to reinforce Five Forks.  He also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in readiness on the north side of the James River to come over on call.  He came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right flank.

Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddie Court-House on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading north-west to Five Forks.  He had only his cavalry with him.  Soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a very stout resistance.  He gradually drove them back however until in the neighborhood of Five Forks.  Here he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way.

In this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and stated that he was falling back toward Dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send Wright’s corps to his assistance.  I replied to him that it was impossible to send Wright’s corps because that corps was already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but the 2d (Humphreys’s) and 5th (Warren’s) corps were on our extreme left and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank of the enemy at Five Forks, and that I would send Warren.

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Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move at once that night (the 31st) to Dinwiddie Court House and put himself in communication with Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him.  He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o’clock next morning.  When he did move it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at Gravelly Run he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he regarded it as not fordable.  Sheridan of course knew of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible, sent orders to him to hasten.  He was also hastened or at least ordered to move up rapidly by General Meade.  He now felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that Sheridan determined to move forward without him.  However, Ayres’s division of Warren’s corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly under Sheridan.

Warren reported to Sheridan about 11 o’clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon.  Griffin’s division in backing to get out of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the fighting.  This did not continue long, however; the division was brought back and with Ayres’s division did most excellent service during the day.  Crawford’s division of the same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance.  Once there it did very excellent service.

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon Five Forks itself.  He was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac during the night.  Unless the assault was made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to Dinwiddie Court-House, or even further than that for the night.

It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan wanted to get Crawford’s division in hand, and he also wanted Warren.  He sent staff officer after staff officer in search of Warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him.  At all events Sheridan was unable to get that officer to him.  Finally he went himself.  He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning Griffin to the command of the 5th corps.  The troops were then brought up and the assault successfully made.

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I was so much dissatisfied with Warren’s dilatory movements in the battle of White Oak Road and in his failure to reach Sheridan in time, that I was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail Sheridan.  He was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act.  But I had before discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before us.  He could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it.  He would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move.

I had sent a staff officer to General Sheridan to call his attention to these defects, and to say that as much as I liked General Warren, now was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate.  It was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed Warren.  I was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that I had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field of duty.

It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went over the parapets of the enemy.  The two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other.  Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large quantities, falling into our hands.  The flying troops were pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under Sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west.

This pursuit continued until about nine o’clock at night, when Sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the enemy’s line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corps across Hatcher’s Run to just south-west of Petersburg, and facing them toward it.  Merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of Five Forks.

This was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of April.  I then issued orders for an assault by Wright and Parke at four o’clock on the morning of the 2d.  I also ordered the 2d corps, General Humphreys, and General Ord with the Army of the James, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their front.

I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the success of the day; in fact I had reported to him during the day and evening as I got news, because he was so much interested in the movements taking place that I wanted to relieve his mind as much as I could.  I notified Weitzel on the north side of the James River, directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly enter the city of Richmond.

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I was afraid that Lee would regard the possession of Five Forks as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a single die.  It was for this reason that I had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as I had received the news of the capture of Five Forks.  The corps commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then.  But we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole line including that north of the James River, until it was light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the morning.

At that hour Parke’s and Wright’s corps moved out as directed, brushed the abatis from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy’s line.  Parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very considerable length of line in that direction, but at that point the outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of Petersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defence of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this.

Wright swung around to his left and moved to Hatcher’s Run, sweeping everything before him.  The enemy had traverses in rear of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to another, as Wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle.  As you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and along about Hatcher’s Run they must be nearly two miles apart.  Both Parke and Wright captured a considerable amount of artillery and some prisoners—­Wright about three thousand of them.

In the meantime Ord and Humphreys, in obedience to the instructions they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and before Wright got up to that point, Ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy’s intrenchments.  The second corps soon followed; and the outer works of Petersburg were in the hands of the National troops, never to be wrenched from them again.  When Wright reached Hatcher’s Run, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side Railroad just outside of the city.

My headquarters were still at Dabney’s saw-mills.  As soon as I received the news of Wright’s success, I sent dispatches announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the troops at Bermuda Hundred and those on the north side of the James, and to the President at City Point.  Further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did I sent the additional news to these points.  Finding at length that they were all in, I mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works.  When I arrived there I rode my horse over the parapet just as Wright’s three thousand prisoners were coming out.  I was soon joined inside by General Meade and his staff.

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Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground.  Parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort.  Before noon Longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the James River thus bringing the bulk of Lee’s army around to the support of his extreme right.  As soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel and directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have Hartsuff, commanding the Bermuda Hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break to go in; Hartsuff especially should do so, for this would separate Richmond and Petersburg.

Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, swept down to Petersburg, coming in on our left.  This gave us a continuous line from the Appomattox River below the city to the same river above.  At eleven o’clock, not having heard from Sheridan, I reinforced Parke with two brigades from City Point.  With this additional force he completed his captured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so as to protect his flank.  He also carried in and made an abatis between himself and the enemy.  Lee brought additional troops and artillery against Parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with very heavy losses.

The enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to Petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, Fort Gregg and Fort Whitworth.  We thought it had now become necessary to carry them by assault.  About one o’clock in the day, Fort Gregg was assaulted by Foster’s division of the 24th corps (Gibbon’s), supported by two brigades from Ord’s command.  The battle was desperate and the National troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place.  The guns of Fort Gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth surrendered.

I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to Sheridan.  In moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the White Oak Road and the Claiborne Road.  The enemy fell back to Sutherland Station on the South Side Road and were followed by Miles.  This position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly intrenched.  Sheridan now came up and Miles asked permission from him to make the assault, which Sheridan gave.  By this time Humphreys had got through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over Miles, who commanded a division in his corps.  I had sent an order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move towards Petersburg.  This order he now got, and started off, thus leaving Miles alone.  The latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards.

Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, I directed Humphreys to send a division back to his relief.  He went himself.

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Sheridan before starting to sweep down to Petersburg had sent Merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some Confederate cavalry that had assembled there.  Merritt drove them north to the Appomattox River.  Sheridan then took the enemy at Sutherland Station on the reverse side from where Miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder, portions of three Confederate corps, to flight.  Sheridan followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped.  Miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with Sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault.  I cannot explain the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to City Point that evening: 

Boydton road, near Petersburg, April 2, 1865.—­4.40 P.M.

Colonel T. S. Bowers, City Point.

We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours will be intrenched from the Appomattox below Petersburg to the river above.  Heth’s and Wilcox’s divisions, such part of them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or because they could not help it.  Sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them.  Miles’s division, 2d corps, was sent from the White Oak Road to Sutherland Station on the South Side Railroad, where he met them, and at last accounts was engaged with them.  Not knowing whether Sheridan would get up in time, General Humphreys was sent with another division from here.  The whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery.  I do not know the number of men and guns accurately however. * * * I think the President might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

During the night of April 2d our line was intrenched from the river above to the river below.  I ordered a bombardment to be commenced the next morning at five A.M., to be followed by an assault at six o’clock; but the enemy evacuated Petersburg early in the morning.

CHAPTER LXV.

The capture of Petersburg—­meeting president Lincoln in Petersburg—­the capture of Richmond—­pursuing the enemy—­visit to Sheridan and Meade.

General Meade and I entered Petersburg on the morning of the 3d and took a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy’s musketry which was flying thick and fast there.  As we would occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the Appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the Confederate army.  I did not have artillery brought up, because I was sure Lee was trying to make his escape, and I wanted to push immediately in pursuit.  At all events I had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture them soon.

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Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated Petersburg, a man came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the Army of Northern Virginia.  He said that Lee had for some time been at work preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when forced out of Petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his troops from Richmond, and falling back into this prepared work.  This statement was made to General Meade and myself when we were together.  I had already given orders for the movement up the south side of the Appomattox for the purpose of heading off Lee; but Meade was so much impressed by this man’s story that he thought we ought to cross the Appomattox there at once and move against Lee in his new position.  I knew that Lee was no fool, as he would have been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams like the James and Appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as those of the Potomac and the James.  Then these streams coming together as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of reinforcement.  It would only have been a question of days, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender his army.  Such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your antagonist.  My judgment was that Lee would necessarily have to evacuate Richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow the Danville Road.  Accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south of Lee, and I told Meade this.  He suggested that if Lee was going that way we would follow him.  My reply was that we did not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (Meade) believed him to be in at that time, I wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the Danville Railroad, at its crossing of the Appomattox River, if we still found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close him up.  That we would then have all the advantage we could possibly have by moving directly against him from Petersburg, even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer.

I had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to start them out on the Danville Road early in the morning, supposing that Lee would be gone during the night.  During the night I strengthened Sheridan by sending him Humphreys’s corps.

Lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at Richmond, during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long.  Davis was at church when he received Lee’s dispatch.  The congregation was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service.  The rebel government left Richmond about two o’clock in the afternoon of the 2d.

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At night Lee ordered his troops to assemble at Amelia Court House, his object being to get away, join Johnston if possible, and to try to crush Sherman before I could get there.  As soon as I was sure of this I notified Sheridan and directed him to move out on the Danville Railroad to the south side of the Appomattox River as speedily as possible.  He replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out.  I then ordered the rest of the Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the same road in the morning.  Parke’s corps followed by the same road, and the Army of the James was directed to follow the road which ran alongside of the South Side Railroad to Burke’s Station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded.  That road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge; consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and locomotives.

Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and had been for some days.  I would have let him know what I contemplated doing, only while I felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might not prove so; and then I would have only added another to the many disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years.  But when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us Godspeed, remained there to hear the result.

The next morning after the capture of Petersburg, I telegraphed Mr. Lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while I would await his arrival.  I had started all the troops out early in the morning, so that after the National army left Petersburg there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the streets.  There was absolutely no one there, except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry.  We had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the President arrived.

About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to me, after warm congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to the army which had accomplished it, was:  “Do you know, general, that I have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do something like this.”  Our movements having been successful up to this point, I no longer had any object in concealing from the President all my movements, and the objects I had in view.  He remained for some days near City Point, and I communicated with him frequently and fully by telegraph.

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Mr. Lincoln knew that it had been arranged for Sherman to join me at a fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of Lee’s army.  I told him that I had been very anxious to have the Eastern armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital.  The Western armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the territory from the Mississippi River to the State of North Carolina, and were now almost ready to knock at the back door of Richmond, asking admittance.  I said to him that if the Western armies should be even upon the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from the section of country which those troops hailed from.  It might lead to disagreeable bickerings between members of Congress of the East and those of the West in some of their debates.  Western members might be throwing it up to the members of the East that in the suppression of the rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the Western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been engaged with.

Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came from so the work was done.

The Army of the Potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years’ record in the suppression of the rebellion.  The army it had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the United States.  Its loss would be the loss of the cause.  Every energy, therefore, was put forth by the Confederacy to protect and maintain their capital.  Everything else would go if it went.  Lee’s army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the South in another quarter.

I never expected any such bickering as I have indicated, between the soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been none between the politicians.  Possibly I am the only one who thought of the liability of such a state of things in advance.

When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lincoln mounted his horse and started on his return to City Point, while I and my staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in advance.  Up to this time I had not received the report of the capture of Richmond.

Page 27

Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a dispatch from General Weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of Richmond at about 8.15 o’clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and that he had found the city on fire in two places.  The city was in the most utter confusion.  The authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the Confederate government had left, for the people to gather up.  The city had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any notice whatever that they were about to leave.  In fact, up to the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that Lee had gained an important victory somewhere around Petersburg.

Weitzel’s command found evidence of great demoralization in Lee’s army, there being still a great many men and even officers in the town.  The city was on fire.  Our troops were directed to extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing.  The fire had been started by some one connected with the retreating army.  All authorities deny that it was authorized, and I presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their enemy.  Be that as it may, the National troops found the city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them.

The troops that had formed Lee’s right, a great many of them, were cut off from getting back into Petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along up the Appomattox River until finally they took water and crossed over.

I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already said, to join the command, which halted at Sutherland Station, about nine miles out.  We had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but the roads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was impossible to get on.  Then, again, our cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they appeared.  This caused further delay.

General Wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when they did start they would be uninterrupted.  Humphreys, who was far ahead, was also out of rations.  They did not succeed in getting them up through the night; but the Army of the Potomac, officers and men, were so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them.  So the march was resumed at three o’clock in the morning.

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Merritt’s cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep Creek, and driven them north to the Appomattox, where, I presume, most of them were forced to cross.

On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had ordered rations up from Danville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at Farmville.  This showed that Lee had already abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to Danville, but had determined to go farther west, by the way of Farmville.  I notified Sheridan of this and directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could reach Lee.  He responded that he had already sent Crook’s division to get upon the road between Burkesville and Jetersville, then to face north and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought Crook must be there now.  The bulk of the army moved directly for Jetersville by two roads.

After I had received the dispatch from Sheridan saying that Crook was on the Danville Road, I immediately ordered Meade to make a forced march with the Army of the Potomac, and to send Parke’s corps across from the road they were on to the South Side Railroad, to fall in the rear of the Army of the James and to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went along.

Our troops took possession of Jetersville and in the telegraph office, they found a dispatch from Lee, ordering two hundred thousand rations from Danville.  The dispatch had not been sent, but Sheridan sent a special messenger with it to Burkesville and had it forwarded from there.  In the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources had reached Danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter.

At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off between the road which the Army of the Potomac was marching on and the Appomattox River, and were attacking the enemy in flank.  They picked up a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property.

Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, and also his advance north of Jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage.  The country was very poor and afforded but very little.  His foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the Army of Northern Virginia.

Griffin’s corps was intrenched across the railroad south of Jetersville, and Sheridan notified me of the situation.  I again ordered Meade up with all dispatch, Sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting Lee’s entire army.  Meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed.  Humphreys moved at two, and Wright at three o’clock in the morning, without rations, as I have said, the wagons being far in the rear.

I stayed that night at Wilson’s Station on the South Side Railroad.  On the morning of the 5th I sent word to Sheridan of the progress Meade was making, and suggested that he might now attack Lee.  We had now no other objective than the Confederate armies, and I was anxious to close the thing up at once.

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On the 5th I marched again with Ord’s command until within about ten miles of Burkesville, where I stopped to let his army pass.  I then received from Sheridan the following dispatch: 

“The whole of Lee’s army is at or near Amelia Court House, and on this side of it.  General Davies, whom I sent out to Painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons.  We can capture the Army of Northern Virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point, and then advance upon it.  My cavalry was at Burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the Danville Road, last night.  General Lee is at Amelia Court House in person.  They are out of rations, or nearly so.  They were advancing up the railroad towards Burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point.”

It now became a life and death struggle with Lee to get south to his provisions.

Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards Farmville, moved Davies’s brigade of cavalry out to watch him.  Davies found the movement had already commenced.  He attacked and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and burning 180 wagons.  He also captured five pieces of artillery.  The Confederate infantry then moved against him and probably would have handled him very roughly, but Sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow Davies, and they came to his relief in time.  A sharp engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the enemy’s infantry, but the latter was repulsed.

Meade himself reached Jetersville about two o’clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his troops.  The head of Humphreys’s corps followed in about an hour afterwards.  Sheridan stationed the troops as they came up, at Meade’s request, the latter still being very sick.  He extended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to the left of Griffin’s corps, and one division to the right.  The cavalry by this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the left, Sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the enemy intended to escape.  He wanted to attack, feeling that if time was given, the enemy would get away; but Meade prevented this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up.

At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he wished I was there myself.  The letter was dated Amelia Court House, April 5th, and signed by Colonel Taylor.  It was to his mother, and showed the demoralization of the Confederate army.  Sheridan’s note also gave me the information as here related of the movements of that day.  I received a second message from Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically the importance of my presence.  This was brought to me by a scout in gray uniform.  It was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up in tin-foil such as

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I then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join Meade’s army.  The distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads.  However, we got to the outposts about ten o’clock in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where Sheridan was bivouacked.  We talked over the situation for some little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he thought Lee was trying to do, and that Meade’s orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us and putting us in rear of him.

We then together visited Meade, reaching his headquarters about midnight.  I explained to Meade that we did not want to follow the enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that, I had no doubt that Lee was moving right then.  Meade changed his orders at once.  They were now given for an advance on Amelia Court House, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther to the left.

CHAPTER LXVI.

Battle of Sailor’s creek—­engagement at Farmville—­correspondence with general Lee—­Sheridan intercepts the enemy.

The Appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the south-west from the neighborhood of the Richmond and Danville Railroad bridge, and then trends north-westerly.  Sailor’s Creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into the Appomattox between the High Bridge and Jetersville.  Near the High Bridge the stage road from Petersburg to Lynchburg crosses the Appomattox River, also on a bridge.  The railroad runs on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few miles west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it.  The roads coming up from the south-east to Farmville cross the Appomattox River there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the Lynchburg and Petersburg Railroad well to the left.

Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, availed himself of all the roads between the Danville Road and Appomattox River to move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear.  In this way he came very near succeeding in getting to his provision trains and eluding us with at least part of his army.

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As expected, Lee’s troops had moved during the night before, and our army in moving upon Amelia Court House soon encountered them.  There was a good deal of fighting before Sailor’s Creek was reached.  Our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train in order to get it past our left.  A severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded.  There was as much gallantry displayed by some of the Confederates in these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week.

The armies finally met on Sailor’s Creek, when a heavy engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry were all brought into action.  Our men on the right, as they were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the lay of the country.  Our firing was also very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreat westward and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired.  The enemy’s loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in captures.  Some six general officers fell into our hands in this engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners.  This engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had overtaken them.

When the move towards Amelia Court House had commenced that morning, I ordered Wright’s corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the place of Griffin’s, and ordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on the right.  The object of this movement was to get the 6th corps, Wright’s, next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and so efficiently in the valley of Virginia.

The 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under Sheridan’s direct command until after the surrender.

Ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward between Burkesville and the High Bridge.  On the morning of the 6th he sent Colonel Washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions to destroy High Bridge and to return rapidly to Burkesville Station; and he prepared himself to resist the enemy there.  Soon after Washburn had started Ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent Colonel Read, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring him back.  Very shortly after this he heard that the head of Lee’s column had got up to the road between him and where Washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could not get through.  Read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy.  He rode on to Farmville and was on his way back again when he found his return

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This stoppage of Lee’s column no doubt saved to us the trains following.  Lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road bridge near the High Bridge, and attempted to destroy it.  He did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway when Humphreys came up with his corps and drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being burned up.  Humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and followed Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at Farmville with the one from Petersburg.  Here Lee held a position which was very strong, naturally, besides being intrenched.  Humphreys was alone, confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position.  He put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not assaulted in return.

Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of Prince Edward’s Court House, along with the 5th corps (Griffin’s), Ord falling in between Griffin and the Appomattox.  Crook’s division of cavalry and Wright’s corps pushed on west of Farmville.  When the cavalry reached Farmville they found that some of the Confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their trains of provisions back to that point; but our troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did not get them for some time.  These troops retreated to the north side of the Appomattox to join Lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after them.  Considerable fighting ensued there between Wright’s corps and a portion of our cavalry and the Confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and drove them away.  Wright built a foot-bridge for his men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of the roads to relieve Humphreys, arriving there that night.  I had stopped the night before at Burkesville Junction.  Our troops were then pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there, and Ord’s command was extended from that point towards Farmville.

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Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer of the regular army, who told me that in a conversation with General Ewell, one of the prisoners and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when we had got across the James River he knew their cause was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still had a right to claim concessions.  The authorities thought differently, however.  Now the cause was lost and they had no right to claim anything.  He said further, that for every man that was killed after this in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little better than murder.  He was not sure that Lee would consent to surrender his army without being able to consult with the President, but he hoped he would.

I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day.  Sheridan and Ord were pushing through, away to the south.  Meade was back towards the High Bridge, and Humphreys confronting Lee as before stated.  After having gone into bivouac at Prince Edward’s Court House, Sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were at Appomattox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and a forced march was necessary in order to get there before Lee’s army could secure them.  He wrote me a note telling me this.  This fact, together with the incident related the night before by Dr. Smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with General Lee on the subject of the surrender of his army.  I therefore wrote to him on this day, as follows: 

Headquarters armies of the U. S., 5 P.M., April 7, 1865.

General R. E. Lee Commanding C. S. A.

The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle.  I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General.

Lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows: 

April 7, 1865.

General:  I have received your note of this day.  Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

R. E. Lee, General.

Lieut.-General U. S. Grant, Commanding Armies of the U. S.

This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as deserving another letter and wrote him as follows: 

April 8, 1865.

General R. E. Lee, Commanding C. S. A.

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Your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia is just received.  In reply I would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely:  that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged.  I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received.

U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General.

Lee’s army was rapidly crumbling.  Many of his soldiers had enlisted from that part of the State where they now were, and were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their homes.  I know that I occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at Farmville, which had probably been used as a Confederate hospital.  The next morning when I came out I found a Confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood.  He said that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of the regiment remaining with Lee’s army, so he just dropped out, and now wanted to surrender himself.  I told him to stay there and he would not be molested.  That was one regiment which had been eliminated from Lee’s force by this crumbling process.

Although Sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved with alacrity and without any straggling.  They began to see the end of what they had been fighting four years for.  Nothing seemed to fatigue them.  They were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until the end.  Straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front.  The infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could.

Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move south of Appomattox Station, which is about five miles south-west of the Court House, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear.  They got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train men had just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the trains.  The other four were held by Custer.

The head of Lee’s column came marching up there on the morning of the 9th, not dreaming, I suppose, that there were any Union soldiers near.  The Confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession of the trains.  However, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them.  In the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains, but not in getting anything from it.  Custer then ordered the other trains run back on the road towards Farmville, and the fight continued.

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So far, only our cavalry and the advance of Lee’s army were engaged.  Soon, however, Lee’s men were brought up from the rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry.  But our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up they found Griffin’s corps and the Army of the James confronting them.  A sharp engagement ensued, but Lee quickly set up a white flag.

CHAPTER LXVII.

Negotiations at Appomattox—­interview with Lee at MCLEAN’S house—­the terms of surrender—­Lee’s surrender—­interview with Lee after the surrender.

On the 8th I had followed the Army of the Potomac in rear of Lee.  I was suffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army.  I spent the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting mustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning.  During the night I received Lee’s answer to my letter of the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following morning. (43) But it was for a different purpose from that of surrendering his army, and I answered him as follows: 

Headquarters armies of the U. S., April 9, 1865.

General R. E. Lee, Commanding C. S. A.

Your note of yesterday is received.  As I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-day could lead to no good.  I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling.  The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood.  By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed.  Sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc.,

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

I proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with the headache, to get to the head of the column.  I was not more than two or three miles from Appomattox Court House at the time, but to go direct I would have to pass through Lee’s army, or a portion of it.  I had therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from another direction.

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When the white flag was put out by Lee, as already described, I was in this way moving towards Appomattox Court House, and consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what Lee had done.  Lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise Meade and one to the front to Sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me for the purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until I could be communicated with.  As they had heard nothing of this until the fighting had got to be severe and all going against Lee, both of these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all.  They were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the Army of Northern Virginia where it could not escape except by some deception.  They, however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours to give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if possible.  It was found that, from the route I had taken, they would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel lines.

Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message through his lines to me.

April 9, 1865.

General:  I received your note of this morning on the picket-line whither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army.  I now request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

R. E. Lee, General.

Lieutenant-general U. S. Grant Commanding U. S. Armies.

When the officer reached me I was still suffering with the sick headache, but the instant I saw the contents of the note I was cured.  I wrote the following note in reply and hastened on: 

April 9, 1865.

General R. E. Lee, Commanding C. S. Armies.

Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 A.M.) received, in consequence of my having passed from the Richmond and Lynchburg road to the Farmville and Lynchburg road.  I am at this writing about four miles west of Walker’s Church and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you.  Notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me.

U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was located with his troops drawn up in line of battle facing the Confederate army near by.  They were very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all a ruse employed to enable the Confederates to get away.  They said they believed that Johnston was marching up from North Carolina now, and Lee was moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if I would only

Page 37

Before stating what took place between General Lee and myself, I will give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree.

Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they are believed to be true.  The war of the rebellion was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact.  As I have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of the hill occupied by the Confederate forces.  Running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point, ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on that side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment.  General Babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first met General Lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting against the tree.  The story had no other foundation than that.  Like many other stories, it would be very good if it was only true.

I had known General Lee in the old army, and had served with him in the Mexican War; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and rank, that he would remember me, while I would more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of General Scott in the Mexican War.

When I had left camp that morning I had not expected so soon the result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb.  I was without a sword, as I usually was when on horseback on the field, and wore a soldier’s blouse for a coat, with the shoulder straps of my rank to indicate to the army who I was.  When I went into the house I found General Lee.  We greeted each other, and after shaking hands took our seats.  I had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the whole of the interview.

What General Lee’s feelings were I do not know.  As he was a man of much dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over the result, and was too manly to show it.  Whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed.  I felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse.  I do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us.

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General Lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword which had been presented by the State of Virginia; at all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in the field.  In my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a lieutenant-general, I must have contrasted very strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of faultless form.  But this was not a matter that I thought of until afterwards.

We soon fell into a conversation about old army times.  He remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army; and I told him that as a matter of course I remembered him perfectly, but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about sixteen years’ difference in our ages), I had thought it very likely that I had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long interval.  Our conversation grew so pleasant that I almost forgot the object of our meeting.  After the conversation had run on in this style for some time, General Lee called my attention to the object of our meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose of getting from me the terms I proposed to give his army.  I said that I meant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properly exchanged.  He said that he had so understood my letter.

Then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreign to the subject which had brought us together.  This continued for some little time, when General Lee again interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that the terms I proposed to give his army ought to be written out.  I called to General Parker, secretary on my staff, for writing materials, and commenced writing out the following terms: 

APPOMATTOX C. H., VA.,

Ap 19th, 1865.

Gen.  R. E. Lee, Comd’g C. S. A.

Gen:  In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of N. Va. on the following terms, to wit:  Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate.  One copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate.  The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands.  The arms, artillery and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive them.  This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage.  This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

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Very respectfully, U. S. Grant, Lt.  Gen.

When I put my pen to the paper I did not know the first word that I should make use of in writing the terms.  I only knew what was in my mind, and I wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no mistaking it.  As I wrote on, the thought occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms.

No conversation, not one word, passed between General Lee and myself, either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects.  He appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or if he had a point to make against them he wished to wait until they were in writing to make it.  When he read over that part of the terms about side arms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, I thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army.

Then, after a little further conversation, General Lee remarked to me again that their army was organized a little differently from the army of the United States (still maintaining by implication that we were two countries); that in their army the cavalrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; and he asked if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them.  I told him that as the terms were written they would not; that only the officers were permitted to take their private property.  He then, after reading over the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear.

I then said to him that I thought this would be about the last battle of the war—­I sincerely hoped so; and I said further I took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers.  The whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding.  The United States did not want them and I would, therefore, instruct the officers I left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of the Confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal to his home.  Lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect.

He then sat down and wrote out the following letter: 

Headquarters army of northern Virginia, April 9, 1865.

General:—­I received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you.  As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted.  I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

R. E. Lee, General.  Lieut.-General U. S. Grant.

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While duplicates of the two letters were being made, the Union generals present were severally presented to General Lee.

The much talked of surrendering of Lee’s sword and my handing it back, this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance.  The word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either of us until I wrote it in the terms.  There was no premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment I wrote it down.  If I had happened to omit it, and General Lee had called my attention to it, I should have put it in the terms precisely as I acceded to the provision about the soldiers retaining their horses.

General Lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, and that they were without forage; that his men had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for rations and forage.  I told him “certainly,” and asked for how many men he wanted rations.  His answer was “about twenty-five thousand;” and I authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to Appomattox Station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted.  As for forage, we had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that.

Generals Gibbon, Griffin and Merritt were designated by me to carry into effect the paroling of Lee’s troops before they should start for their homes—­General Lee leaving Generals Longstreet, Gordon and Pendleton for them to confer with in order to facilitate this work.  Lee and I then separated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and all went into bivouac for the night at Appomattox.

Soon after Lee’s departure I telegraphed to Washington as follows: 

Headquarters Appomattox C. H., Va., April 9th, 1865, 4.30 P.M.

Hon.  E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, Washington.

General Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia this afternoon on terms proposed by myself.  The accompanying additional correspondence will show the conditions fully.

U. S. Grant, Lieut.-General.

When news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory.  I at once sent word, however, to have it stopped.  The Confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall.

I determined to return to Washington at once, with a view to putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what I now deemed other useless outlay of money.  Before leaving, however, I thought I (44) would like to see General Lee again; so next morning I rode out beyond our lines towards his headquarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer carrying a white flag.

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Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me.  We had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of which Lee said to me that the South was a big country and that we might have to march over it three or four times before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it as they could no longer resist us.  He expressed it as his earnest hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result.  I then suggested to General Lee that there was not a man in the Confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies I had no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity.  But Lee said, that he could not do that without consulting the President first.  I knew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was right.

I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed to have a great desire to go inside the Confederate lines.  They finally asked permission of Lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the permission was granted.  They went over, had a very pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with them when they returned.

When Lee and I separated he went back to his lines and I returned to the house of Mr. McLean.  Here the officers of both armies came in great numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same flag.  For the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped their minds.  After an hour pleasantly passed in this way I set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort, for Burkesville Junction, up to which point the railroad had by this time been repaired.

CHAPTER LXVIII.

Morale of the two armies—­relative conditions of the north and south —­president Lincoln visits Richmond—­arrival at Washington—­president Lincoln’s assassination—­president Johnson’s policy.

After the fall of Petersburg, and when the armies of the Potomac and the James were in motion to head off Lee’s army, the morale of the National troops had greatly improved.  There was no more straggling, no more rear guards.  The men who in former times had been falling back, were now, as I have already stated, striving to get to the front.  For the first time in four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they could return to their homes with their country saved.  On the other hand, the Confederates were more than correspondingly

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There has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought between the sections, the South magnifying the number of Union troops engaged and belittling their own.  Northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same error.  I have often heard gentlemen, who were thoroughly loyal to the Union, speak of what a splendid fight the South had made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve four being colored slaves, non-combatants.  I will add to their argument.  We had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the South.

But the South had rebelled against the National government.  It was not bound by any constitutional restrictions.  The whole South was a military camp.  The occupation of the colored people was to furnish supplies for the army.  Conscription was resorted to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of State and intended National government.  The old and physically disabled furnished a good portion of these.  The slaves, the non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age.  Children from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were not much older when they began to hold the plough.  The four million of colored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number in the North, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support armies.  Women did not work in the fields in the North, and children attended school.

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The arts of peace were carried on in the North.  Towns and cities grew during the war.  Inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to increase the products of a day’s labor in the shop, and in the field.  In the South no opposition was allowed to the government which had been set up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellion had been successful.  No rear had to be protected.  All the troops in service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground threatened with invasion.  The press of the South, like the people who remained at home, were loyal to the Southern cause.

In the North, the country, the towns and the cities presented about the same appearance they do in time of peace.  The furnace was in blast, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only to supply the population of the North and the troops invading the South, but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war.  In the North the press was free up to the point of open treason.  The citizen could entertain his views and express them.  Troops were necessary in the Northern States to prevent prisoners from the Southern army being released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by fire our Northern cities.  Plans were formed by Northern and Southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers—­regardless of the destruction of innocent lives.  The copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes, and belittled those of the Union army.  It was, with a large following, an auxiliary to the Confederate army.  The North would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the Confederate ranks and the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the Union sentiment was in the South, than we were as the battle was fought.

As I have said, the whole South was a military camp.  The colored people, four million in number, were submissive, and worked in the field and took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause destined to defeat.  The cause was popular, and was enthusiastically supported by the young men.  The conscription took all of them.  Before the war was over, further conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as senior reserves.  It would have been an offence, directly after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the South, who was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had been in the Confederate army.  He would assert that he had, or account for his absence from the ranks.  Under such circumstances it is hard to conceive how the North showed such a superiority of force in every battle fought.  I know they did not.

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During 1862 and ’3, John H. Morgan, a partisan officer, of no military education, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rear of the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee.  He had no base of supplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went.  The army operating against the South, on the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the North, from which all supplies had to come to the front.  Every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient distances apart.  These guards could not render assistance beyond the points where stationed.  Morgan Was foot-loose and could operate where, his information—­always correct—­led him to believe he could do the greatest damage.  During the time he was operating in this way he killed, wounded and captured several times the number he ever had under his command at any one time.  He destroyed many millions of property in addition.  Places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by him.  Forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west, and held from the National front quite as many men as could be spared for offensive operations.  It is safe to say that more than half the National army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were on leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their bearing arms.  Then, again, large forces were employed where no Confederate army confronted them.  I deem it safe to say that there were no large engagements where the National numbers compensated for the advantage of position and intrenchment occupied by the enemy.

While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the President went to Richmond in company with Admiral Porter, and on board his flagship.  He found the people of that city in great consternation.  The leading citizens among the people who had remained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should be done to relieve them from suspense.  General Weitzel was not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the Confederate capital.  The President sent for him, and, on his arrival, a short interview was had on board the vessel, Admiral Porter and a leading citizen of Virginia being also present.  After this interview the President wrote an order in about these words, which I quote from memory:  “General Weitzel is authorized to permit the body calling itself the Legislature of Virginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia troops from the Confederate armies.”

Immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers.  This call, however, went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had contemplated, as he did not say the “Legislature of Virginia” but “the body which called itself the Legislature of Virginia.”  Mr. Stanton saw the call as published in the Northern papers the very next issue and took the liberty of countermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the Legislature, or any other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the President was nearer the spot than he was.

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This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton.  He was a man who never questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time what he wanted to do.  He was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist; but the Constitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted.  In this latter particular I entirely agree with the view he evidently held.  The Constitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861-5.  While it did not authorize rebellion it made no provision against it.  Yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy.  The Constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any way affected the progress and termination of the war.

Those in rebellion against the government of the United States were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the acts of their Congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for which the South was then fighting.  It would be a hard case when one-third of a nation, united in rebellion against the national authority, is entirely untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their efforts to maintain the Union intact, should be restrained by a Constitution prepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the permanency of the confederation of the States.

After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, I went with my staff and a few others directly to Burkesville Station on my way to Washington.  The road from Burkesville back having been newly repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the second day when I reached City Point.  As soon as possible I took a dispatch-boat thence to Washington City.

While in Washington I was very busy for a time in preparing the necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc.  But by the 14th I was pretty well through with this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then in Burlington, New Jersey, attending school.  Mrs. Grant was with me in Washington at the time, and we were invited by President and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to the theatre on the evening of that day.  I replied to the President’s verbal invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that I was very anxious to get away and visit my children, and if I could get through my work during the day I should do so.  I did get through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending Mr. Lincoln word, of course, that I would not be at the theatre.

At that time the railroad to New York entered Philadelphia on Broad Street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the Delaware River, and then ferried to Camden, at which point they took the cars again.  When I reached the ferry, on the east side of the City of Philadelphia, I found people awaiting my arrival there; and also dispatches informing me of the assassination of the President and Mr. Seward, and of the probable assassination of the Vice President, Mr. Johnson, and requesting my immediate return.

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It would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassination of the President.  I knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see all the people of the United States enter again upon the full privileges of citizenship with equality among all.  I knew also the feeling that Mr. Johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation against the Southern people, and I feared that his course towards them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a long while.  I felt that reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far.

I immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to Washington City; but Mrs. Grant was with me; it was after midnight and Burlington was but an hour away.  Finding that I could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from the Philadelphia station, I went up with her and returned immediately by the same special train.  The joy that I had witnessed among the people in the street and in public places in Washington when I left there, had been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of mourning.  I have stated what I believed then the effect of this would be, and my judgment now is that I was right.  I believe the South would have been saved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered by Mr. Johnson’s course towards them during the first few months of his administration.  Be this as it may, Mr. Lincoln’s assassination was particularly unfortunate for the entire nation.

Mr. Johnson’s course towards the South did engender bitterness of feeling.  His denunciations of treason and his ever-ready remark, “Treason is a crime and must be made odious,” was repeated to all those men of the South who came to him to get some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at something with the feeling that what they obtained would be secure to them.  He uttered his denunciations with great vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of safety, many Southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance.

The President of the United States is, in a large degree, or ought to be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and judgment of those over whom he presides; and the Southerners who read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the Northern people; whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, I believe the great majority of the Northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against their government.  They believed, I have no doubt, as I did, that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy.

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The people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into the Union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation.  Naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their old antagonists, and the better citizens they would be from the beginning.  They surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their necks.

I do not believe that the majority of the Northern people at that time were in favor of negro suffrage.  They supposed that it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred; but Mr. Johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the South not only as an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to consideration of any of our citizens.  This was more than the people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the Union were prepared for, and they became more radical in their views.  The Southerners had the most power in the executive branch, Mr. Johnson having gone to their side; and with a compact South, and such sympathy and support as they could get from the North, they felt that they would be able to control the nation at once, and already many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled to do so.

Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one hand, and receiving the support of the South on the other, drove Congress, which was overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one measure and then another to restrict his power.  There being a solid South on one side that was in accord with the political party in the North which had sympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of Congress and of the majority of the legislatures of the States, became necessary to enfranchise the negro, in all his ignorance.  In this work, I shall not discuss the question of how far the policy of Congress in this particular proved a wise one.  It became an absolute necessity, however, because of the foolhardiness of the President and the blindness of the Southern people to their own interest.  As to myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, I gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the people, I favored immediate enfranchisement.

CHAPTER LXIX.

Sherman and Johnston—­Johnston’s surrender to Sherman—­capture of Mobile—­Wilson’s expedition—­capture of Jefferson Davis—­general Thomas’s qualities—­estimate of general Canby.

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When I left Appomattox I ordered General Meade to proceed leisurely back to Burkesville Station with the Army of the Potomac and the Army of the James, and to go into camp there until further orders from me.  General Johnston, as has been stated before, was in North Carolina confronting General Sherman.  It could not be known positively, of course, whether Johnston would surrender on the news of Lee’s surrender, though I supposed he would; and if he did not, Burkesville Station was the natural point from which to move to attack him.  The army which I could have sent against him was superior to his, and that with which Sherman confronted him was also superior; and between the two he would necessarily have been crushed, or driven away.  With the loss of their capital and the Army of Northern Virginia it was doubtful whether Johnston’s men would have the spirit to stand.  My belief was that he would make no such attempt; but I adopted this course as a precaution against what might happen, however improbable.

Simultaneously with my starting from City Point, I sent a messenger to North Carolina by boat with dispatches to General Sherman, informing him of the surrender of Lee and his army; also of the terms which I had given him; and I authorized Sherman to give the same terms to Johnston if the latter chose to accept them.  The country is familiar with the terms that Sherman agreed to conditionally, because they embraced a political question as well as a military one and he would therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely.

General Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City Point while visiting there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what Mr. Lincoln had said to the peace commissioners when he met them at Hampton Roads, viz.:  that before he could enter into negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points:  one being that the Union should be preserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the terms upon which we would live together.  He had also seen notices in the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln’s visit to Richmond, and had read in the same papers that while there he had authorized the convening of the Legislature of Virginia.

Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that I had made with general Lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the President of the United States.  But seeing that he was going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms were only conditional.  They signed them with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be sent to Washington for approval; if approved by the proper authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, then he would give due notice, before resuming hostilities.  As the world knows,

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When, some days after my return to Washington, President Johnson and the Secretary of war received the terms which General Sherman had forwarded for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called and I was sent for.  There seemed to be the greatest consternation, lest Sherman would commit the government to terms which they were not willing to accede to and which he had no right to grant.  A message went out directing the troops in the South not to obey General Sherman.  I was ordered to proceed at once to North Carolina and take charge of matter there myself.  Of course I started without delay, and reached there as soon as possible.  I repaired to Raleigh, where Sherman was, as quietly as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of my presence.

When I arrived I went to Sherman’s headquarters, and we were at once closeted together.  I showed him the instruction and orders under which I visited him.  I told him that I wanted him to notify General Johnston that the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in Washington, and that he was authorized to offer the same terms I had given General Lee.  I sent Sherman to do this himself.  I did not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army generally; so I left it to Sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that I was anywhere near the field.  As soon as possible I started to get away, to leave Sherman quite free and untrammelled.

At Goldsboro’, on my way back, I met a mail, containing the last newspapers, and I found in them indications of great excitement in the North over the terms Sherman had given Johnston; and harsh orders that had been promulgated by the President and Secretary of War.  I knew that Sherman must see these papers, and I fully realized what great indignation they would cause him, though I do not think his feelings could have been more excited than were my own.  But like the true and loyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions I had given him, obtained the surrender of Johnston’s army, and settled down in his camp about Raleigh, to await final orders.

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There were still a few expeditions out in the South that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders.  With these it was impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of Lee and Johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do.

The three expeditions which I had tried so hard to get off from the commands of Thomas and Canby did finally get off:  one under Canby himself, against Mobile, late in March; that under Stoneman from East Tennessee on the 20th; and the one under Wilson, starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 22d of March.  They were all eminently successful, but without any good result.  Indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them.  The war was practically over before their victories were gained.  They were so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the armies which were gradually forcing the Confederate armies to a surrender.  The only possible good that we may have experienced from these raids was by Stoneman’s getting near Lynchburg about the time the armies of the Potomac and the James were closing in on Lee at Appomattox.

Stoneman entered North Carolina and then pushed north to strike the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.  He got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of Lynchburg.  His approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at Appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there.  He then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of Johnston’s army about the time the negotiations were going on between Sherman and Johnston for the latter’s surrender.  In this raid Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners were the trophies of his success.

Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of March.  The city of Mobile was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments—­Spanish Fort, on the east side of the bay, and Fort Blakely, north of the city.  These forts were invested.  On the night of the 8th of April, the National troops having carried the enemy’s works at one point, Spanish Fort was evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of Lee’s surrender, Blakely was carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us.  On the 11th the city was evacuated.

I had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent against Mobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage.  It finally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any bloodshed whatever.

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Wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed.  He was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly.  Forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige.  He now had principally conscripts.  His conscripts were generally old men and boys.  He had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of Wilson’s cavalry.  Selma fell on the 2d of April, with a large number of prisoners and a large quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to be disposed of by the victors.  Tuscaloosa, Montgomery and West Point fell in quick succession.  These were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of war material.  They were fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they were captured.  Macon surrendered on the 21st of April.  Here news was received of the negotiations for the surrender of Johnston’s army.  Wilson belonged to the military division commanded by Sherman, and of course was bound by his terms.  This stopped all fighting.

General Richard Taylor had now become the senior Confederate officer still at liberty east of the Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May he surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command.  General E. Kirby Smith surrendered the trans-Mississippi department on the 26th of May, leaving no other Confederate army at liberty to continue the war.

Wilson’s raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country.  This occurred at Irwinsville, Georgia, on the 11th of May.  For myself, and I believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling, I would have been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason:  I feared that if not captured, he might get into the trans-Mississippi region and there set up a more contracted confederacy.  The young men now out of homes and out of employment might have rallied under his standard and protracted the war yet another year.  The Northern people were tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgage upon their homes.

Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to escape, because he did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment.  He knew there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-Confederate president, for high treason.  He thought blood enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a nation.  At all events he did not wish to be the judge to decide whether more should be shed or not.  But his own life was sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president of the Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy.

All things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest of all concerned.  This reflection does not, however, abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and great a man as Abraham Lincoln.

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He would have proven the best friend the South could have had, and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out by reconstruction under a President who at first wished to revenge himself upon Southern men of better social standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the proposition to become their Moses to lead them triumphantly out of all their difficulties.

The story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period to stay the hands of the President is too fresh in the minds of the people to be told now.  Much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained.  These laws did serve their purpose, and now remain “a dead letter” upon the statute books of the United States, no one taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought.

Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. Davis was wearing when he was captured.  I cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of the facts; but I have been under the belief, from information given to me by General Wilson shortly after the event, that when Mr. Davis learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a gentleman’s dressing gown.  Naturally enough, Mr. Davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished provided it might be done successfully.  If captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner.  He represented all there was of that hostility to the government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war—­and the most costly in other respects of which history makes any record.  Every one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be executed.  Had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his admirers.

As my official letters on file in the War Department, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect upon General Thomas by dwelling somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that I give my estimate of him as a soldier.  The same remark will apply also in the case of General Canby.  I had been at West Point with Thomas one year, and had known him later in the old army.  He was a man of commanding appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave.  He possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree.  He gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost their love.  This implies a very valuable quality.  It is a quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops serving under the commander possessing it.

Thomas’s dispositions were deliberately made, and always good.  He could not be driven from a point he was given to hold.  He was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action.  I do not believe that he could ever have conducted Sherman’s army from Chattanooga to Atlanta against the defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864.  On the other hand, if it had been given him to hold the line which Johnston tried to hold, neither that general nor Sherman, nor any other officer could have done it better.

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Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the great tragedy of 1861-5.

General Canby was an officer of great merit.  He was naturally studious, and inclined to the law.  There have been in the army but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting every act of Congress and every regulation for the government of the army as he.  His knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staff officer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time of his being assigned to the Military Division of the Gulf.  He was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and learning.  I presume his feelings when first called upon to command a large army against a fortified city, were somewhat like my own when marching a regiment against General Thomas Harris in Missouri in 1861.  Neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else commanding.  Had Canby been in other engagements afterwards, he would, I have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility.  He was afterwards killed in the lava beds of Southern Oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile Modoc Indians.  His character was as pure as his talent and learning were great.  His services were valuable during the war, but principally as a bureau officer.  I have no idea that it was from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but because of his superior efficiency there.

CHAPTER LXX.

The end of the war—­the march to Washington—­one of Lincoln’s anecdotes —­grand review at Washington—­characteristics of Lincoln and Stanton —­estimate of the different corps commanders.

Things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in North Carolina and Virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out.  Suitable garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the South to insure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the government of the several States, and to insure security to the lives and property of all classes.  I do not know how far this was necessary, but I deemed it necessary, at that time, that such a course should be pursued.  I think now that these garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done.

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Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro, up to Manchester, on the south side of the James River, opposite Richmond, and there put them in camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what the situation was there.

It was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him.  Halleck had been sent to Richmond to command Virginia, and had issued orders prohibiting even Sherman’s own troops from obeying his, Sherman’s, orders.  Sherman met the papers on his return, containing this order of Halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage.  On his arrival at Fortress Monroe returning from Savannah, Sherman received an invitation from Halleck to come to Richmond and be his guest.  This he indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, furthermore, that he had seen his order.  He also stated that he was coming up to take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably be as well for Halleck not to show himself, because he (Sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person might do through indignation for the treatment he had received.  Very soon after that, Sherman received orders from me to proceed to Washington City, and to go into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of the troops.

There was no incident worth noting in the march northward from Goldsboro, to Richmond, or in that from Richmond to Washington City.  The army, however, commanded by Sherman, which had been engaged in all the battles of the West and had marched from the Mississippi through the Southern States to the sea, from there to Goldsboro, and thence to Washington City, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the Army of the Potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops, the entire theatre of the four years’ war for the preservation of the Union.

The march of Sherman’s army from Atlanta to the sea and north to Goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent in the way it was conducted.  It had an important bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war.  All the States east of the Mississippi River up to the State of Georgia, had felt the hardships of the war.  Georgia, and South Carolina, and almost all of North Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the Northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts.  Their newspapers had given such an account of Confederate success, that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the Yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with honor to themselves.

Even during this march of Sherman’s the newspapers in his front were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the Southern people.  As the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state of affairs.  In turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to submit without compromise.

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Another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of Georgia was entirely cut off from the Confederate armies.  As the troops advanced north from Savannah, the destruction of the railroads in South Carolina and the southern part of North Carolina, further cut off their resources and left the armies still in Virginia and North Carolina dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much exhausted of food and forage.

In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville Junction and the other from the neighborhood of Raleigh, North Carolina, arrived and went into camp near the Capital, as directed.  The troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever been in their lives.  I doubt whether an equal body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great battle.

The armies of Europe are machines; the men are brave and the officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of Europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called upon to take part.  Our armies were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships.

There was nothing of particular importance occurred during the time these troops were in camp before starting North.

I remember one little incident which I will relate as an anecdote characteristic of Mr. Lincoln.  It occurred a day after I reached Washington, and about the time General Meade reached Burkesville with the army.  Governor Smith of Virginia had left Richmond with the Confederate States government, and had gone to Danville.  Supposing I was necessarily with the army at Burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there informing me that, as governor of the Commonwealth of the State of Virginia, he had temporarily removed the State capital from Richmond to Danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the functions of his office there without molestation by the Federal authorities.  I give this letter only in substance.  He also inquired of me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country and go abroad without interference.  General Meade being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who brought it that I was not present. 

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I do not remember what the instructions were the President gave me, but I know that Governor Smith was not permitted to perform the duties of his office.  I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the country who desired to do so.  He would have been equally willing to permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their choice.

On the 18th of May orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a grand review by the President and his cabinet of Sherman’s and Meade’s armies.  The review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days.  Meade’s army occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the President’s house.  Sherman witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the President and his cabinet.  Here he showed his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the Secretary of War, by refusing to take his extended hand.

Sherman’s troops had been in camp on the south side of the Potomac.  During the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from the Capitol.  Promptly at ten o’clock on the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in review.  Sherman’s army made a different appearance from that of the Army of the Potomac.  The latter had been operating where they received directly from the North full supplies of food and clothing regularly:  the review of this army therefore was the review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy’s country, and of being ever on the watch.  Sherman’s

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The sight was varied and grand:  nearly all day for two successive days, from the Capitol to the Treasury Building, could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columns of companies.  The National flag was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from which to get a view of the grand armies.  The city was about as full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on inauguration day when a new President takes his seat.

