Had I ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put Hancock in the lead.  It would also have given us an hour or earlier start.  It took all that time for Warren to get the head of his column to the left of Hancock after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the enemy.  This hour, and Hancock’s capacity to use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush Anderson before he could be reinforced.  But the movement made was tactical.  It kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the enemy.  Our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the right passed.  If an attack had been made by the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed.  By a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed.  Then, too, I had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders.  At that time my judgment was that Warren was the man I would suggest to succeed Meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field.  As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform.