before.  This was a long, weak position, depending upon no natural obstacles; but it was, under the circumstances, well defended by a skilful disposition of the artillery, under charge of Col.  Tompkins.  Gen. Newton’s division held the right of this line, facing west; Gen. Brooks had Russell’s brigade, also posted so as to face west, on the left of Newton, while Bartlett and Torbert faced south, the former resting his left somewhere near Howe’s right brigade.  This portion of the line was, on Monday afternoon, re-enforced by Wheaton’s brigade of Newton’s division, withdrawn from the extreme right; and here it rendered effective service at the time the attack was made on Howe, and captured a number of prisoners.  The bulk of Howe’s division lay facing east, from near Guest’s house to the river.  The whole line of battle may be characterized, therefore, as a rough convex order,—­or, to describe it more accurately, lay on three sides of a square, of which the Rappahannock formed the fourth.  This line protected our pontoon-bridges at Scott’s Dam, a mile below Banks’s Ford.

No doubt Sedgwick determined wisely in preferring to accept battle where he lay, if it should be forced upon him, to retiring to Banks’s Ford, and attempting a crossing in retreat by daylight.

Under these harassing conditions, Sedgwick determined to hold on till night, and then cross the river; having specially in view Hooker’s caution to look well to the safety of his corps, coupled with the information that he could not expect to relieve him, and was too far away to direct him with intelligence.

Subsequent despatches instructed Sedgwick to hold on where he was, till Tuesday morning.  These despatches are quoted at length on a later page.

Having re-occupied Fredericksburg heights, in front of which Hall’s brigade of Gibbon’s division was deployed as a skirmish-line, and occasionally exchanged a few shots with the enemy, Early communicated with McLaws, and proposed an immediate joint assault upon Sedgwick; but McLaws, not deeming himself strong enough to attack Sedgwick with the troops Early and he could muster, preferred to await the arrival of Anderson, whom he knew to be rapidly pushing to join the forces at Salem Church.

Anderson, who, prior to the receipt of his new orders, had been making preparations for a demonstration against Hooker’s left at Chancellorsville, and had there amused himself by shelling a park of supply-wagons across the river, broke up from his position at the crossing of the Mine and River roads, headed east, and arrived about eleven A.M. at the battle-ground of Sunday afternoon.  In an hour he was got into line on Early’s left, while McLaws retained the crest he had so stubbornly defended against Brooks.

Lee now had in front of Sedgwick a force outnumbering the Sixth Corps by one-quarter, with open communications to Fredericksburg.

The general instructions issued by Lee, after a preliminary reconnoissance, were to push in Sedgwick’s centre by a vigorous assault; and, while preparations were making for this evolution, a slight touch of the line was kept up, by the activity of the Confederate pickets in our front.