It may not be out of place to again allude to President Lincoln and the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government.  There is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the President.  With Mr. Stanton the case is different.  They were the very opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each possessed great ability.  Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men by making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him.  He preferred yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having his own way.  It distressed him to disappoint others.  In matters of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least offensive way.  Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority to command, unless resisted.  He cared nothing for the feeling of others.  In fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify.  He felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising with him.  If his act was not sustained, he would change it—­if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so.

It was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement of each other.  The Secretary was required to prevent the President’s being imposed upon.  The President was required in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not done to others.  I do not know that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of the people.  It is not a correct view, however, in my estimation.  Mr. Lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public trust.

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Mr. Lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in making and executing their plans.  The Secretary was very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the Confederate capital.  He could see our weakness, but he could not see that the enemy was in danger.  The enemy would not have been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field.  These characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after Early came so near getting into the capital.

Among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war between the States, and who attracted much public attention, but of whose ability as soldiers I have not yet given any estimate, are Meade, Hancock, Sedgwick, Burnside, Terry and Hooker.  There were others of great merit, such as Griffin, Humphreys, Wright and Mackenzie.  Of those first named, Burnside at one time had command of the Army of the Potomac, and later of the Army of the Ohio.  Hooker also commanded the Army of the Potomac for a short time.

General Meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his usefulness that were beyond his control.  He had been an officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years of age.  He never had, I believe, a command of less than a brigade.  He saw clearly and distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own position.  His first idea was to take advantage of the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we wanted to move afterwards.  He was subordinate to his superiors in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own.  He was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who knew him.  He was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most offensive manner.  No one saw this fault more plainly than he himself, and no one regretted it more.  This made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with information.  In spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his country.

General Burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected.  He was not, however, fitted to command an army.  No one knew this better than himself.  He always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what they were entitled to.  It was hardly his fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command.

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Of Hooker I saw but little during the war.  I had known him very well before, however.  Where I did see him, at Chattanooga, his achievement in bringing his command around the point of Lookout Mountain and into Chattanooga Valley was brilliant.  I nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man.  He was not subordinate to his superiors.  He was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others.  His disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his standard all he could of his juniors.

Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers who did not exercise a separate command.  He commanded a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he was responsible.  He was a man of very conspicuous personal appearance.  Tall, well-formed and, at the time of which I now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that would attract the attention of an army as he passed.  His genial disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence of troops serving under him.  No matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander was looking after them.

Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I had an opportunity of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal observation.  I had known him in Mexico when both of us were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade.  He stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man.  He was brave and conscientious.  His ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread responsibility.  He was willing to do any amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct.  He declined the command of the Army of the Potomac once, if not oftener.

General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a volunteer without a military education.  His way was won without political influence up to an important separate command—­the expedition against Fort Fisher, in January, 1865.  His success there was most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-general of volunteers.  He is a man who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of their wants and their dues.  As a commander, he won their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any given time.

Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good corps commanders, but came into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract public attention.  All three served as such, in the last campaign of the armies of the Potomac and the James, which culminated at Appomattox Court House, on the 9th of April, 1865.  The sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything else.  I regarded Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the army.  Graduating at West Point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its close.  This he did upon his own merit and without influence.

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CONCLUSION.

The cause of the great War of the Rebellion against the United Status will have to be attributed to slavery.  For some years before the war began it was a trite saying among some politicians that “A state half slave and half free cannot exist.”  All must become slave or all free, or the state will go down.  I took no part myself in any such view of the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, I have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true.

Slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for its security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for its protection.  Hence the people of the South were dependent upon keeping control of the general government to secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution.  They were enabled to maintain this control long after the States where slavery existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout the Northern States.  They saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of the Northern States by enacting such laws as the Fugitive Slave Law.  By this law every Northern man was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a Southern man.  Northern marshals became slave-catchers, and Northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection of the institution.

This was a degradation which the North would not permit any longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute books.  Prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of the people of the North had no particular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not forced to have it themselves.  But they were not willing to play the role of police for the South in the protection of this particular institution.

In the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs and steamboats—­in a word, rapid transit of any sort—­the States were each almost a separate nationality.  At that time the subject of slavery caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind.  But the country grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the States got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the National government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution.

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It is probably well that we had the war when we did.  We are better off now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made.  The civilized nations of Europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of different nationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the few who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country or who knew anything about other people.  Then, too, our republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking out of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe generally believed that our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest strain was brought upon it.  Now it has shown itself capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality.

But this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of avoiding wars in the future.

The conduct of some of the European states during our troubles shows the lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come upon a single individual.  Seeing a nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population, wealth and intelligence, the European nations thought it would be well to give us a check.  We might, possibly, after a while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their institutions.  Hence, England was constantly finding fault with the administration at Washington because we were not able to keep up an effective blockade.  She also joined, at first, with France and Spain in setting up an Austrian prince upon the throne in Mexico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that Mexico had of being treated as an independent power.  It is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted.

Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from them.  Under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seized upon Mexico as a foothold for establishing a European monarchy upon our continent, thus threatening our peace at home.  I, myself, regarded this as a direct act of war against the United States by the powers engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the United States would treat it as such when their hands were free to strike.  I often spoke of the matter to Mr. Lincoln and the Secretary of War, but never heard any special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it.  I inferred that they felt a good deal as I did, but were unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our hands.

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All of the powers except France very soon withdrew from the armed intervention for the establishment of an Austrian prince upon the throne of Mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles in our way.  After the surrender of Lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, I sent Sheridan with a corps to the Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in expelling the French from Mexico.  These troops got off before they could be stopped; and went to the Rio Grande, where Sheridan distributed them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in the quarter of Mexico bordering on that stream.  This soon led to a request from France that we should withdraw our troops from the Rio Grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs.  Finally Bazaine was withdrawn from Mexico by order of the French Government.  From that day the empire began to totter.  Mexico was then able to maintain her independence without aid from us.

France is the traditional ally and friend of the United States.  I did not blame France for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the Mexican Republic.  That was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or merit.  He had succeeded in stealing the government of his country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and instincts of his people.  He tried to play the part of the first Napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role.  He sought by new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow.

Like our own war between the States, the Franco-Prussian war was an expensive one; but it was worth to France all it cost her people.  It was the completion of the downfall of Napoleon III.  The beginning was when he landed troops on this continent.  Failing here, the prestige of his name—­all the prestige he ever had—­was gone.  He must achieve a success or fall.  He tried to strike down his neighbor, Prussia—­and fell.

I never admired the character of the first Napoleon; but I recognize his great genius.  His work, too, has left its impress for good on the face of Europe.  The third Napoleon could have no claim to having done a good or just act.

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war.  There can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, in population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made to crush us out.  Now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate European powers for a time until we could prepare for them.

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We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put in the finest possible condition.  Neither of these cost much when it is considered where the money goes, and what we get in return.  Money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the meantime.  Money spent upon sea-coast defences is spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people.  The work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of security.

England’s course towards the United States during the rebellion exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother country.  I regretted it.  England and the United States are natural allies, and should be the best of friends.  They speak one language, and are related by blood and other ties.  We together, or even either separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish commerce between all the nationalities of the world.

England governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracing the people of different races from her own, better than any other nation.  She is just to the conquered, but rigid.  She makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer.  She does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she is at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home government.

The hostility of England to the United States during our rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent.  It was the hostility of the leaders of one political party.  I am told that there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get up in England a demonstration in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in favor of the Union, or, as they called it, in favor of the North.  Even in Manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the North at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing.

It is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before.  The condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of anxiety, to say the least.  But he was brought to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to remain here as any other class of our citizens.  It was looking to a settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of Santo Domingo during the time I was President of the United States.

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration, but by all the people, almost without price.  The island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions of people.  The products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the cost of their passage.  I took it that the colored people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states governed by their own race.  They would still be States of the Union, and under the protection of the General Government; but the citizens would be almost wholly colored.

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By the war with Mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed.  It was seen that the volunteers of the Mexican war largely composed the pioneers to settle up the Pacific coast country.  Their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important points of the territory acquired by that war.  After our rebellion, when so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of the villages, but wanted larger fields.  The mines of the mountains first attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys and productive grazing and farming lands were there.  This territory, the geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any portion of our country.  Railroads traverse it in every direction, north, south, east, and west.  The mines are worked.  The high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural lands are found in many of the valleys.  This is the work of the volunteer.  It is probable that the Indians would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for the war.  We must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good.

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth.  In fact an immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they move among entire strangers.  So much was the country divided into small communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak.  Before, new territories were settled by a “class”; people who shunned contact with others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them, would push out farther from civilization.  Their guns furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their bread and vegetables.  All the streams abounded with fish.  Trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the States once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they could not raise—­powder, lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store goods.  Occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter into these purchases—­a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey.

Little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements of these frontiersmen.  This is all changed now.  The war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise.  The feeling now is, that a youth must cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the world.  There is now such a commingling of the people that particular idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent; the country has filled up “from the centre all around to the sea”; railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the student of geography.

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The war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence.  We have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home, and the respect of other nations.  Our experience ought to teach us the necessity of the first; our power secures the latter.

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great harmony between the Federal and Confederate.  I cannot stay to be a living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but I feel it within me that it is to be so.  The universally kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemed to me the beginning of the answer to “Let us have peace.”

The expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section of the country, nor to a division of the people.  They came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations—­the Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and from the various societies of the land—­scientific, educational, religious or otherwise.  Politics did not enter into the matter at all.

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given because I was the object of it.  But the war between the States was a very bloody and a very costly war.  One side or the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an end.  I commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious side.  I was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that side of the controversy.  It is a significant and gratifying fact that Confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous move.  I hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end.

APPENDIX.

Report of lieutenant-general U. S. Grant, of the united states armies 1864-65.

Headquarters armies of the united states, Washington, D. C., July 22, 1865.

Hon.  E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

Sir:  I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to command the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war.  The resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

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The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of their armies.  It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy’s superior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance.  Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out.  Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say.  All I can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending forces was about as follows:  The Mississippi River was strongly garrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth.  The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream.  A few points in Southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande.  All the balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out.  The let-alone policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time.  But the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along the Mississippi River, and the disloyal

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Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies.  In the South, a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them.  This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals.  The army commanded by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac.  The army under Johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman.  In addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in North-east Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia and extreme eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign.

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Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies and the Department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the Army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements of all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources.  If the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do so.  More specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest extent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River against Shreveport, Louisiana (which had been organized previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of March, of the importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days’ more time than General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the Red River expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his expedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red River with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks), instead of a demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows: 

“1st.  If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

“2d.  That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande.  This can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions.  At least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.

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“3d.  By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number.  Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river.  According to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against Mobile.  To this I expect to add five thousand men from Missouri.  If however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against Mobile.  With these and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon Mobile.  Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut.  This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to co-operate.  You can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach.  My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but, from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about the matter.  It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon.  All I would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once.  Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general N. P. Banks.”

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee’s army would be his objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also.  For his movement two plans presented themselves:  One to cross the Rapidan below Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left.  Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections.  By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a raid.  But if we took this route, all we did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed how to cooperate.  If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or James rivers.  Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F. Butler: 

“Fort Monroe, Virginia, April 2, 1864.

“General:-In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished.

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“It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy.  But, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy’s country from the territory they have to guard.  By such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy’s force, if no greater object is gained.  Lee’s army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them.  The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move.  I propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable:  The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee’s army being the objective point.  You will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty—­I should say not less than twenty thousand effective men—­to operate on the south side of James River, Richmond being your objective point.  To the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person.  Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department.

“General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable.  Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made.

“When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as possible.  Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can.  From City Point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

“The fact that has already been stated—­that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your force and the Army of the Potomac—­must be your guide.  This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you advance.  Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit.

“All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction.  If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.

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“You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general B. F. Butler.”

On the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated.  On the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpeper.  The exact time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of April; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpeper and Richmond, if he would stand.  Should he, however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction with his (General Butler’s) army on the James River; that, could I be certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to have his left resting on the James, above the city, I would form the junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force there as possible.

In co-operation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines between the loyal States and the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was so held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania.  Whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison.  By such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them.  General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad.  Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own request, General Sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men.  The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down the Tennessee Railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the New River Bridge and the salt-works, at Saltville, Va.

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Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything being in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and capture the enemy’s important strongholds, made me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee’s army, to accomplish this desired result in the East.  If he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and still retain enough for the defence of Richmond.  It was well understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the James River, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible.  Believing, however, in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective point of his operations.  As the Army of the Potomac was to move simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James River.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the Army of the Potomac.  My instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him.  The campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place.  His commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would otherwise have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and orders of Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions.  Before night, the whole army was across the Rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at Germania Ford, and the second corps at Ely’s Ford, the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition.  The average distance travelled by the troops that day was about twelve miles.  This I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of crossing the river in the

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General Burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria Railroad, holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received.  This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th.  By six o’clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness Tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers.  Considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o’clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th.  After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion.  But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order.  On the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field.  From this it was evident to my mind that the two days’ fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works.  I therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank.  On the night of the 7th, the march was commenced towards Spottsylvania Court House, the fifth corps moving on the most direct road.  But the enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first.  On the 8th, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at Spottsylvania.  This force was steadily driven back on the main force,

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General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having joined him with the tenth corps.  At the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of Petersburg and Richmond.  On the 5th, he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise.  On the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and commenced intrenching.  On the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting.  On the 9th he telegraphed as follows: 

“Headquarters, near Bermuda landing, May 9, 1864.

“Hon.  E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War.

“Our operations may be summed up in a few words.  With one thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the Chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position.  These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets towards Richmond.

“General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same day with our movement up James River, forced the Black Water, burned the railroad bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting into Beauregard’s force at that point.

“We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of Lee’s army.  I have ordered up the supplies.

“Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting of the railroads by Kautz.  That portion which reached Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

“General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to Lee from Beauregard’s force.

“Benj.  F. Butler, Major-General.”

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy’s first line of defences at Drury’s Bluff, or Fort Darling, with small loss.  The time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and South Carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places.  On the 16th, the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front of Drury’s Bluff.  He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him.  His army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked.  It required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there.

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On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid against the Danville Railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chula Stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence, crossing to the South Side Road, struck it at Wilson’s, Wellsville, and Black’s and White’s Stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, which he reached on the 18th.

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H. W. Wessells, and our gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured.  The gunboat Smithfield was sunk, and the Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac.  In addition to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of Virginia.

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy.  I determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that they be sent forward, under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the Army of the Potomac.

On the 24th of May, the 9th army corps, commanded by Major-General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade’s command.

Finding the enemy’s position on the North Anna stronger than either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn the enemy’s position by his right.

Generals Torbert’s and Merritt’s divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the Pamunkey River at Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the enemy at Hawes’s Shop.  On the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and Cold Harbor Road, and developed the enemy’s position north of the Chickahominy.  Late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss.  An attack was immediately ordered by General Meade, along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

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On the 31st, General Wilson’s division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the South Anna River, after defeating the enemy’s cavalry.  General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and General Smith’s command, which had just arrived, via White House, from General Butler’s army.

On the 1st day of June an attack was made at five P.M. by the 6th corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders.  This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy’s first line of works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of General Smith.  During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance.  That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed.  The 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d.  On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy’s works, in the hope of driving him from his position.  In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light.  It was the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses.  I would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the city.  I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the James.  While the former might have been better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the James.  My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee’s army north of Richmond, if possible.  Then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat.  After the battle of the Wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had.  He acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily

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On the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan’s, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan’s instructions.

On the 10th of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry, under General Gillmore, and of cavalry under General Kautz, to capture Petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the Appomattox.  The cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire.  General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point, General Smith’s command by water, via the White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac.  This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th.  One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps.  The advance corps reached James River, at Wilcox’s Landing and Charles City Court House, on the night of the 13th.

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia had been confronting each other.  In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of either.  The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their Capital and Southern territory.  Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were

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During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James River, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels.  Too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them.  Under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May.  General Crook, who had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averell.  They crossed the mountains by separate routes.  Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, near Wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to New River and Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including New River Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at Union on the 15th.  General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy at New Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek.  Not regarding the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command, and Major-General Hunter appointed to supersede him.  His instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to Major-General H. W. Halleck, chief of staff of the army: 

“Near Spottsylvania Court house, Va.  “May 20, 1864.

* * * * * * * “The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through Staunton.  On the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition.  If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service. * * *

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“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general H. W. Halleck.”

“Jericho Ford, Va., May 25, 1864.

“If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country.  The railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks.  Completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general H. W. Halleck.”

