The tale seems too monstrous for belief, nor is it to be admitted with certainty, that Manmaker and the other councillors implicated had actually given their adhesion to the plot, because the Spanish emissaries in their correspondence with the King assured him of the fact.  But if such a foundation for suspicion could have been found against Barneveld and his friends, the world would not have heard the last of it from that hour to this.

It is superfluous to say that the Prince was entirely foreign to these plans.  He had never been mentioned as privy to the little arrangements of Councillor du Agean and others, although he was to benefit by them.  In the Spanish schemes he seems to have been considered as an impediment, although indirectly they might tend to advance him.

“We have managed now, I hope, that his Majesty will be recognized as sovereign of the country,” wrote the confidential agent of the King of Spain in the Netherlands, Emmanuel Sueyro, to the government of Madrid.  “The English will oppose it with all their strength.  But they can do nothing except by making Count Maurice sovereign of Holland and duke of Julich and Cleve.  Maurice will also contrive to make himself master of Wesel, so it is necessary for the Archduke to be beforehand with him and make sure of the place.  It is also needful that his Majesty should induce the French government to talk with the Netherlanders and convince them that it is time to prolong the Truce.”

This was soon afterwards accomplished.  The French minister at Brussels informed Archduke Albert that du Maurier had been instructed to propose the prolongation, and that he had been conferring with the Prince of Orange and the States-General on the subject.  At first the Prince had expressed disinclination, but at the last interview both he and the States had shown a desire for it, and the French King had requested from the Archduke a declaration whether the Spanish government would be willing to treat for it.  In such case Lewis would offer himself as mediator and do his best to bring about a successful result.

But it was not the intention of the conspirators in the Netherlands that the Truce should be prolonged.  On the contrary the negotiation for it was merely to furnish the occasion for fully developing their plot.  “The States and especially those of Zealand will reply that they no longer wish the Truce,” continued Sueyro, “and that they would prefer war to such a truce.  They desire to put ships on the coast of Flanders, to which the Hollanders are opposed because it would be disagreeable to the French.  So the Zealanders will be the first to say that the Netherlanders must come back to his Majesty.  This their President Hanmaker has sworn.  The States of Overyssel will likewise give their hand to this because they say they will be the first to feel the shock of the war.  Thus we shall very easily carry out our design, and as we shall concede to the Zealanders their demands in regard to the navigation they at least will place themselves under the dominion of his Majesty as will be the case with Friesland as well as Overyssel.”