after Halleck’s departure enabled Rosecrans to hold his position until the troops of both McPherson and Hurlbut approached towards the rebel front and rear.  The enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter:  all their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed.  The loss on our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with Van Dorn’s.  McPherson came up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemy as was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of Rosecrans just after the repulse.  His approach, as well as that of Hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect.  General Rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although I had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled.  He did not do so, and I repeated the order after the battle.  In the first order he was notified that the force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy was not pursued.

General Ord had joined Hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took command of his troops.  This force encountered the head of Van Dorn’s retreating column just as it was crossing the Hatchie by a bridge some ten miles out from Corinth.  The bottom land here was swampy and bad for the operations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into.  Ord attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a panic.  Many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off the bridge in their hurried retreat.  Ord followed and met the main force.  He was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher up the stream.  Ord was wounded in this engagement and the command devolved on Hurlbut.

Rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and then took the wrong road.  Moving in the enemy’s country he travelled with a wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war.  His march was therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards his supplies.  Two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly been.  Even when he did start, if Rosecrans had followed the route taken by the enemy, he would have come upon Van Dorn in a swamp with a stream in front and Ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading north and towards Chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as far as the enemy had moved to get to the Hatchie, he was as far from battle as when he started.  Hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such force as Van Dorn’s if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he might have been in great peril.