me a sense intermediate between those which we assign, as a rule, to the two terms ‘Liberty’ and ‘Free Will.’  On one hand I believe that ‘Liberty’ consists in being entirely oneself, in acting in conformity with oneself; it is then to a certain degree the ‘moral liberty’ of philosophers, the independence of the person with regard to everything other than itself.  But that is not quite this Liberty, since the independence I am describing has not always a moral character.  Further, it does not consist in depending on oneself as an effect depends on the cause which, of necessity, determines it.  In this, I should come back to the sense of ‘Free Will.’” And yet, he continues, “I do not accept this sense either, since Free Will, in the usual meaning of the term, implies the equal possibility of two contraries, and, on my theory, we cannot formulate or even conceive, in this case, the thesis of the equal possibility of the two contraries, without falling into grave error about the nature of Time.  The object of my thesis has been precisely to find a position intermediate between ’moral Liberty’ and ‘Free Will.’  Liberty, such as I understand it, is situated between these two terms, but not at equal distances from both; if I were obliged to blend it with one of the two, I should select ‘Free-Will.’” Nor is Liberty to be reduced to spontaneity.  “At most, this would be the case in the animal world where the psychological life is principally that of the affections.  But in the case of a man, a thinking being, the free act can be called a synthesis of feelings and ideas, and the evolution which leads to it, a reasonable evolution.” [Footnote:  Matter and Memory, p. 243 (Fr. p. 205).] “In a word, if it is agreed to call every act free, which springs from the self, and from the self alone, the act which bears the mark of our personality is truly free, for our self alone will lay claim to its paternity.” [Footnote:  Time and Free Will, p. 172 (Fr. p. 132).  It is interesting to compare with this the remark by Nietzsche in Also sprach Zarathustra, Thus Spake Zarathustra,—­“Let your Ego be in relation to your acts that which the mother is in relation to the child.”] The secret of the solution lies surely here, and in the words given above:  “Liberty consists in being entirely oneself.”  If we act rightly we shall act freely, and yet be determined.  Yet here there will be no contradiction, for we shall be self-determined.  It is only the man who is self-determined that can in any sense be said to know the meaning of “human” Freedom.  “We call free,” said Spinoza, “that which exists in virtue of the necessities of its own nature, and which is determined by itself alone.”  Liberty is not absolute, for then we ourselves would be at the beck and call of every external excitation, desire, passion, or temptation.  Our salvation consists in self-determination, so we shall avoid licence but preserve Freedom.  We can only repeat the Socratic maxim—­“Know thyself”—­and resolve to take to heart the appeal of our own Shakespeare: