are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together.  But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding.  We only feel a connexion or determination of the thought, to pass from one object to another.  It follows, therefore, that the thought alone finds personal identity, when reflecting on the train of past perceptions, that compose a mind, the ideas of them are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other.  However extraordinary this conclusion may seem, it need not surprize us.  Most philosophers seem inclined to think, that personal identity arises from consciousness; and consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought or perception.  The present philosophy, therefore, has so far a promising aspect.  But all my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness.  I cannot discover any theory, which gives me satisfaction on this head.

In short there are two principles, which I cannot render consistent; nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz, that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.  Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple and individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there would be no difficulty in the case.  For my part, I must plead the privilege of a sceptic, and confess, that this difficulty is too hard for my understanding.  I pretend not, however, to pronounce. it absolutely insuperable.  Others, perhaps, or myself, upon more mature reflections, may discover some hypothesis, that will reconcile those contradictions.

I shall also take this opportunity of confessing two other errors of less importance, which more mature reflection has discovered to me in my reasoning.  The first may be found in Vol.  I. page 106. where I say, that the distance betwixt two bodies is known, among other things, by the angles, which the rays of light flowing from the bodies make with each other.  It is certain, that these angles are not known to the mind, and consequently can never discover the distance.  The second error may be found in Vol.  I. page 144 where I say, that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different degrees of force and vivacity.  I believe there are other differences among ideas, which cannot properly be comprehended under these terms.  Had I said, that two ideas of the same object can only be different by their different feeling, I should have been nearer the truth.

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