No.  VII.

Its supposed checks and balances.

In a former essay I devoted an elaborate discussion to the comparison of the royal and unroyal form of Parliamentary government.  I showed that at the formation of a Ministry, and during the continuance of a Ministry, a really sagacious monarch might be of rare use.  I ascertained that it was a mistake to fancy that at such times a constitutional monarch had no rule and no duties.  But I proved likewise that the temper, the disposition, and the faculties then needful to fit a constitutional monarch for usefulness were very rare, at least as rare as the faculties of a great absolute monarch, and that a common man in that place is apt to do at least as much harm as good—­perhaps more harm.  But in that essay I could not discuss fully the functions of a king at the conclusion of an administration, for then the most peculiar parts of the English Government—­the power to dissolve the House of Commons, and the power to create new peers—­come into play, and until the nature of the House of Lords and the nature of the House of Commons had been explained, I had no premises for an argument as to the characteristic action of the king upon them.  We have since considered the functions of the two houses, and also the effects of changes of Ministry on our administrative system; we are now, therefore, in a position to discuss the functions of a king at the end of an administration.  I may seem over formal in this matter, but I am very formal on purpose.  It appears to me that the functions of our executive in dissolving the Commons and augmenting the Peers are among the most important, and the least appreciated, parts of our whole government, and that hundreds of errors have been made in copying the English Constitution from not comprehending them.

Hobbes told us long ago, and everybody now understands, that there must be a supreme authority, a conclusive power, in every State on every point somewhere.  The idea of government involves it—­when that idea is properly understood.  But there are two classes of Governments.  In one the supreme determining power is upon all points the same:  in the other, that ultimate power is different upon different points—­now resides in one part of the Constitution and now in another.  The Americans thought that they were imitating the English in making their Constitution upon the last principle—­in having one ultimate authority for one sort of matter, and another for another sort.  But in truth the English Constitution is the type of the opposite species; it has only one authority for all sorts of matters.  To gain a living conception of the difference let us see what the Americans did.