Also, in a speech, Reformer Lionel Phillips informs the public that the Reform Committee Delegation has “been received with courtesy by the Government Commission,” and “been assured that their proposals shall be earnestly considered.”  That “while the Reform Committee regretted Jameson’s precipitate action, they would stand by him.”

Also the populace are in a state of “wild enthusiasm,” and “46 can scarcely be restrained; they want to go out to meet Jameson and bring him in with triumphal outcry.”

Also the British High Commissioner has issued a damnifying proclamation against Jameson and all British abettors of his game.  It arrives January 1st.

It is a difficult position for the Reformers, and full of hindrances and perplexities.  Their duty is hard, but plain: 

1.  They have to repudiate the inroad, and stand by the inroader.

2.  They have to swear allegiance to the Boer government, and distribute cavalry horses to the rebels.

3.  They have to forbid overt acts against the Boer government, and distribute arms to its enemies.

4.  They have to avoid collision with the British government, but still stand by Jameson and their new oath of allegiance to the Boer government, taken, uncovered, in presence of its flag.

They did such of these things as they could; they tried to do them all; in fact, did do them all, but only in turn, not simultaneously.  In the nature of things they could not be made to simultane.

In preparing for armed revolution and in talking revolution, were the Reformers “bluffing,” or were they in earnest?  If they were in earnest, they were taking great risks—­as has been already pointed out.  A gentleman of high position told me in Johannesburg that he had in his possession a printed document proclaiming a new government and naming its president—­one of the Reform leaders.  He said that this proclamation had been ready for issue, but was suppressed when the raid collapsed.  Perhaps I misunderstood him.  Indeed, I must have misunderstood him, for I have not seen mention of this large incident in print anywhere.

Besides, I hope I am mistaken; for, if I am, then there is argument that the Reformers were privately not serious, but were only trying to scare the Boer government into granting the desired reforms.

The Boer government was scared, and it had a right to be.  For if Mr. Rhodes’s plan was to provoke a collision that would compel the interference of England, that was a serious matter.  If it could be shown that that was also the Reformers’ plan and purpose, it would prove that they had marked out a feasible project, at any rate, although it was one which could hardly fail to cost them ruinously before England should arrive.  But it seems clear that they had no such plan nor desire.  If, when the worst should come to the worst, they meant to overthrow the government, they also meant to inherit the assets themselves, no doubt.