History of the United Netherlands from the Death of William the Silent to the Twelve Year's Truce — Complete (1584-1609) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 2,620 pages of information about History of the United Netherlands from the Death of William the Silent to the Twelve Year's Truce — Complete (1584-1609).

History of the United Netherlands from the Death of William the Silent to the Twelve Year's Truce — Complete (1584-1609) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 2,620 pages of information about History of the United Netherlands from the Death of William the Silent to the Twelve Year's Truce — Complete (1584-1609).

The stadholder, after much argument, yielded as usual to the authority of the magistrates, without being convinced as to the sagacity of their plans.  It was arranged that an army should make a descent upon the Flemish coast in the early spring, and make a demonstration upon Sluys.  The effect of this movement, it was thought, would be to draw the enemy out of his entrenchments, in which case it would be in the power of Maurice to put an end at once to the siege.  It is unquestionable that the better alternative, in the judgment of the prince, was to take possession; if possible, of Sluys itself.  His preparations were, however, made with a view to either event, and by the middle of April he had collected at Willemstad a force of fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse.  As on the former memorable expedition, he now again insisted that a considerable deputation of the States and of the States’ council should accompany the army.  His brother Henry, and his cousins Lewis William, Lewis Gunther, and Ernest Casimir, were likewise with him, as well as the Prince of Anhalt and other distinguished personages.

On the 25th April the army, having crossed the mouth of the West Scheld, from Zeeland, in numberless vessels of all sizes and degrees, effected their debarkation on the island of Cadzand.

In the course of two days they had taken possession of the little town, and all the forts of that island, having made their entrance through what was called the Black Channel.  Had they steered boldly through the Swint or Sluys channel at once, it is probable that they might have proceeded straight up to Sluy’s, and taken the place by surprise.  Maurice’s habitual caution was, perhaps, on this occasion, a disadvantage to him, but he would have violated the rules of war, and what seemed the dictates of common sense, had he not secured a basis of operations, and a possibility of retreat, before plunging with his army into the heart of a hostile country.  The republic still shuddered at the possible catastrophe of four years before, when circumstances had forced him to take the heroic but dangerous resolution of sending off his ships from Nieuport.  Before he had completed his arrangements for supplies on the island of Cadzand, he learned from scouts and reconnoitring parties that Spinola had sent a thousand infantry, besides five hundred cavalry, under Trivulzio, to guard the passage across the Swint.  Maurice was thus on the wrong side of the great channel by which Sluy’s communicated with the sea?

The town of Sluy’s and its situation have been described in a former chapter.  As a port, it was in those days considered a commodious and important one, capable of holding five hundred ships.  As a town, it was not so insignificant as geographical and historical changes have since made it, and was certainly far superior to Ostend, even if Ostend had not been almost battered out of existence.  It had spacious streets and squares, and excellent fortifications

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History of the United Netherlands from the Death of William the Silent to the Twelve Year's Truce — Complete (1584-1609) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.