In a very recent case where a clever thief had been convicted of looting various apartments in New York City of over eighty thousand dollars’ worth of jewelry, the female owners were summoned to identify their property.  The writer believes that in every instance these ladies were absolutely ingenuous and intended to tell the absolute truth.  Each and every one positively identified various of the loose stones found in the possession of the prisoner as her own.  This was the case even when the diamonds, emeralds and pearls had no distinguishing marks at all.  It was a human impossibility actually to identify any such objects, and yet these eminently respectable and intelligent gentlewomen swore positively that they could recognize their jewels.  They drew the inference merely that as the prisoner had stolen similar jewels from them these must be the actual ones which they had lost, an inference very likely correct, but valueless in a tribunal of justice.

Where their inferences are questioned, women, as a rule, are much more ready to “swear their testimony through” than men.  They are so accustomed to act upon inference that, finding themselves unable to substantiate their assertion by any sufficient reason, they become irritated, “show fight,” and seek refuge in prevarication.  Had they not, during their entire lives, been accustomed to mental short-cuts, they would be spared the humiliation of seeing their evidence “stricken from the record.”

One of the ladies referred to testified as follows: 

“Can you identify that diamond?”

“I am quite sure that it is mine:” 

“How do you know?”

“It looks exactly like it.”

“But may it not be a similar one and not your own?”

“No; it is mine.”

“But how?  It has no marks.”

“I don’t care.  I know it is mine.  I swear it is!”

The good lady supposed that, unless she swore to the fact, she might lose her jewel, which was, of course, not the case at all, as the sworn testimony founded upon nothing but inference left her in no better position than she was in before.

The writer regrets to say that observation would lead him to believe that women as a rule have somewhat less regard for the spirit of their oaths than men, and that they are more ready, if it be necessary, to commit perjury.  This may arise from the fact that women are fully aware that their sex protects them from the same severity of cross-examination to which men would be subjected under similar circumstances.  It is today fatal to a lawyer’s case if he be not invariably gentle and courteous with a female witness, and this is true even if she be a veritable Sapphira.

In spite of these limitations, which, of course, affect the testimony of almost every person, irrespective of sex, women, with the possible exception of children, make the most remarkable witnesses to be found in the courts.  They are almost invariably quick and positive in their answers, keenly alive to the dramatic possibilities of the situation, and with an unerring instinct for a trap or compromising admission.