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms.  On the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, via Lexington, which place he reached and invested on the 16th day of June.  Up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point.  The destruction of the enemy’s supplies and manufactories was very great.  To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg a short time before Hunter.  After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place.  Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of Kanawha.  This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it.  If it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburg and the force sent for its defence.  I have never taken exception to the operations of General Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service.  The promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac:  The 2d corps commenced crossing the James River on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at Wilcox’s Landing.  The laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry.

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After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held.  I told him that I would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing and throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us.  General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy’s pickets near Petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason that I have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown.  Then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg from the Appomattox River, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners.  This was about seven P.M.  Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source.  The night was clear the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations.  General Hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops.  But instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force.  An attack was ordered to be made at six o’clock that evening by the troops under Smith and the 2d and 9th corps.  It required until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position.  The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o’clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners.

The 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged.  The advantages of position gained by us were very great.  The army then proceeded to envelop Petersburg towards the South Side Railroad as far as possible without attacking fortifications.

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On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, to get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn before we could discover it.  General Butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond.  As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking at Wilcox’s Landing, under orders for City Point, to report to General Butler at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged upon him.

About two o’clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning.  General Wright, with his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy’s works.  But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy’s works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line.  Between four and five o’clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line.

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with Bermuda Hundred.

On the 19th, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the Virginia Central Railroad, arrived at the White House just as the enemy’s cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire.  The result of this expedition was, that General Sheridan met the enemy’s cavalry near Trevilian Station, on the morning of the 11th of June, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout.  He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses.  On the 12th he destroyed the railroad from Trevilian Station to Louisa Court House.  This occupied until three o’clock P.M., when he advanced in the direction of Gordonsville.  He found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter place and too strong to successfully assault.  On the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy’s works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry.  Night closed the contest.  Not having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching White House at the time before stated.  After breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after heavy fighting.  He commenced crossing on the 25th, near Fort Powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

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On the 22d, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, and General Kautz’s division of cavalry of the Army of the James moved against the enemy’s railroads south of Richmond.  Striking the Weldon Railroad at Reams’s Station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and the South Side road about fifteen miles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway Station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy’s cavalry.  He reached Burkesville Station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the Danville Railroad to Roanoke Bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not dislodge him.  He then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met the enemy’s cavalry in force at the Weldon Railroad crossing of Stony Creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement.  Thence he made a detour from his left with a view of reaching Reams’s Station (supposing it to be in our possession).  At this place he was met by the enemy’s cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains.  In this last encounter, General Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines.  General Wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our left and rear.  The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained.  It severed all connection by railroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy’s railroad from near Richmond to the Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy’s lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of July the 2d corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz’s cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the James River and joined the force General Butler had there.  On the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery.  On the 28th our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Market Road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force.  The fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides.  The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force back there.  One division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the assault to be made.  The other two divisions of the 2d corps and Sheridan’s cavalry were crossed over on

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Immediately upon the enemy’s ascertaining that General Hunter was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus laying the Shenandoah Valley open for raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that valley.  As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha River, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to Harper’s Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there.  It became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy.  For this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against Richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red River expedition.  The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days’ men, and detachments from the invalid corps.  One division under command of General Ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under General Wright, were subsequently sent to Washington.  On the 3d of July the enemy approached Martinsburg.  General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at Shepherdtown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper’s Ferry, crossed the occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column towards Frederick City.  General Wallace, with Rickett’s division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge.  His force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms,

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Learning that Early was retreating south towards Lynchburg or Richmond, I directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley; and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible.  I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave Washington.  Subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to return to the James.

About the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper’s Ferry.  The rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania which on the 30th burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards Cumberland.  They were met and defeated by General Kelley, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia.  From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat.  It took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been.  To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the Department of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle Department, and I so recommended.

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On the 2d of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to Major-General Halleck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against Early.  At this time the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while our forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, leaving open to the enemy Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania.  From where I was, I hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington.  Therefore, on the 4th, I left City Point to visit Hunter’s command, and determine for myself what was best to be done.  On arrival there, and after consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following instructions: 

“Monocacy bridge, Maryland, August 5, 1864—­8 P.M.

“General:—­Concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of Harper’s Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary.  Use, in this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved.  From Harper’s Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so.  If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes.  In detaching such a force, the brigade of the cavalry now en route from Washington via Rockville may be taken into account.

“There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses.  These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac.  One brigade will probably start to-morrow.  In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return.  Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy.  It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed—­they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

“Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this you want to keep him always in sight.  Be guided in your course by the course he takes.

“Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march.

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“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general D. Hunter.”

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached
Halltown that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper’s Ferry by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions.  I remained at Monocacy until General Sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of Washington.

On the 7th of August, the Middle Department, and the Departments of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna, were constituted into the “Middle Military Division,” and Major-General Sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac.  The first reached him at Harper’s Ferry about the 11th of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place.  The two armies lay in such a position—­the enemy on the west bank of the Opequon Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville—­that either could bring on a battle at any time.  Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him.  Under these circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken.  Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined the risk should be taken.  But fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan’s feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City Point on the 15th of September to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done.  I met him at Charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of instructions necessary—­Go in!  For the conveniences of forage, the teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper’s Ferry.  I asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing Tuesday morning.  His reply was, that he could before daylight on Monday.  He was off promptly to time, and I may here add, that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

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Early on the morning of the 19th, General Sheridan attacked General Early at the crossing on the Opequon Creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o’clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequon Creek to Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery.  The enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher’s Hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th [22d].  Sheridan pursued him with great energy through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge.  After stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of Cedar Creek.

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early again returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of October, his cavalry encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty prisoners.  On the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains which separate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the North Fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole line.  Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and Newtown.  At this juncture, General Sheridan, who was at Winchester when the battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor.  The enemy was defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning.  The wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg.  Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson.  Thus ended this, the enemy’s last attempt to invade the North via the Shenandoah Valley.  I was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the Army of the Potomac, and to send one division from Sheridan’s army to the Army of the James, and another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman’s new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early in the Shenandoah Valley.  I therefore sent the 2d corps and Gregg’s division of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a force of General Butler’s army, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent.  In this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division (Kershaw’s), of the three reputed detached, had gone.

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The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist this movement, the 5th corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the Weldon Railroad.  During the day he had considerable fighting.  To regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss.  On the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front at Petersburg.  On the 25th, the 2d corps and Gregg’s division of cavalry, while at Reams’s Station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the 12th of September, a branch railroad was completed from the City Point and Petersburg Railroad to the Weldon Railroad, enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon Railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the James for the defence of Richmond.  On the night of the 28th, the 10th corps, Major-General Birney, and the 18th corps, Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler’s army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below Chaffin’s Farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the New Market Road and intrenchments.  This success was followed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front of the Chaffin Farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss.  Kautz’s cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy’s inner line, but was unable to get further.  The position captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond, that I determined to hold it.  The enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly.  On the morning of the 30th, General Meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the enemy’s line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side.  In this reconnoissance we captured and held the enemy’s works near Poplar Spring Church.  In the afternoon, troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured works.  Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss.

On the 7th of October, the enemy attacked Kautz’s cavalry north of the James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces.  This he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter.  On the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us.

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On the 27th, the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy’s right flank.  The 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher’s Run, and moved up the south side of it towards the South Side Railroad, until the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the Boydton Plank Road where it crosses Hatcher’s Run.  At this point we were six miles distant from the South Side Railroad, which I had hoped by this movement to reach and hold.  But finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy’s fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I determined to withdraw to within our fortified line.  Orders were given accordingly.  Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connected with General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters.  Soon after I left the enemy moved out across Hatcher’s Run, in the gap between Generals Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on General Hancock’s right and rear.  General Hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement, General Butler made a demonstration on the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsburg Road, and also on the York River Railroad.  In the former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy’s lines of communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south.  By the 7th of February, our lines were extended to Hatcher’s Run, and the Weldon Railroad had been destroyed to Hicksford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the 6th of May, with the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded, respectively, by Generals Thomas McPherson, and Schofield, upon Johnston’s army at Dalton; but finding the enemy’s position at Buzzard’s Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPherson was sent through Snake Gap to turn it, while Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it in front and on the north.  This movement was successful.  Johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May 15th.  A heavy battle ensued.  During the night the enemy retreated south.  Late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed.  The next morning, however, he had again disappeared.  He was vigorously

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On the 4th of June, Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at New Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, Pine, and Lost mountains.  He was forced to yield the two last-named places, and concentrate his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Generals Thomas and McPherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault.  On the night of the 2d of July, Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned Kenesaw and retreated across the Chattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee to give his men rest and get up stores until the 17th of July, when he resumed his operations, crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to Augusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta.  At this place General Hood succeeded General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of July.  About one P.M. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted McPherson was killed.  General Logan succeeded him, and commanded the Army of the Tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss.  Finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after securing his line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy’s left flank upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications.  In this he succeeded, and after defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro, and Lovejoy’s, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of September occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton, and driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro, and Franklin, and was finally driven south of the Tennessee.  The damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days.

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During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau joined General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad, and its branches near Opelika.  Cavalry raids were also made by Generals McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the remaining Railroad communication with Atlanta.  The first two were successful the latter, disastrous.

General Sherman’s movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt, skilful, and brilliant.  The history of his flank movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying it, give the details of that most successful campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating.  This passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops.  The cavalry force of the enemy under Forrest, in Northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of Georgia, to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility of further use.  To guard against this danger, Sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in West Tennessee.  He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him.  On the morning of the 10th of June, General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy.  By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon Sherman’s line of communications.  The persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary.  In the meantime, Major-General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been sent by General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return from Red River, where they had done most excellent service.  He was directed by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against Forrest.  This he did with the promptness and effect which has characterized his whole military career.  On the 14th of July, he met the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly.  The fighting continued through three days.  Our loss was small compared with that of the enemy.  Having accomplished the object of his expedition, General Smith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April this same force under Forrest annoyed us considerably.  On the 24th of March it captured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, 40th Illinois Volunteers.  Colonel H., having but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place.

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On the 13th of April, part of this force, under the rebel General Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, but received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, 34th New Jersey Volunteers, that being placed there by his Government with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the question.

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and the 1st Regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth.  The garrison fought bravely until about three o’clock in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest’s operations, were also very active in Kentucky.  The most noted of these was Morgan.  With a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the State through Pound Gap in the latter part of May.  On the 11th of June they attacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison.  On the 12th he was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of the State.  This notorious guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by General Gillem.

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the Red River expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, I am unable to give the date of its starting.  The troops under General Smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left Vicksburg on the 10th of March, and reached the designated point on Red River one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks.  The rebel forces at Fort de Russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fort de Russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small-arms.  Our loss was but slight.  On the 15th he pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th.  On the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson’s Hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four pieces of artillery.

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On the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel General Taylor, at Cane River.  By the 26th, General Banks had assembled his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to Grand Ecore.  On the morning of April 6th he moved from Grand Ecore.  On the afternoon of the 7th, he advanced and met the enemy near Pleasant Hill, and drove him from the field.  On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat.  On the 8th, at Sabine Cross Roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores.  During the night, General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss.  During the night, General Banks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to Alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April.  Here a serious difficulty arose in getting Admiral Porter’s fleet which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their return.  At the suggestion of Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14th of May, after considerable skirmishing with the enemy’s advance, and reached Morganzia and Point Coupee near the end of the month.  The disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of Mobile.

On the 23d of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the 7th army corps, to cooperate with General Banks’s expedition on the Red River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th.  On the 16th of April, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near Elkin’s Ferry, in Washita County, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith.  After several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, General Steele reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Red River, and the loss of one of his own trains at Mark’s Mill, in Dallas County, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas River.  He left Camden on the 26th of April, and reached Little Rock on the 2d of May.  On the 30th of April, the enemy attacked him while crossing Saline River at Jenkins’s Ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss.  Our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the “Military Division of the West Mississippi,” was therefore directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then occupied.

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Before starting General A. J. Smith’s troops back to Sherman, General Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the Mississippi River.  General Smith met and defeated this force near Lake Chicot on the 5th of June.  Our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General Gordon Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile Bay.  On the 8th of August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces.  Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the 9th, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment, surrendered on the 23d.  The total captures amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith’s command, then en route from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri.  A cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow.  This made General Rosecrans’s forces superior to those of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas, would cut off his retreat.  On the 26th day of September, Price attacked Pilot Knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the Missouri River, and continued up that river towards Kansas.  General Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General Rosecrans’s cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners.  He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Arkansas.  The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force may be used.  There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September 20th, the enemy’s cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th.  Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender.  Forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard.  On the morning of

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Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack.  On the morning of the 3d he moved towards Mount Pleasant.  While these operations were going on, every exertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroy the saltworks at Saltville, Virginia.  He met the enemy on the 2d of October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge him.  During the night he withdrew his command and returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service.  The great length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to fully meet them.  He exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with this army, was soon reported to the south-west of Atlanta.  Moving far to Sherman’s right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama.  Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows: 

“Centreville, Georgia”, October 10—­noon.

“Dispatch about Wilson just received.  Hood is now crossing Coosa River, twelve miles below Rome, bound west.  If he passes over the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee to defend the State?  He will have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach Nashville.

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“W.  T. Sherman, Major-General. 
“Lieutenant-general grant.”

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter: 

“I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby’s should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city of Savannah is in our possession.”  This was in reply to a letter of mine of date September 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia, etc.

“City point, Virginia,

“October 11, 1864—­11 A.M.

“Your dispatch of October 10th received.  Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee River, about Florence or Decatur?  If he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River.  If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood’s army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home.  Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south.  If there is any way of getting at Hood’s army, I would prefer that, but I must trust to your own judgment.  I find I shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah.  Your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place.  I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from going north.  With Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general W. T. Sherman.”

“Kingston, Georgia, “October 11—­11 A.M.

“Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rome.  He threw one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow.  I hold Atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line.  This reduces my active force to a comparatively small army.  We cannot remain here on the defensive.  With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly

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“Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

“W.  T. Sherman, Major-General. 
“Lieutenant-general grant.”

“City point, Virginia, “October 11,1864—­11.30 P.M.

“Your dispatch of to-day received.  If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee River firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general W. T. Sherman.”

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east and west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west.  In other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi River.  General Sherman’s plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch Hood.  Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, General Sherman sent the 4th corps, Major-General Stanley commanding, and the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, back to Chattanooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through Georgia.  With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle.  It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of November, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon.  His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed.  Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer.  The blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood’s army, the only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi River, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and Sherman’s route to his own choice.

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How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of Fort McAllister, on the Savannah River, and the occupation of Savannah on the 21st of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman’s admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy’s lines of communication with Mobile and detain troops in that field.  General Foster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, via Broad River, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah.  The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-General E. D. Osband (colonel 3d United States colored cavalry), captured, on the 27th of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central Railroad bridge and trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores.  The expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results.  The expedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad River and debarked at Boyd’s Neck on the 29th of November, from where it moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville.  At Honey Hill, about three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing.  During the night General Hatch withdrew.  On the 6th of December General Foster obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah Railroad, between the Coosawhatchie and Tulifinny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom.  At all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting.  On the 26th of October, the advance of Hood’s army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but failing to carry the place, withdrew towards Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Florence.  On the 28th, Forrest reached the Tennessee, at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports.  On the 2d of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports.  On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison.  The gunboats becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. 

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On the 19th, General Hood continued his advance.  General Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards Nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements.  The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed.  His loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three thousand eight hundred wounded.  Among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured.  Our entire loss was two thousand three hundred.  This was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations.  During the night, General Schofield fell back towards Nashville.  This left the field to the enemy—­not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned—­so that General Thomas’s whole force might be brought together.  The enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of Nashville on the 2d of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennessee River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith’s command, and such other troops as he could spare.  The advance of this reinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of November.

On the morning of the 15th December, General Thomas attacked Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay.  This impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky.  I feared Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there.  After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started West to superintend matters there in person.  Reaching Washington

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After Hood’s defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation.  On the 28th of December our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and North Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee River.  A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, 15th Pennsylvania Volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy’s pontoon-bridge.  The details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in General Thomas’s report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started from Memphis on the 21st of December.  On the 25th he surprised and captured Forrest’s dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for Hood’s army, four thousand new English carbines, and large amounts of public stores.  On the morning of the 28th he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the Mississippi Central Railroad at Winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January 5th.

During the operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee.  On the 13th of November he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners.  Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to Knoxville.  Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by General Ammen.  Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean’s Station to operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia —­destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia as far

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Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic value.  The navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect.  The nature of the outlet of Cape Fear River was such, that it required watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of New Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a land force, which I agreed to furnish.  Immediately commenced the assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point.  This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both North and South.  The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it.  This caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time of starting.  A force of six thousand five hundred men was regarded as sufficient.  The time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of December, if not before.  Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to make all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment.

