But if, with the exception of this terrible Revolutionary government, a Parliamentary government upon principle surpasses all its competitors in administrative efficiency, why is it that our English Government, which is beyond comparison the best of Parliamentary governments, is not celebrated through the world for administrative efficiency?  It is noted for many things, why is it not noted for that?  Why, according to popular belief is it rather characterised by the very contrary?

One great reason of the diffused impression is, that the English Government attempts so much.  Our military system is that which is most attacked.  Objectors say we spend much more on our army than the great military monarchies, and yet with an inferior result.  But, then, what we attempt is incalculably more difficult.  The continental monarchies have only to defend compact European territories by the many soldiers whom they force to fight; the English try to defend without any compulsion—­only by such soldiers as they persuade to serve—­territories far surpassing all Europe in magnitude, and situated all over the habitable globe.  Our Horse Guards and War Office may not be at all perfect—­I believe they are not:  but if they had sufficient recruits selected by force of law—­ if they had, as in Prussia, the absolute command of each man’s time for a few years, and the right to call him out afterwards when they liked, we should be much surprised at the sudden ease and quickness with which they did things.  I have no doubt too that any accomplished soldier of the Continent would reject as impossible what we after a fashion effect.  He would not attempt to defend a vast scattered empire, with many islands, a long frontier line in every continent, and a very tempting bit of plunder at the centre, by mere volunteer recruits, who mostly come from the worst class of the people—­whom the Great Duke called the “scum of the earth”—­who come in uncertain numbers year by year—­who by some political accident may not come in adequate numbers, or at all, in the year we need them most.  Our War Office attempts what foreign War Offices (perhaps rightly) would not try at; their officers have means of incalculable force denied to ours, though ours is set to harder tasks.

Again, the English navy undertakes to defend a line of coast and a set of dependencies far surpassing those of any continental power.  And the extent of our operations is a singular difficulty just now.  It requires us to keep a large stock of ships and arms.  But on the other hand, there are most important reasons why we should not keep much.  The naval art and the military art are both in a state of transition; the last discovery of to-day is out of date, and superseded by an antagonistic discovery to-morrow.  Any large accumulation of vessels or guns is sure to contain much that will be useless, unfitting, antediluvian, when it comes to be tried.  There are two cries against the Admiralty which go on side by side: