or shortly after, and, if opposed strongly, to-morrow night.”  In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Hooker says, “The problem was, to throw a sufficient force of infantry across at Kelley’s Ford, descend the Rappahannock, and knock away the enemy’s forces, holding the United-States and Banks’s Ford, by attacking them in the rear, and as soon as these fords were opened, to re-enforce the marching column sufficiently for them to continue the march upon the flank of the rebel army until his whole force was routed, and, if successful, his retreat intercepted.  Simultaneous with this movement on the right, the left was to cross the Rappahannock below Fredericksburg, and threaten the enemy in that quarter, including his depot of supplies, to prevent his detaching an overwhelming force to his left.”

Hooker, moreover, not only told Hunt that he expected to fight near Banks’s Ford, but instructed him to get all his artillery to that point from below, where it had been massed to cover Sedgwick’s crossing.

There was every reason why the army should be got out of the Wilderness, in the midst of which lies Chancellorsville.  This is, of all places in that section, the least fit for an engagement in which the general commanding expects to secure the best tactical results.  But out towards Fredericksburg the ground opens, showing a large number of clearings, woods of less density, and a field suited to the operations of all arms.

Every thing should have been done to get the two wings within easier communication; and more than all, having once surprised the enemy, and advanced against him, a retreat should have been made from imperative reasons alone.

Hooker explains this falling back in after-days, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, thus:  “They”—­the forces on the turnpike and plank road—­“had proceeded but a short distance when the head of the column emerged from the heavy forest, and discovered the enemy to be advancing in line of battle.  Nearly all the Twelfth Corps had emerged from the forest at that moment” (this is a very imperfect statement of the facts); “but, as the passage-way through the forest was narrow, I was satisfied that I could not throw troops through it fast enough to resist the advance of Gen. Lee, and was apprehensive of being whipped in detail.”  And in another place, “When I marched out on the morning of the 1st of May I could get but few troops into position:  the column had to march through narrow roads, and could not be thrown forward fast enough to prevent their being overwhelmed by the enemy in his advance.  On assuming my position, Lee advanced on me in that manner, and was soon repulsed, the column thrown back in confusion into the open ground.  It could not live there.  The roads through the forest were not unlike bridges to pass.  A mile or more in advance of the position I had would have placed me beyond the forest, where, with my superior forces, the enemy would in all probability have been beaten.”