hereof we need only observe that one who had not yet experienced vision would not at first sight know motion.  Whence it clearly follows that motion perceivable by sight is of a sort distinct from motion perceivable by touch.  The antecedent I prove thus:  by touch he could not perceive any motion but what was up or down, to the right or left, nearer or farther from him; besides these and their several varieties or complications, it is impossible he should have any idea of motion.  He would not therefore think anything to be motion, or give the name motion to any idea which he could not range under some or other of those particular kinds thereof.  But from sect. 95 it is plain that by the mere act of vision he could not know motion upwards or downwards, to the right or left, or in any other possible direction.  From which I conclude he would not know motion at all at first sight.  As for the idea of motion in abstract, I shall not waste paper about it, but leave it to my reader to make the best he can of it.  To me it is perfectly unintelligible.

138.  The consideration of motion may furnish a new field for inquiry:  but since the manner wherein the mind apprehends by sight the motion of tangible objects, with the various degrees thereof, may be easily collected from what hath been said concerning the manner wherein that sense doth suggest their various distances, magnitudes, and situations, I shall not enlarge any farther on this subject, but proceed to consider what may be alleged, with greatest appearance of reason, against the proposition we have shown to be true.  For where there is so much prejudice to be encountered, a bare and naked demonstration of the truth will scarce suffice.  We must also satisfy the scruples that men may raise in favour of their preconceived notions, show whence the mistake arises, how it came to spread, and carefully disclose and root out those false persuasions that an early prejudice might have implanted in the mind.

139.  First, therefore, it will be demanded how visible extension and figures come to be called by the same name with tangible extension and figures, if they are not of the same kind with them?  It must be something more than humour or accident that could occasion a custom so constant and universal as this, which has obtained in all ages and nations of the world, and amongst allranks of men, the learned as well as the illiterate.

140.  To which I answer, we can no more argue a visible and tangible square to be of the same species from their being called by the same name, than we can that a tangible square and the monosyllable consisting of six letters whereby it is marked are of the same species because they are both called by the same name.  It is customary to call written words and the things they signify by the same name:  for words not being regarded in their own nature, or otherwise than as they are marks of things, it had been superfluous, and beside the design of language, to have given them