found means of protecting his interests.  To this end he sought and obtained an order from the Court of Appeals, which grave judiciary, after duly considering the evidence on which the criminal was convicted before Fetter’s tribunal, was of opinion that evidence had been improperly extorted by cruelty; and, in accordance with that opinion, ordered a new trial, which said trial would be dististinguished above that at Fetter’s court by being presided over by a judicial magistrate.  This distinguished functionary, the judicial magistrate, who generally hears the appeals from Fetter’s court, is a man of the name of Fairweather Fuddle, a clever wag, whose great good-nature is only equalled by the rotundity of his person, which is not a bad portraiture of our much-abused Sir John Falstaff, as represented by the heavy men of our country theatres.  Now, to enter upon an analysis of the vast difference between Fetter’s court in ordinary, and Fuddle’s court in judiciary, would require the aid of more philosophy than we are capable of summoning; nor would the sagacious reader be enlightened thereby, inasmuch as the learned of our own atmosphere have spent much study on the question without arriving at any favourable result.  Very low people, and intelligent negroes—­ whose simple mode of solving difficult problems frequently produces results nearest the truth—­do say without fear or trembling that the distinction between these great courts exists in the fact of Justice Fuddle drinking the more perfect brandy.  Now, whether the quality of brandy has anything to do with the purity of ideas, the character of the judiciary, or the tempering of the sentences, we will leave to the reader’s discrimination; but true it is, that, while Fetter’s judgments are always for the state, Fuddle leans to mercy and the master’s interests.  Again, were Fuddle to evince that partiality for the gallows which has become a trait of character with his legal brother, it would avail him nothing, inasmuch as by confirming Fetter’s judgments the fees would alike remain that gentleman’s.  If, then, the reader reason on the philosophy of self-interest, he may find the fees, which are in no wise small, founding the great distinction between the courts of Messrs. Fuddle and Fetter; for by reversing Fetter’s judgments fees accrue to Fuddle’s own court, and belong to his own well-lined pocket; whereas, did he confirm them, not one cent of fees could he claim.  The state should without delay remedy this great wrong, and give its judicial gentlemen a fair chance of proving their judgments well founded in contrariety.  We should not, forsooth, forget to mention that Fuddle, in his love of decorum—­though he scarce ever sat in judgment without absorbing his punch the while—­never permitted in his forum the use of those knock-down arguments which were always a prelude to Fetter’s judgments.