I believe, the policy would soon become unmanageable.  The result would be, as I have tried to explain, that the Assembly would be always changing its Ministry, that having no reason to fear the penalty which that change so often brings in England, they would be ready to make it once a month.  Caprice is the characteristic vice of miscellaneous assemblies, and without some check their selection would be unceasingly mutable.  This peculiar danger of the present Constitution of France has however been prevented by its peculiar circumstances.  The Assembly have not been inclined to remove M. Thiers, because in their lamentable present position they could not replace M. Thiers.  He has a monopoly of the necessary reputation.  It is the Empire—­the Empire which he always opposed—­that has done him this kindness.  For twenty years no great political reputation could arise in France.  The Emperor governed and no one member could show a capacity for government.  M. Rouher, though of vast real ability, was in the popular idea only the Emperor’s agent; and even had it been otherwise, M. Rouher, the one great man of Imperialism, could not have been selected as a head of the Government, at a moment of the greatest reaction against the Empire.  Of the chiefs before the twenty years’ silence, of the eminent men known to be able to handle Parliaments and to govern Parliaments, M. Thiers was the only one still physically able to begin again to do so.  The miracle is, that at seventy-four even he should still be able.  As no other great chief of the Parliament regime existed, M. Thiers is not only the best choice, but the only choice.  If he were taken away, it would be most difficult to make any other choice, and that difficulty keeps him where he is.  At every crisis the Assembly feels that after M. Thiers “the deluge,” and he lives upon that feeling.  A change of the President, though legally simple, is in practice all but impossible; because all know that such a change might be a change, not only of the President, but of much more too:  that very probably it might be a change of the polity—­that it might bring in a Monarchy or an Empire.

Lastly, by a natural consequence of the position, M. Thiers does not govern as a Parliamentary Premier governs.  He is not, he boasts that he is not, the head of a party.  On the contrary, being the one person essential to all parties, he selects Ministers from all parties, he constructs a Cabinet in which no one Minister agrees with any other in anything, and with all the members of which he himself frequently disagrees.  The selection is quite in his hand.  Ordinarily a Parliamentary Premier cannot choose; he is brought in by a party; he is maintained in office by a party; and that party requires that as they aid him, he shall aid them; that as they give him the very best thing in the State, he shall give them the next best things.  But M. Thiers is under no such restriction.  He can choose as he likes, and does choose.  Neither in the selection of his Cabinet nor in the management of the Chamber, is M. Thiers guided as a similar person in common circumstances would have to be guided.  He is the exception of a moment; he is not the example of a lasting condition.