or Colombia, by any curved line that gives us the
best supplies, breaking up in our course as much railroad
as possible; then, ignoring Charleston and Augusta
both, I would occupy Columbia and Camden, pausing there
long enough to observe the effect. I would then
strike for the Charleston & Wilmington Railroad, somewhere
between the Santee and Cape Fear Rivers, and, if possible,
communicate with the fleet under Admiral Dahlgren
(whom I find a most agreeable gentleman, accommodating
himself to our wishes and plans). Then I would
favor an attack on Wilmington, in the belief that
Porter and Butler will fail in their present undertaking.
Charleston is now a mere desolated wreck, and is
hardly worth the time it would take to starve it out.
Still, I am aware that, historically and politically,
much importance is attached to the place, and it may
be that, apart from its military importance, both you
and the Administration may prefer I should give it
more attention; and it would be well for you to give
me some general idea on that subject, for otherwise
I would treat it as I have expressed, as a point of
little importance, after all its railroads leading
into the interior have been destroyed or occupied
by us. But, on the hypothesis of ignoring Charleston
and taking Wilmington, I would then favor a movement
direct on Raleigh. The game is then up with
Lee, unless he comes out of Richmond, avoids you and
fights me; in which case I should reckon on your being
on his heels. Now that Hood is used up by Thomas,
I feel disposed to bring the matter to an issue as
quick as possible. I feel confident that I can
break up the whole railroad system of South Carolina
and North Carolina, and be on the Roanoke, either
at Raleigh or Weldon, by the time spring fairly opens;
and, if you feel confident that you can whip Lee outside
of his intrenchments, I feel equally confident that
I can handle him in the open country.
One reason why I would ignore Charleston is this:
that I believe Hardee will reduce the garrison to
a small force, with plenty of provisions; I know that
the neck back of Charleston can be made impregnable
to assault, and we will hardly have time for siege
operations.
I will have to leave in Savannah a garrison, and,
if Thomas can spare them, I would like to have all
detachments, convalescents, etc., belonging to
these four corps, sent forward at once. I do
not want to cripple Thomas, because I regard his operations
as all-important, and I have ordered him to pursue
Hood down into Alabama, trusting to the country for
supplies.
I reviewed one of my corps to-day, and shall continue
to review the whole army. I do not like to boast,
but believe this army has a confidence in itself that
makes it almost invincible. I wish you could
run down and see us; it would have a good effect, and
show to both armies that they are acting on a common
plan. The weather is now cool and pleasant,
and the general health very good. Your true friend,