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On the 6th of December, the following instructions were given: 

“City point, Virginia, December 6, 1864.

“General:  The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington.  If successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington itself.  There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy’s forces now looking after Sherman in Georgia.  The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken.  The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between Cape Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river.  Should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places.  These in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would be sealed.  Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise.  If time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration.

“The details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops.

“Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against Richmond without delay.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general B. F. Butler.”

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him.  They were so sent, but General Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read General Butler’s published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my indorsement and papers accompanying it.  I had no idea of General Butler’s accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in command.  I rather formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat.  The expedition was detained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

Page 104

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived at the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening of the 15th.  Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors.  The sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th.  The powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of General Butler from Beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southern newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they were informed by the Northern press.

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up towards the fort.  But before receiving a full report of the result of this reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the expedition.  The re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th.

On the return of the expedition officers and men among them Brevet Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M. Curtis, First-Lieutenant G. W. Ross, 117th Regiment New York Volunteers, First-Lieutenant William H. Walling, and Second-Lieutenant George Simpson, 142d New York Volunteers voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a dispatch from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken.  The natural supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also.  Finding it had not, however, I answered on the 30th of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would send a force and make another attempt to take the place.  This time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry to command the expedition.  The troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train.  The latter it was never found necessary to land.  I communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions: 

“City point, Virginia, January 3, 1865.

“General:  The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls.  You will then proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

Page 105

“It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander.  I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action.  It would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing.  I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes.  I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities.  The first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort.  You want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy.  If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

“My own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear River, while the balance of it operates on the outside.  Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy.

“A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required.  All other supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them.

“Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured.  When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

“In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions.  You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

“General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels.  These troops will be brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from.  Should you require them, they will be sent to you.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Brevet major-general A. H. Terry.”

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher.  This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer.

Page 106

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off Beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination that evening.  Under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by three o’clock P.M. was completed without loss.  On the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort.  This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire.  In the afternoon of the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison and armament.  Thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war.  Our loss was:  killed, one hundred and ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six.  On the 16th and the 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell and the works on Smith’s Island, which were immediately occupied by us.  This gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River.

At my request, Mayor-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia and North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas’s surplus troops—­fields from which they would co-operate with other movements.  General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications at Eastport, in readiness for orders.  On the 7th of January, General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General Schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible.  This direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached Washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and New Bern.  On the 26th he was directed to send General A. J. Smith’s command and a division of cavalry to report to General Canby.  By the 7th of February the whole force was en route for its destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department, and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of Major-General Sherman.  The following instructions were given him: 

“City point, Va., January 31, 1865.

Page 107

“General:—­ * * * Your movements are intended as co-operative with Sherman’s through the States of South and North Carolina.  The first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington.  Goldsboro’ will then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or New Bern, or both, as you deem best.  Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro’, you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast—­as near to it as you can, building the road behind you.  The enterprise under you has two objects:  the first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march.  As soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or New Bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days’ rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals.  You will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy.  I believe General Palmer has received some instructions direct from General Sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army.  You will learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly.  A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary.

“Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at City Point.  Communicate with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph.

“The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own command.

“The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid Sherman.  In such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting for instructions.  You will report, however, what you purpose doing.  The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you.  I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action.  Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro’ any time from the 22d to the 28th of February; this limits your time very materially.

“If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supplied from Washington.  A large force of railroad men have already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two.  On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general J. M. Schofield.”

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher, accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.

Page 108

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah his army entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture of Lee’s army as the most important operation towards closing the rebellion—­I sent orders to General Sherman on the 6th of December, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point with the balance of his command.

On the 18th of December, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of Hood’s army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport Sherman’s army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do.  A few days after this I received a communication from General Sherman, of date 16th December, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation.  Also that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me; but that this would consume about six weeks’ time after the fall of Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of January.  The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to make preparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as he could.

On the 21st of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the 23d corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at Fort Fisher, about eight thousand men; at New Bern, about four thousand; that if Wilmington was captured, General Schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to New Bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior towards Goldsboro’, in co-operation with his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in co-operation with the navy under Admiral Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear River.  Fort Anderson, the enemy’s main defence on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it.

Page 109

After fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards Goldsboro’ during the night.  Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro’ in two columns—­one from Wilmington, and the other from New Bern—­and to repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by Cape Fear River, towards Fayetteville, if it became necessary.  The column from New Bern was attacked on the 8th of March, at Wise’s Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners.  On the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the night.  On the 14th the Neuse River was crossed and Kinston occupied, and on the 21st Goldsboro’ was entered.  The column from Wilmington reached Cox’s Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro’, on the 22d.

By the 1st of February, General Sherman’s whole army was in motion from Savannah.  He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 17th; thence moved on Goldsboro’, North Carolina, via Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of March, opening up communication with General Schofield by way of Cape Fear River.  On the 15th he resumed his march on Goldsboro’.  He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro’, and after a severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat.  Our loss in this engagement was about six hundred.  The enemy’s loss was much greater.  On the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under Joe Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it back upon the main body.  General Slocum, who was in the advance ascertaining that the whole of Johnston’s army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which were pushed forward.  On the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands.  From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro’, which place had been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the Neuse River ten miles above there, at Cox’s Bridge, where General Terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a junction with the columns from New Bern and Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston, South Carolina.  It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of February, and occupied by our forces on the 18th.

On the morning of the 31st of January, General Thomas was directed to send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman, from East Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well down towards Columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible.  Of the feasibility of this latter, however, General Stoneman was to judge. 

Page 110

“City point, Va., February 14, 1865.

“General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama.  His force will consist of about twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith’s command.  The cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg.  It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation.  Hood’s army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn.  It is so asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is not true, Canby’s movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your standpoint easy.  I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south.  The object would be threefold:  first, to attract as much of the enemy’s force as possible, to insure success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy’s line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field.  Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against.  This, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama.  Discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above.

“Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what number of men you can put into the field.  If not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient.  It is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week.  I do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn.  If you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received.

Page 111

“To insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies.  I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken.  No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses.

“Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you will be able to send under these directions.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general G. H. Thomas.”

On the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the 20th as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the city, north of James River, should be cut off.  The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce Sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly the latter of the objects.  I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as follows: 

“City point, Va., February 20, 1865—­1 P.M.

“General:—­As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone.  From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion.  Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after Mosby’s gang.  From Lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams in Virgina to the westward of Danville, and push on and join General Sherman.  This additional raid, with one now about starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, then thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon.  I would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this.  Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday 1st.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general P. H. Sheridan.”

On the 25th I received a dispatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina.  In answer, the following telegram was sent him: 

Page 112

“City point, Va., February 25, 1865.

“General:—­Sherman’s movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets with from the enemy.  If strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit out for a new start.  I think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed.  I believe he has passed Charlotte.  He may take Fayetteville on his way to Goldsboro’.  If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after movements by the information you obtain.  Before you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from Goldsboro’ towards Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington or New Bern.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general P. H. Sheridan.”

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February, with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each.  On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to Waynesboro’.  Thence he pushed on to Waynesboro’, where he found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under General Early.  Without stopping to make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured.  The prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester.  Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d.  Here he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards Richmond and Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the Rivanna River and awaited the arrival of his trains.  This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg.  On the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River Canal to New Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal.  From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to obtain possession of the bridge across the James River at that place, but failed.  The enemy burned it on our approach.  The enemy also burned the bridge across the river at Hardwicksville.  The other column moved down the railroad towards Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst Court House, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at New Market.  The river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by

Page 113

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas: 

“City point, Virginia, March 7, 1865—­9.30 A.M.

“General:—­I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull’s Gap and fortify there.  Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as required.  With Bull’s Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign towards Lynchburg, or into North Carolina.  I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he gets into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be caught west of that.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general G. H. Thomas.”

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expeditions—­one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson against the enemy’s vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee, under Major-General Stoneman, towards Lynchburg—­and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan’s cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James were confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of Richmond and Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro’; General Pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

Page 114

After the long march by General Sheridan’s cavalry over winter roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House.  At this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit.  On the 24th of March, General Sheridan moved from White House, crossed the James River at Jones’s Landing, and formed a junction with the Army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg on the 27th.  During this move, General Ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the Chickahominy.

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond were issued: 

“City point, Virginia, March 24, 1865.

“General:  On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville railroads.  Two corps of the Army of the Potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two roads crossing Hatcher’s Run, nearest where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards Dinwiddie Court House.

“The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the division now under General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldon Road and the Jerusalem Plank Road, turning west from the latter before crossing the Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching Stony Creek.  General Sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will be given him.  All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the Middle Military Division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the defences of City Point.  Major-General Parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines about Petersburg and City Point, subject of course to orders from the commander of the Army of the Potomac.  The 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held.  If, however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the Weldon Road.  All troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given.

“General Ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the Army of the Potomac.  In the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the Army of the Potomac, and the colored division the right column.  During the movement Major-General Weitzel will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the Army of the James.

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“The movement of troops from the Army of the James will commence on the night of the 27th instant.  General Ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army.  A cavalry expedition, from General Ord’s command, will also be started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of April, under Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about Hicksford.  This, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient.  They should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the Blackwater.  The crossing should probably be at Uniten.  Should Colonel Sumner succeed in reaching the Weldon Road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston.  The railroad bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke.  All the troops will move with four days’ rations in haversacks and eight days’ in wagons.  To avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of days’ supplies with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing.  Sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies.  The densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders.

“All necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced at once.  The reserves of the 9th corps should be massed as much as possible.  While I would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy’s line by them, they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders.  In case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army.  To prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army.  General Weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so.  A success north of the James should be followed up with great promptness.  An attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely.  In that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence of Richmond.  Preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the James, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy.

Page 116

“By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against Richmond is left behind.  The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the moving column, and return.  It cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it.  The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines.  I would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action.  I would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged.  In like manner, I would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-generals Meade, Ord, and Sheridan.”

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front of the 9th corps (which held from the Appomattox River towards our left), and carried Fort Stedman, and a part of the line to the right and left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners.  Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred and six missing.  General Meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts.  Pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy’s strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners.  The enemy made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without success.  Our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven missing.  The enemy’s loss in killed and wounded was far greater.

General Sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about Goldsboro’, and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command to bear against Lee’s army, in co-operation with our forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg.  General Sherman proposed in this movement to threaten Raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roanoke at Gaston or thereabouts, whence he could move on to the Richmond

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I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before.  I was firmly convinced that Sherman’s crossing the Roanoke would be the signal for Lee to leave.  With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary.  By moving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the Danville Road, retard the concentration of the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save.  I therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered.

On the night of the 27th, Major-General Ord, with two divisions of the 24th corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and one division of the 25th corps, Brigadier-General Birney commanding, and MacKenzie’s cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned him near Hatcher’s Run on the morning of the 29th.  On the 28th the following instructions were given to General Sheridan: 

“City point, Va., March 28, 1865.

“General:—­The 5th army corps will move by the Vaughn Road at three A.M. to-morrow morning.  The 2d moves at about nine A.M., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddie Court House.  Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads.  You may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can.  It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible.  Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate.  I shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you.  Should I not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville Road.  If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the South Side Road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent.  I would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville Road, which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible.  Make your destruction on that road as complete as possible.  You can then pass on to the South Side Road, west of Burkesville, and destroy that in like manner.

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“After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee’s army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into North Carolina and join General Sherman.  Should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro’.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general P. H. Sheridan.”

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced.  At night the cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court House, and the left of our infantry line extended to the Quaker Road, near its intersection with the Boydton Plank Road.  The position of the troops from left to right was as follows:  Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made.  I therefore addressed the following communication to General Sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so: 

“Gravelly creek, March 29, 1865.

“General:—­Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie.  We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem Plank Road to Hatcher’s Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously.  After getting into line south of Hatcher’s, we pushed forward to find the enemy’s position.  General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker Road intersects the Boydton Road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men.  Humphreys reached Dabney’s Mill, and was pushing on when last heard from.

“I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back.  I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy’s roads at present.  In the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear.  The movements of the enemy’s cavalry may, of course, modify your action.  We will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy.  The signal-officer at Cobb’s Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general P. H. Sheridan.”

From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them.  During the 30th, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he found the enemy in full force.  General Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy

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Page 120

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th corps.  The report of this reached me after nightfall.  Some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and open the way for retreat.  To guard against this, General Miles’s division of Humphreys’s corps was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o’clock in the morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy’s lines.  General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher’s Run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners.  He was closely followed by two divisions of General Ord’s command, until he met the other division of General Ord’s that had succeeded in forcing the enemy’s lines near Hatcher’s Run.  Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General Wright on the left.  General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy’s main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line.  General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, returned General Miles to his proper command.  On reaching the enemy’s lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon’s corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works—­the most salient and commanding south of Petersburg—­thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city.  The enemy south of Hatcher’s Run retreated westward to Sutherland’s Station, where they were overtaken by Miles’s division.  A severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford’s Station towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners.  This force retreated by the main road along the Appomattox River.  During the night of the 2d the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville.  On the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced.  General Sheridan pushed for the Danville Road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville, along the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along that road behind him.  On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville Road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court House.  He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day.  General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.

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On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the following communication: 

“Wilson’s station, April 5, 1865.

“General:  All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville with the remnant of his force.  Sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized.  We hope to reduce this number one-half.  I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go there.  If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee’s and Johnston’s armies.  Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro’, or nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this.  Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“Major-general W. T. Sherman.”

On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving west of Jetersville, towards Danville.  General Sheridan moved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to General Meade on his reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery.  General Ord advanced from Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges.  This advance met the head of Lee’s column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered.  This caused a delay in the enemy’s movements, and enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched himself.  In the afternoon, General Sheridan struck the enemy south of Sailors’ Creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among whom were many general officers.  The movements of the 2d corps and General Ord’s command contributed greatly to the day’s success.

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward’s Court House; the 6th corps, General Ord’s command, and one division of cavalry, on Farmville; and the 2d corps by the High Bridge Road.  It was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but so close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over.  The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at Farmville to its support.

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Feeling now that General Lee’s chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I addressed him the following communication from Farmville: 

“April 7, 1865.

“General—­The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle.  I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“General R. E. Lee.”

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmville the following: 

“April 7, 1865.

“General:  I have received your note of this date.  Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

“R.  E. Lee, General. 
“Lieutenant-general U. S. Grant.”

To this I immediately replied: 

“April 8, 1865.

“General:—­Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received.  In reply, I would say, that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon —­namely, That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged.  I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the Army of the Northern Virginia will be received.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“General R. E. Lee.”

Early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed.  General Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight ahead for Appomattox Station, followed by General Ord’s command and the 5th corps.  During the day General Meade’s advance had considerable fighting with the enemy’s rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general engagement.  Late in the evening General Sheridan struck the railroad at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee’s army.  During this day I accompanied General Meade’s column, and about midnight received the following communication from General Lee: 

April 8, 1865.

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“General:—­I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day.  In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition.  To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end.  I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A.M. to-morrow on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies.

“R.  E. Lee, General. 
“Lieutenant-general U. S. Grant.”

Early on the morning of the 9th I returned him an answer as follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox: 

“April 9, 1865.

“General:—­Your note of yesterday is received.  I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten A.M. to-day could lead to no good.  I will state, however, general, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling.  The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood.  By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed.  Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, etc.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“General R. E. Lee.”

On this morning of the 9th, General Ord’s command and the 5th corps reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to break through our cavalry.  The infantry was at once thrown in.  Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan’s headquarters, I received the following from General Lee: 

“April 9, 1865.

“General:—­I received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army.  I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose.

“R.  E. Lee, General. 
“Lieutenant-general U. S. Grant.”

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-House, the result of which is set forth in the following correspondence: 

Appomattox Court-house, Virginia, April 9, 1865.

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“General:  In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit:  Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate.  The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands.  The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them.  This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage.  This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
“General R. E. Lee.”

“Headquarters army of northern Virginia, April 9, 1865.

“General:  I have received your letter of this date containing the terms of surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you.  As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted.  I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

“R.  E. Lee, General. 
“Lieutenant-general U. S. Grant.”

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the 5th army corps under Griffin, and Mackenzie’s cavalry, were designated to remain at Appomattox Court-House until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of the public property.  The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity of Burkesville.

General Lee’s great influence throughout the whole South caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th, General Sherman moved directly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th.  The day preceding, news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at Smithfield.

