General Headquarters and Engineers . . . 9
First Corps . . . . . . . . 299
Second Corps . . . . . . . . 1,923
Third Corps . . . . . . . . 4,119
Fifth Corps . . . . . . . . 700
Sixth Corps . . . . . . . . 4,610
Eleventh Corps . . . . . . . . 2,412
Twelfth Corps . . . . . . . . 2,822
Pleasonton’s Brigade . . . . . . 202
Cavalry Corps under Stoneman . . . . 189

          
                                                                                ------

          
                                   17,285

Confederateloss.

Jackson’s Corps,—­
Early’s division . . . . . . . 851
A. P. Hill’s division . . . . . . 2,583
Trimble’s (Colston) division . . . . 1,868
D. H. Hill’s (Rodes) division . . . . 2,178

Longstreet’s Corps,—­
Anderson’s division . . . . . . 1,180
McLaws’s division . . . . . . 1,379
Artillery . . . . . . . . . 227
Cavalry . . . . . . . . . 11
------
10,277
Prisoners . . . . . . . . . 2,000
------
12,277

Both armies now returned to their ancient encampments, elation as general on one side as disappointment was profound upon the other.

Hooker says in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:  “I lost under those operations” (viz., the Chancellorsville campaign) “one piece artillery, I think five or six wagons, and one ambulance.  Of course, many of the Eleventh Corps lost their arms and knapsacks.”

The Confederates, however, claim to have captured nineteen thousand five hundred stand of small arms, seventeen colors, and much ammunition.  And, while acknowledging a loss of eight guns, it is asserted by them that they captured thirteen.

The orders issued to the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia by their respective commanders, on the return of the forces to the shelter of their old camps, need no comment.  They are characteristic to a degree.

Headquartersarmy of the Potomac,
May 6, 1863. 
General orders no. 49.

The major-general commanding tenders to this army his congratulations on the achievements of the last seven days.  If it has not accomplished all that was expected, the reasons are well known to the army.  It is sufficient to say that they were of a character not to be foreseen or prevented by human sagacity or resources.

In withdrawing from the south bank of the Rappahannock before delivering a general battle to our adversaries, the army has given renewed evidence of its confidence in itself, and its fidelity to the principles it represents.