warfare, China has undoubtedly won for herself a new
place in the world’s esteem. Both in Europe
and America the news of this development awakened
well-understandable enthusiasm, and convinced men that
the Republic at last stood for something vital and
real. Until the 9th February, 1917, what China
had been doing was not really to maintain her neutrality,
since she had been unable to defend her territory
from being made a common battleground in 1914:
she had been engaged in guarding and perpetuating
her traditional impotency. For whilst it may
be accurate to declare—a fact which few
Westerners have realized—that to the mass
of the Chinese nation the various members of the European
Family are undistinguishable from one another, there
being little to choose in China between a Russian
or a German, an Englishman or an Austrian, a Frenchman
or a Greek, the trade-contact of a century had certainly
taught to a great many that there was profit in certain
directions and none in certain others. It was
perfectly well-known, for instance, that England stood
for a sea-empire; that the sea was an universal road;
that British ships, both mercantile and military,
were the most numerous; and that other things being
equal it must primarily be Britain more than any other
European country which would influence Chinese destinies.
But the British Alliance with Japan had greatly weakened
the trust which originally existed; and this added
to the fact that Germany, although completely isolated
and imprisoned by the sea, still maintained herself
intact by reason of her marvellous war-machine, which
had ploughed forward with such horrible results in
a number of directions, had made inaction seem the
best policy. And yet, although the Chinese may
be pardoned for not forming clear concepts regarding
the rights and wrongs of the present conflict, they
had undoubtedly realized that it was absolutely essential
for them not to remain outside the circle of international
friendships when a direct opportunity was offered
them to step within.
It was a sudden inkling of these things which now
dawned on the public mind and slowly awakened enthusiasm.
For the first time since Treaty relations with the
Powers had been established Chinese diplomatic action
had swept beyond the walls of Peking and embraced
world-politics within its scope. The Confucianist
conception of the State, as being simply a regional
creation, a thing complete in itself and all sufficient
because it was locked to the past and indifferent
to the future, had hitherto been supreme, foreign
affairs being the result of unwilling contact at sea-ports
or in the wastes of High Asia where rival empires meet.
To find Chinese—five years after the inauguration
of their Republic—ready to accept literally
and loyally in the western way all the duties and
obligations which their rights of eminent domain confer
was a great and fine discovery. It has been supposed
by some that a powerful role was played in this business