Accordingly it is something which is considered neither as am object of inclination nor of fear, although it has something analogous to both.  The object of respect is the law only, and that, the law which we impose on ourselves, and yet recognise as necessary in itself.  As a law, we are subjected to it without consulting self-love; as imposed by us on ourselves, it is a result of our will.  In the former aspect it has an analogy to fear, in the latter to inclination.  Respect for a person is properly only respect for the law (of honesty, &c.), of which he gives us an example.  Since we also look on the improvement of our talents as a duty, we consider that we see in a person of talents, as it were, the example of A law (viz. to become like him in this by exercise), and this constitutes our respect.  All so-called moral interest consists simply in respect for the law.]

But what sort of law can that be, the conception of which must determine the will, even without paying any regard to the effect expected from it, in order that this will may be called good absolutely and without qualification?  As I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise to it from obedience to any law, there remains nothing but the universal conformity of its actions to law in general, which alone is to serve the will as a principle, i. e.  I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become A universal law.  Here now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion.  The common reason of men in its practical judgments perfectly coincides with this, and always has in view the principle here suggested.  Let the question be, for example:  May I when in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it?  I readily distinguish here between the two significations which the question may have.  Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to make a false promise.  The former may undoubtedly often be the case.  I see clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from a present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it must be well considered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much greater inconvenience than that from which I now free myself, and as, with all my supposed cunning, the consequences cannot be so easily foreseen but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me than any mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be considered whether it would not be more prudent to act herein according to a universal maxim, and to make it a habit to promise nothing except with the intention of keeping it.  But it is soon clear to me that such a maxim