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On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and General Johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the President.  This agreement was disapproved by the President on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to your orders.  Notice was at once given by him to General Johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into.  On the 25th another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston’s army upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the 20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Big Lick.  The force striking it at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between New River and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro’, on the North Carolina Railroad; struck that road and destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro’, and between Greensboro’ and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along it, and captured four hundred prisoners.  At Salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores.  At this place he destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards Charlotte.  Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make preparations for a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of March.  The 16th corps, Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish River; the 13th corps, under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan and joined the 16th corps on Fish River, both moving thence on Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th; while Major-General Steele’s command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially invested Fort Blakely.  After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of April.  During the night the enemy evacuated the fort.  Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable.  These successes practically opened to us the Alabama River, and enabled us to approach Mobile from the north.  On the night of the 11th the city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of the 12th.

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The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama.  On the 1st of April, General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the Cahawba River.  On the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, defended by Forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners.  On the 4th he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa.  On the 10th he crossed the Alabama River, and after sending information of his operations to General Canby, marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned it.  At this place many stores and five steamboats fell into our hands.  Thence a force marched direct on Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th.  At the former place we got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public property.  At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars.  On the 20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field-guns, one thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General Howell Cobb.  General Wilson, hearing that Jeff.  Davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of May 11th.

On the 4th day of May, General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.

A force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on the 26th day of May, and before they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major-General Canby.  This surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had been surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have not mentioned.  Many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief dispatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported.

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For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the East fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference in their fighting qualities.  All that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done.  The Western armies commenced their battles in the Mississippi Valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina.  The armies of the East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old antagonists at Appomattox Court House, Virginia.  The splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed had either section failed in its duty.  All have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the United States.  Let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor.

I have the honor to be, Very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.

THE END

__________
Footnotes

(1) Afterwards General Gardner, C.S.A.

(2) General Garland expressed a wish to get a message back to General Twiggs, his division commander, or General Taylor, to the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced.  Deeming the return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it, so he called for a volunteer.  Lieutenant Grant offered his services, which were accepted.—­PUBLISHERS.

(3) Mentioned in the reports of Major Lee, Colonel Garland and General Worth.—­PUBLISHERS.

(4) NOTE.—­It had been a favorite idea with General Scott for a great many years before the Mexican war to have established in the United States a soldiers’ home, patterned after something of the kind abroad, particularly, I believe, in France.  He recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his annual reports to the Secretary of War, but never got any hearing.  Now, as he had conquered the state, he made assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and appointed officers to receive the money.  In addition to the sum thus realized he had derived, through capture at Cerro Gordo, sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled the fund to a total of about

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The latter went into disuse many years ago.  In fact it never had many soldiers in it, and was, I believe, finally sold.

(5) The Mexican war made three presidential candidates, Scott, Taylor and Pierce—­and any number of aspirants for that high office.  It made also governors of States, members of the cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both in state and nation.  The rebellion, which contained more war in a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole Mexican war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results to those engaged on the Union side.  On the other side, the side of the South, nearly every man who holds office of any sort whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a Confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the fact that the South was a military camp, and there were very few people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it.

(6) C. B. Lagow, the others not yet having joined me.

(7) NOTE.—­Since writing this chapter I have received from Mrs. W. H. L. Wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in the first day’s fight on the field of Shiloh, a letter from General Lew.  Wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th.  At the date of this letter it was well known that the Confederates had troops out along the Mobile & Ohio railroad west of Crump’s landing and Pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near Shiloh.  This letter shows that at that time General Lew.  Wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might happen for the passing of reinforcements between Shiloh and his position, extending from Crump’s landing westward, and he sends it over the road running from Adamsville to the Pittsburg landing and Purdy road.  These two roads intersect nearly a mile west of the crossing of the latter over Owl Creek, where our right rested.  In this letter General Lew.  Wallace advises General W. H. L. Wallace that he will send “to-morrow” (and his letter also says “April 5th,” which is the same day the letter was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and suggesting the propriety of General W. H. L. Wallace’s sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that they could “act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different camps.”

Page 129

This modifies very materially what I have said, and what has been said by others, of the conduct of General Lew.  Wallace at the battle of Shiloh.  It shows that he naturally, with no more experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms, would take the particular road that he did start upon in the absence of orders to move by a different road.

The mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very much in rear of the position of his advance.  This falling back had taken place before I sent General Wallace orders to move up to Pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the road nearest the river.  But my order was verbal, and to a staff officer who was to deliver it to General Wallace, so that I am not competent to say just what order the General actually received.

General Wallace’s division was stationed, the First brigade at Crump’s landing, the Second out two miles, and the Third two and a half miles out.  Hearing the sounds of battle General Wallace early ordered his First and Third brigades to concentrate on the Second.  If the position of our front had not changed, the road which Wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right than the River road.

U. S. Grant.

Mount MACGREGOR, new York, June 21, 1885.

(8) NOTE:  In an article on the battle of Shiloh which I wrote for the Century Magazine, I stated that General A. McD.  McCook, who commanded a division of Buell’s army, expressed some unwillingness to pursue the enemy on Monday, April 7th, because of the condition of his troops.  General Badeau, in his history, also makes the same statement, on my authority.  Out of justice to General McCook and his command, I must say that they left a point twenty-two miles east of Savannah on the morning of the 6th.  From the heavy rains of a few days previous and the passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep in mud, which made marching slow.  The division had not only marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the rain all night without rest.  It was engaged in the battle of the second day and did as good service as its position allowed.  In fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest commendation from division commanders in the Army of the Tennessee.  General Sherman both in his memoirs and report makes mention of this fact.  General McCook himself belongs to a family which furnished many volunteers to the army.  I refer to these circumstances with minuteness because I did General McCook injustice in my article in the Century, though not to the extent one would suppose from the public press.  I am not willing to do any one an injustice, and if convinced that I have done one, I am always willing to make the fullest admission.

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(9) NOTE.—­For gallantry in the various engagements, from the time I was left in command down to 26th of October and on my recommendation, Generals McPherson and C. S. Hamilton were promoted to be Major-Generals, and Colonels C. C. Marsh, 20th Illinois, M. M. Crocker, 13th Iowa J. A. Mower, 11th Missouri, M. D. Leggett, 78th Ohio, J. D. Stevenson, 7th Missouri, and John E. Smith, 45th Illinois, to be Brigadiers.

(10) Colonel Ellet reported having attacked a Confederate battery on the Red River two days before with one of his boats, the De Soto.  Running aground, he was obliged to abandon his vessel.  However, he reported that he set fire to her and blew her up.  Twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy.  With the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the New Era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at Grand Gulf and reaching the vicinity of Vicksburg.

(11) One of Colonel Ellet’s vessels which had run the blockade on February the 2d and been sunk in the Red River.

(12) NOTE.—­On this occasion Governor Richard Yates, of Illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied me to Carthage.  I furnished an ambulance for his use and that of some of the State officers who accompanied him.

(13) NOTE.—­When General Sherman first learned of the move I proposed to make, he called to see me about it.  I recollect that I had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river to a house a short distance back from the levee.  I was seated on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when Sherman came up.  After a few moments’ conversation he said that he would like to see me alone.  We passed into the house together and shut the door after us.  Sherman then expressed his alarm at the move I had ordered, saying that I was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year—­or a long time—­to get me in.  I was going into the enemy’s country, with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below.  He said that it was an axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc.  He pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to make.  This was, in substance, to go back until high ground could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster.  I said this would take us back to Memphis.  Sherman then said that was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad from Memphis to Grenada, repairing the road as we advanced.  To this I replied, the country is already disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our armies; the last

Page 131

Sherman wrote to my adjutant general, Colonel J. A. Rawlins, embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals upon the subject.  Colonel Rawlins showed me the letter, but I did not see any reason for changing my plans.  The letter was not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned between Sherman and myself to the end of the war, that I remember of.  I did not regard the letter as official, and consequently did not preserve it.  General Sherman furnished a copy himself to General Badeau, who printed it in his history of my campaigns.  I did not regard either the conversation between us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply friendly advice which the relations between us fully justified.  Sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered by himself.  I make this statement here to correct an impression which was circulated at the close of the war to Sherman’s prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation.

(14) Meant Edward’s Station.

(15) CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN: 

Enclosed herewith I send you copy of instructions to Major-General Thomas.  You having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you.  It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with the South, but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known.

I will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to Thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the Tennessee above Chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to Cleveland or thereabouts.

U. S. GRANT
Maj.-Gen’l.

CHATTANOOGA, November 18, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga: 

Page 132

All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy’s position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday at daylight.  Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable.  However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him.  You will co-operate with Sherman.  The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered.  This division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley.  Your effort then will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible.  The junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river.  Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy.  Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary’s division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland.  Howard’s corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman.  It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary.  All these troops will be provided with two days’ cooked rations in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier.  Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away.  You will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek.

U. S. GRANT,
Major-General.

(16) In this order authority was given for the troops to reform after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge.

(17) CHATTANOOGA, November 24,1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL.  CEO.  H. THOMAS,
Chattanooga

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General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing.  His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at Chickamauga Creek.  I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in cooperation.  Your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require.  If Hooker’s position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road.

U. S. GRANT,

Major-General.

(18) WASHINGTON, D. C., December 8, 1863, 10.2 A.M.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT: 

Understanding that your lodgment at Knoxville and at Chattanooga is now secure, I wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object.  God bless you all,

A. LINCOLN,

President U. S.

(19) General John G. Foster.

(20) During this winter the citizens of Jo Davies County, Ill., subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for General Grant, which was always known as the Chattanooga sword.  The scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the names of the battles in which General Grant had participated.

Congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at Chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for Vicksburg and Chattanooga.  All such things are now in the possession of the government at Washington.

(21) WASHINGTON, D. C. December 29, 1863.

MAJ.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT: 

General Foster has asked to be relieved from his command on account of disability from old wounds.  Should his request be granted, who would you like as his successor?  It is possible that Schofield will be sent to your command.

H. W. HALLECK
General-in-Chief. 
(OFFICIAL.)

(22) See letter to Banks, in General Grant’s report, Appendix.

(23) [PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
April 4, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL:—­It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre.  For your information I now write you my programme, as at present determined upon.

Page 134

I have sent orders to Banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against Shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defence of Red River to General Steele and the navy and to return your troops to you and his own to New Orleans; to abandon all of Texas, except the Rio Grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the Mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men.  To this I will add five thousand men from Missouri.  With this force he is to commence operations against Mobile as soon as he can.  It will be impossible for him to commence too early.

Gillmore joins Butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against Richmond from the south side of the James River.  This will give Butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, W. F. Smith commanding the right wing of his forces and Gillmore the left wing.  I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside’s corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective men, and operate directly against Lee’s army, wherever it may be found.

Sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under Ord and Averell, to start from Beverly, Virginia, and the other, under Crook, to start from Charleston on the Kanawha, to move against the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

Crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about Saltville, and move east from there to join Ord.  His force will be all cavalry, while Ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms.

You I propose to move against Johnston’s army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.

I do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way.  Submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations.

As stated, Banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can.  Gillmore is ordered to report at Fortress Monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable.  Sigel is concentrating now.  None will move from their places of rendezvous until I direct, except Banks.  I want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible.  But all I can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible.  I know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but I believe you will accomplish it.

From the expedition from the Department of West Virginia I do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way I can take troops from there.  With the long line of railroad Sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front.  In this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it.  In other words, if Sigel can’t skin himself he can hold a leg while some one else skins.

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I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(24) See instructions to Butler, in General Grant’s report, Appendix.

(25) IN FIELD, CULPEPER C. H., VA., April 9, 1864.

MAJ.-GENERAL GEO. G. MEADE
Com’d’g Army of the Potomac.

For information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially for your own perusal alone.

So far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one common centre.  Banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the Red River to General Steele and the navy, to abandon Texas with the exception of the Rio Grande, and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to move on Mobile.  This he is to do without reference to other movements.  From the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave New Orleans before the 1st of May, if so soon.  Sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, Jo.  Johnston’s army being his objective point, and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim.  If successful he will secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile with the aid of Banks.

Sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front.  This he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it.  Two columns of his command will make south at the same time with the general move; one from Beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under Major-General Ord; the other from Charleston, Va., principally cavalry, under Brig.-General Crook.  The former of these will endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, about south of Covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to Lynchburg and return to its base by way of the Shenandoah Valley, or join you.  The other will strike at Saltville, Va., and come eastward to join Ord.  The cavalry from Ord’s command will try tributaries would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the Rapidan to the James River.  But Lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one I would have to take in following.  A movement by his left—­our right—­would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with.  All idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered.  The country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us.

Page 136

While these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle.  In the West Forrest made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at Union City, and followed it up by an attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the Ohio.  While he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison.  On the first intelligence of Forrest’s raid I telegraphed Sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into.  Sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order.

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at Fort Pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the Mississippi River.  The garrison to force a passage southward, if they are successful in reaching the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting Richmond with all the South and South-west.

Gillmore will join Butler with about 10,000 men from South Carolina.  Butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front.  The force will be commanded by Maj.-General W. F. Smith.  With Smith and Gillmore, Butler will seize City Point, and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river.  His movement will be simultaneous with yours.

Lee’s army will be your objective point.  Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also.  The only point upon which I am now in doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the Rapidan above or below him.  Each plan presents great advantages over the other with corresponding objections.  By crossing above, Lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond and going north on a raid.  But if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out.  We separate from Butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate.  By the other route Brandy Station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the York or James rivers.

These advantages and objections I will talk over with you more fully than I can write them.

Burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce you.  Immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th inst., I will give him the defence of the road from Bull Run as far south as we wish to hold it.  This will enable you to collect all your strength about Brandy Station and to the front.

There will be naval co-operation on the James River, and transports and ferries will be provided so that should Lee fall back into his intrenchments at Richmond, Butler’s force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such.  What I would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard.  Two wagons to a regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores.  One wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters.

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Should by Lee’s right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to White House on the Pamunkey.  Your estimates for this contingency should be made at once.  If not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the James River or elsewhere.

If Lee’s left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores.  I would say not much short of five hundred rounds of infantry ammunition would do.  By the other, half the amount would be sufficient.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

(26) General John A. Logan, upon whom devolved the command of the Army of the Tennessee during this battle, in his report gave our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000:  and General G. M. Dodge, graphically describing to General Sherman the enemy’s attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and was broken by his depleted command, remarks:  “The disparity of forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my two brigades under Fuller and Mersy they took 351 prisoners, representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the enemy.”

(27) UNION ARMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864.

[COMPILED.]

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.

MAJ.-GEN.  W. S. HANCOCK, commanding Second Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. Francis C. Barlow. 
          First Brigade, Col.  Nelson A. Miles. 
          Second Brigade, Col.  Thomas A. Smyth. 
          Third Brigade, Col.  Paul Frank. 
          Fourth Brigade, Col.  John R. Brooke.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John Gibbon. 
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alex.  S. Webb. 
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Joshua T. Owen. 
          Third Brigade, Col.  Samuel S. Carroll.

     Third Division, Maj.-Gen. David B. Birney. 
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. H. H. Ward. 
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Hays.

     Fourth Divisin, Brig.-Gen. Gershom Mott. 
          First Brigade, Col.  Robert McAllister. 
          Second Brigade, Col.  Wm. R. Brewster.

          Artillery Brigade, Col.  John C. Tidball.

MAJ.-GEN.  G. K. WARREN, commanding Fifth Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. Charles Griffin. 
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Romeyn B. Ayres. 
          Second Brigade, Col.  Jacob B. Sweitzer. 
          Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. J. J. Bartlett.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. John C. Robinson. 
          First Brigade, Col.  Samuel H. Leonard. 
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry Baxter. 
          Third Brigade, Col.  Andrew W. Denison.

Page 138

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Samuel W. Crawford. 
          First Brigade, Col.  Wm McCandless. 
          Third Brigade, Col.  Joseph W. Fisher.

     Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth. 
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Lysander Cutler. 
          Second Brigade Brig.-Gen. James C. Rice. 
          Third Brigade, Col.  Roy Stone

          Artillery Brigade, Col.  S. S. Wainwright.

MAJ.-GEN.  JOHN SEDGWICK, commanding Sixth Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. H. G. Wright. 
          First Brigade, Col.  Henry W. Brown. 
          Second Brigade, Col.  Emory Upton. 
          Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. D. A. Russell. 
          Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Alexander Shaler.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. George W. Getty. 
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Frank Wheaton. 
          Second Brigade, Col.  Lewis A. Grant. 
          Third Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Thos.  H. Neill. 
          Fourth Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry L. Eustis.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. James Ricketts. 
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wm. H. Morris. 
          Second Brigade, Brig.-Gen. T. Seymour.

