immediate interest, to the violation of all the laws of society.  But as this imperfection is inherent in human nature, we know that it must attend men in all their states and conditions; and that these, whom we chuse for rulers, do not immediately become of a superior nature to the rest of mankind, upon account of their superior power and authority.  What we expect from them depends not on a change of their nature but of their situation, when they acquire a more immediate interest in the preservation of order and the execution of justice.  But besides that this interest is only more immediate in the execution of justice among their subjects; besides this, I say, we may often expect, from the irregularity of human nature, that they will neglect even this immediate interest, and be transported by their passions into all the excesses of cruelty and ambition..  Our general knowledge of human nature, our observation of the past history of mankind, our experience of present times; all these causes must induce us to open the door to exceptions, and must make us conclude, that we may resist the more violent effects of supreme power, without any crime or injustice.

Accordingly we may observe, that this is both the general practice and principle of mankind, and that no nation, that coued find any remedy, ever yet suffered the cruel ravages of a tyrant, or were blamed for their resistance.  Those who took up arms against Dionysius or Nero, or Philip the second, have the favour of every reader in the perusal of their history:  and nothing but the most violent perversion of common sense can ever lead us to condemn them.  It is certain, therefore, that in all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as that of passive obedience, but make allowances for resistance in the more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression.  The general opinion of mankind has some authority in all cases; but in this of morals it is perfectly infallible.  Nor is it less infallible, because men cannot distinctly explain the principles, on which it is founded.  Few persons can carry on this train of reasoning: 

Government is a mere human invention for the interest of society.  Where the tyranny of the governor removes this interest, it also removes the natural obligation to obedience.  The moral obligation is founded on the natural, and therefore must cease where that ceases; especially where the subject is such as makes us foresee very many occasions wherein the natural obligation may cease, and causes us to form a kind of general rule for the regulation of our conduct in such occurrences.