(5) We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no more charged with the colouring of the worst part, than logic with sophistry, or morality with vice; for we know the doctrines of contraries are the same, though the use be opposite.  It appeareth also that logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as the fist from the palm—­the one close, the other at large—­but much more in this, that logic handleth reason exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners.  And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge on the other, as participating of both; for the proofs and demonstrations of logic are toward all men indifferent and the same, but the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought to differ according to the auditors: 

“Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion.”

Which application in perfection of idea ought to extend so far that if a man should speak of the same thing to several persons, he should speak to them all respectively and several ways; though this politic part of eloquence in private speech it is easy for the greatest orators to want:  whilst, by the observing their well-graced forms of speech, they leese the volubility of application; and therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend this to better inquiry, not being curious whether we place it here or in that part which concerneth policy.

(6) Now therefore will I descend to the deficiences, which, as I said, are but attendances; and first, I do not find the wisdom and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who began to make a collection of the popular signs and colours of good and evil, both simple and comparative, which are as the sophisms of rhetoric (as I touched before).  For example —

   “Sophisma. 
Quod laudatur, bonum:  quod vituperatur, malum. 
   Redargutio. 
Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces.”

Malum est, malum est (inquit emptor):  sed cum recesserit, tum gloriabitur!  The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three—­one, that there be but a few of many; another, that there elenches are not annexed; and the third, that he conceived but a part of the use of them:  for their use is not only in probation, but much more in impression.  For many forms are equal in signification which are differing in impression, as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharp and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same.  For there is no man but will be a little more raised by hearing it said, “Your enemies will be glad of this” —

“Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae.”

than by hearing it said only, “This is evil for you.”

(7) Secondly, I do resume also that which I mentioned before, touching provision or preparatory store for the furniture of speech and readiness of invention, which appeareth to be of two sorts:  the one in resemblance to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other to a shop of things ready made up; both to be applied to that which is frequent and most in request.  The former of these I will call antitheta, and the latter formulae.