          Artillery Brigade, Col.  C. H. Tompkins

MAJ.-GEN.  P. H. SHERIDAN, commanding Cavalry Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. Torbert. 
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. G. A. Custer. 
          Second Brigade, Col.  Thos.  C. Devin. 
          Reserve Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Wesley Merritt

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. D. McM.  Gregg. 
          First Brigade, Brig.-Gen. Henry E. Davies, Jr. 
          Second Brigade, Col.  J. Irvin Gregg.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Wilson. 
          First Brigade, Col.  T. M. Bryan, Jr. 
          Second Brigade, Col.  Geo. H. Chapman.

MAJ.-GEN.  A. E. BURNSIDE, commanding Ninth Army Corps.

     First Division, Brig.-Gen. T. G. Stevenson. 
          First Brigade, Col.  Sumner Carruth. 
          Second Brigade, Col.  Daniel Leasure.

     Second Division, Brig.-Gen. Robert B. Potter. 
          First Brigade, Col.  Zenas R. Bliss. 
          Second Brigade, Col.  Simon G. Griffin.

     Third Division, Brig.-Gen. Orlando Willcox. 
          First Brigade, Col.  John F. Hartranft. 
          Second Brigade, Col.  Benj.  C. Christ.

     Fourth Division, Brig.-Gen. Edward Ferrero. 
          First Brigade, Col.  Joshua K. Sigfried. 
          Second Brigade, Col.  Henry G. Thomas.

          Provisional Brigade, Col.  Elisha G. Marshall.

BRIG.-GEN.  HENRY J. HUNT, commanding Artillery.

     Reserve, Col.  H. S. Burton. 
          First Brigade, Col.  J. H. Kitching. 
          Second Brigade, Maj.  J. A. Tompkins. 
          First Brig.  Horse Art., Capt.  J. M. Robertson. 
          Second Brigade, Horse Art., Capt.  D. R. Ransom. 
          Third Brigade, Maj.  R. H. Fitzhugh.

Page 139

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS....... 
Provost Guard, Brig.-Gen. M. R. Patrick. 
Volunteer Engineers, Brig.-Gen. H. W. Benham.

CONFEDERATE ARMY.

Organization of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31st, 1834.

First Army Corps:  LIEUT.-GEN.  R. H. ANDERSON, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN.  GEO. E. PICKETT’S Division. 
     Brig.-Gen. Seth M. Barton’s Brigade. (a)
     Brig.-Gen. M. D. Corse’s "
          " Eppa Hunton’s "
          " Wm. R. Terry’s "

MAJ.-GEN.  C. W. FIELD’S Division. (b)
     Brig.-Gen. G. T. Anderson’s Brigade
           " E. M. Law’s (c) "
           " John Bratton’s "

MAJ.-GEN.  J. B. KERSHAW’S Division. (d)
     Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford’s Brigade
           " B. G. Humphreys’ "
           " Goode Bryan’s "
           " Kershaw’s (Old) "

Second Army Corps:  MAJOR-GENERAL JUBAL A. EARLY, Commanding

MAJ.-GEN.  JOHN B. GORDON’S Division. 
     Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays’ Brigade. (e)
         " John Pegram ’s " (f)
         " Gordon’s " (g)
     Brig.-Gen. R. F. Hoke’s "

MAJ.-GEN.  EDWARD JOHNSON’S Division. 
     Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A. Walker). (h)
     Brig.-Gen. J M Jones’ Brigade. (h)
         " Geo H. Stewart’s " (h)
         " L. A. Stafford’s " (e)

MAJ.-GEN.  R. E. RODES’ Division. 
     Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel’s Brigade. (i)
         " Geo. Dole’s " (k)
         " S. D. Ramseur’s Brigade.
         " C. A. Battle’s "
         " R. D. Johnston’s " (f)

Third Army Corps:  LIEUT.-GEN.  A. P. HILL, Commanding.

MAJ.-GEN.  WM. MAHONE’S Division. (l)
     Brig.-Gen. J. C. C. Sanders’ Brigade. 
                Mahone’s "
     Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris’s " (m)
        " A. R. Wright’s "
        " Joseph Finegan’s "

MAJ.-GEN.  C. M. WILCOX’S Division. 
     Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas’s Brigade (n)
        " James H. Lane’s "
        " Sam’l McCowan’s "
        " Alfred M. Scale’s "

MAJ.-GEN.  H. HETH’S Division. (o)
     Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis’s Brigade.
        " John R. Cooke’s "
        " D. McRae’s "
        " J. J. Archer’s "
        " H. H. Walker’s "

unattached:  5th Alabama Battalion.

Cavalry Corps:  LIEUTENANT-GENERAL WADE HAMPTON, Commanding.(p)

MAJ.-GEN.  FITZHUGH LEE’S Division
     Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham’s Brigade
        " L. L. Lomax’s "

MAJ.-GEN.  M. C. BUTLER’S Division. 
     Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant’s Brigade.
        " P. M. B. Young’s "
        " Thomas L. Rosser’s "

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MAJ.-GEN.  W. H. F. LEE’S Division. 
     Brig.-Gen. Rufus Barringer’s Brigade.
        " J. R. Chambliss’s "

  Artillery Reserve:  BRIG.-GEN.  W. N. PENDLETON, Commanding.

BRIG.-GEN.  E. P. ALEXANDER’S DIVISION.*
     Cabell’s Battalion. 
          Manly’s Battery.
          1st Co.  Richmond Howitzers. 
          Carleton’s Battery. 
          Calloway’s Battery.

Haskell’s Battalion. 
Branch’s Battery. 
Nelson’s    "
Garden’s    "
Rowan       "

     Huger’s Battalion. 
          Smith’s Battery. 
          Moody "
          Woolfolk "
          Parker’s "
          Taylor’s "
          Fickling’s "
          Martin’s "

Gibb’s Battalion. 
Davidson’s Battery. 
Dickenson’s   "
Otey’s        "

BRIG.-GEN.  A. L. LONG’S DIVISION.

Braxton’s Battalion. 
Lee Battery.
1st Md.  Artillery. 
Stafford    "
Alleghany   "

Cutshaw’s Battalion. 
Charlotteville Artillery. 
Staunton           "
Courtney           "

     Carter’s Battalion. 
          Morris Artillery. 
          Orange "
          King William Artillery. 
          Jeff Davis "

Nelson’s Battalion. 
Amherst Artillery. 
Milledge     "
Fluvauna     "

     Brown’s Battalion. 
          Powhatan Artillery.
          2d Richmond Howitzers.
          3d " "
          Rockbridge Artillery. 
          Salem Flying Artillery.

COL R. L.WALKER’S DIVISION.

     Cutt’s Battalion. 
          Ross’s Battery. 
          Patterson’s Battery. 
          Irwin Artillery.

Richardson’s Battalion. 
Lewis Artillery. 
Donaldsonville Artillery. 
Norfolk Light       "
Huger               "

     Mclntosh ’s Battalion. 
          Johnson’s Battery. 
          Hardaway Artillery. 
          Danville "
          2d Rockbridge Artillery.

     Pegram’s Battalion. 
          Peedee Artillery. 
          Fredericksburg Artillery. 
          Letcher "
          Purcell Battery. 
          Crenshaw’s Battery.

Poague’s Battalion. 
Madison Artillery. 
Albemarle    "
Brooke       "
Charlotte    "

NOTE. (a) COL.  W. R. Aylett was in command Aug. 29th, and probably at above date. (b) Inspection report of this division shows that it also contained Benning’s and Gregg’s Brigades. (c) Commanded by Colonel P. D. Bowles. (d) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not indicated.

Organization of the Army of the Valley District. (e) Constituting York’s Brigade. (f) In Ramseur’s Division. (g) Evan’s Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson commanding, and containing 12th Georgia Battalion. (h) The Virginia regiments constituted Terry’s Brigade, Gordon’s Division. (i) Grimes’ Brigade. (k) Cook’s "

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(l) Returns report but one general officer present for duty; name not indicated. (m) Colonel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding. (n) Colonel Thomas J. Simmons, commanding. (o) Four brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not indicated. (p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton’s, Fitz-Lee’s, and W. H. F. Lee’s Division, and Dearing’s Brigade.

But one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and Alexander’s name not on the original.

(28) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S., May II, 1864.—­3 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding Army of the Potomac.

Move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o’clock A.M. to-morrow. will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with Burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack.  Warren and Wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself.  There is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by Mott’s division and the 9th corps.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(29) HEADQUARTERS, ARMIES U. S., May 11, 1864.-4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL A. E. BURNSIDE,
Commanding 9th Army Corps.

Major-General Hancock has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o’clock A.M. to-morrow.  You will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o’clock A.M. to-morrow the 12th inst.  Let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy.

I send two of my staff officers, Colonels Comstock and Babcock, in whom I have great confidence and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you and General Hancock with instructions to render you every assistance in their power.  Generals Warren and Wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and Hancock’s attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(30) HEADQUARTERS ARMIES U. S., May 12, 1864, 6.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day’s work, including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery.  The enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch.  We have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (Johnson’s), one brigade (Doles’), and one regiment entire from the enemy.

Page 142

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(31) SPOTTSYLVANIA C. H., May 13, 1864.

HON E. M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington, D. C.

I beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days’ battles, to wit:  Brigadier-General H. G. Wright and Brigadier-General John Gibbon to be Major-Generals; Colonel S. S. Carroll, 8th Ohio Volunteers Colonel E. Upton, 121st New York Volunteers; Colonel William McCandless, 2d Pennsylvania Reserves, to be Brigadier-Generals.  I would also recommend Major-General W. S. Hancock for Brigadier-General in the regular army.  His services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recognition.  In making these recommendations I do not wish the claims of General G. M. Dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time.  I would also ask to have General Wright assigned to the command of the Sixth Army Corps.  I would further ask the confirmation of General Humphreys to the rank of Major-General.

General Meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations.  He and Sherman are the fittest officers for large commands I have come in contact with.  If their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of Major-Generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and I would feel personally gratified.  I would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(32) QUARLES’ MILLS, VA., May 26, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

The relative position of the two armies is now as follows:  Lee’s right rests on a swamp east of the Richmond and Fredericksburg road and south of the North Anna, his centre on the river at Ox Ford, and his left at Little River with the crossings of Little River guarded as far up as we have gone.  Hancock with his corps and one division of the 9th corps crossed at Chesterfield Ford and covers the right wing of Lee’s army.  One division of the 9th corps is on the north bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility.  The 5th and 6th corps with one division of the 9th corps run from the south bank of the Anna from a short distance above Ox Ford to Little River, and parallel with and near to the enemy.

To make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify.  To turn the enemy by his right, between the two Annas is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests.  To turn him by the left leaves Little River, New Found River and South Anna River, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army, to be crossed.  I have determined therefore to turn the enemy’s right by crossing at or near Hanover Town.  This crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies.

Page 143

During the last night the teams and artillery not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left.  As soon as it is dark this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced march for Hanover Town to seize and hold the crossings.  The balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rapidly as possible.  The left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing.  Lee’s army is really whipped.  The prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably.  A battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had.  Our men feel that they have gained the MORALE over the enemy, and attack him with confidence.  I may be mistaken, but I feel that our success over Lee’s army is already assured.  The promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy.

We are destroying all the rails we can on the Central and Fredericksburg roads.  I want to leave a gap on the roads north of Richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rail from elsewhere.  Even if a crossing is not effected at Hanover Town it will probably be necessary for us to move on down the Pamunkey until a crossing is effected.  I think it advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from Port Royal to the White House.  I wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct Smith to put the railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to hold it.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(33) NEAR COLD HARBOR, June 3, 1864, 7 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding A. P.

The moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken.  I shall go to where you are in the course of an hour.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(34) COLD HARBOR, June 5,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington,
D. C.

A full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north-east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg Railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army.  To do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the James.  My idea from the start has been to beat Lee’s army if possible north of Richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the James River to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat.

Page 144

I now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have.  They act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them.  Without a greater sacrifice of human life than I am willing to make all cannot be accomplished that I had designed outside of the city.  I have therefore resolved upon the following plan: 

I will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the Army of the Potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad from about Beaver Dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west.  When this is effected I will move the army to the south side of the James River, either by crossing the Chickahominy and marching near to City Point, or by going to the mouth of the Chickahominy on north side and crossing there.  To provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided.

Once on the south side of the James River, I can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal.  If Hunter succeeds in reaching Lynchburg, that will be lost to him also.  Should Hunter not succeed, I will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can.

The feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(35) COLD HARBOR, VA., June 6, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL D. HUNTER

Commanding Dept.  W. Va.

General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with instructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence there the destruction of the Va.  Cen.  R. R., destroying this way as much as possible.  The complete destruction of this road and of the canal on James River is of great importance to us.  According to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your guidance, you were to proceed to Lynchburg and commence there.  It would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for a single day.  But that point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all.  I see, in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route should be from Staunton via Charlottesville.  If you have

Page 145

If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in your Department, you are authorized to send it back.

If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal.  Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(36) FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL’S OFFICE.

FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE.  | KILLED.  | WOUNDED.  | MISSING. |
AGGREGATE.  |

Wilderness, May 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 |
Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601|
North Anna, May 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 |
Totopotomoy, May 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | Cold
Harbor, May 31st to June 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 |
Total ................  | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 |

(37) CITY POINT, VA., June 17, 1864. 11 A.M.

MAJOR-GEN.  HALLECK,
Washington, D. C.

* * * * * * *

The enemy in their endeavor to reinforce Petersburg abandoned their intrenchments in front of Bermuda Hundred.  They no doubt expected troops from north of the James River to take their place before we discovered it.  General Butler took advantage of this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road between Richmond and Petersburg, which I hope to retain possession of.

Too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the last five days.  Day and night has been all the same, no delays being allowed on any account.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieut.-General.

(38) CITY POINT, VA., July 24, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE,
Commanding, etc.

The engineer officers who made a survey of the front from Bermuda Hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there.  The chances they think will be better on Burnside’s front.  If this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy’s line we expect to penetrate.  All officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy’s present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through.

Page 146

To the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault.  Their lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful.  The field artillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders.  One thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders.  If they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from army commanders.  General Ord can co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from Bermuda Hundred can be sent to reinforce you or can be used to threaten an assault between the Appomattox and James rivers, as may be deemed best.

This should be done by Tuesday morning, if done at all.  If not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as Hicksford at least, and to Weldon if possible.

* * * * * * *

Whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at
Petersburg, Burnside’s mine will be blown up....

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(39) See letter, August 5th, Appendix.

(40) See Appendix, letters of Oct. 11th.

(41) CITY POINT, VA., December 2,1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville Tenn.

If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to abandon the line of the Tennessee.  Should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies.  Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees, citizens, etc.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 2, 1864.—­1.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

With your citizen employees armed, you can move out of Nashville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing.  After the repulse of Hood at Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was.  At this distance, however, I may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy.  You will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads if Hood is not speedily disposed of.  Put forth therefore every possible exertion to attain this end.  Should you get him to retreating give him no peace.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

Page 147

CITY POINT, VA., December 5, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to where he can cross it?  It seems to me whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is.  Time strengthens him in all possibility as much as it does you.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864—­4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your cavalry.  There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio River.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 8, 1864.—­8.30 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

Your dispatch of yesterday received.  It looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are scattered.  Why not attack at once?  By all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see which, you or Hood, can beat to the Ohio.  If you think necessary call on the governors of States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river.  You clearly never should cross except in rear of the enemy.  Now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy.  If destroyed he never can replace it.  Use the means at your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end of the land to the other.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

CITY POINT, VA., December 11, 1864.—­4 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find.  Let there be no further delay.  Hood cannot even stand a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores.  If he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of his army.  I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that you have moved.  Delay no longer for weather or reinforcements.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., December 15, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS,
Nashville, Tenn.

I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from Van Duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, I shall go no further.  Push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed.  Your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up Hood’s army and render it useless for future operations.  Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country as the enemy have done.  Much is now expected.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

(42) See orders to Major-General Meade, Ord, and Sheridan, March 24th, Appendix.

Page 148

(43) See Appendix.

(44) NOTE.—­The fac-simile of the terms of Lee’s surrender inserted at this place, was copied from the original document furnished the publishers through the courtesy of General Ely S. Parker, Military Secretary on General Grant’s staff at the time of the surrender.

Three pages of paper were prepared in General Grant’s manifold order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations and erasures were added by General Parker at the suggestion of General Grant.  After such alteration it was handed to General Lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to General Grant.  The original was then transcribed by General Parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished General Lee.

The fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the original document and all interlineations and erasures.

There is a popular error to the effect that Generals Grant and Lee each signed the articles of surrender.  The document in the form of a letter was signed only by General Grant, in the parlor of McLean’s house while General Lee was sitting in the room, and General Lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and handed it to General Grant.