“Major-general D. Hunter, Commanding Dept West Virginia.

“General Sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning with instructions to proceed to Charlottesville, Va., and to commence there the destruction of the Virginia Central railroad, destroying this way as much as possible.  The complete destruction of this road and of the canal on James River is of great importance to us.  According to the instructions I sent to General Halleck for your guidance, you will proceed to Lynchburg and commence there.  It would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for a single day.  But that point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting into the road or canal at all.  I see, in looking over the letter to General Halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route should be from Staunton via Charlottesville.  If you have so understood it, you will be doing just what I want.  The direction I would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in the valley between Staunton and Lynchburg, you immediately turn east by the most practicable road until you strike the Lynchburg branch of the Virginia Central road.  From there move eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join General Sheridan.  After the work laid out for General Sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid out in General Sheridan’s instructions.  If any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in your department, you are authorized to send it back.  If on receipt of this you should be near to Lynchburg and deem it practicable to reach that point, you will exercise your judgment about going there.  If you should be on the railroad between Charlottesville and Lynchburg, it may be practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal.  Lose no opportunity to destroy the canal.

“U.  S. Grant, Lieutenant-General.”

Owing to the hard service of the preceding month we had lost many horses, so the number of dismounted men was large; and my strength had also been much reduced by killed and wounded during the same period of activity.  The effective mounted force of my two divisions was therefore much diminished, they mustering only about six thousand officers and men when concentrated on June 6 at New Castle ferry.  Here they were provided with three days’ rations, intended to last five days, and with two days’ grain for the horses.  The rations and forty rounds of ammunition per man were to be carried on the persons of the troopers, the grain on the pommel of the saddle, and the reserve ammunition in wagons.  One medical wagon and eight ambulances were also furnished, and one wagon was authorized for each division and brigade headquarters; enough canvas-covered boats for a small pontoon-bridge were also provided.