In truth, the principal peculiarity of the House of Commons in financial affairs is nowadays not a special privilege, but an exceptional disability.  On common subjects any member can propose anything, but not on money—­the Minister only can propose to tax the people.  This principle is commonly involved in mediaeval metaphysics as to the prerogative of the Crown, but it is as useful in the nineteenth century as in the fourteenth, and rests on as sure a principle.  The House of Commons—­now that it is the true sovereign, and appoints the real executive—­has long ceased to be the checking, sparing, economical body it once was.  It now is more apt to spend money than the Minister of the day.  I have heard a very experienced financier say, “If you want to raise a certain cheer in the House of Commons make a general panegyric on economy; if you want to invite a sure defeat, propose a particular saving”.  The process is simple.  Every expenditure of public money has some apparent public object; those who wish to spend the money expatiate on that object; they say, “What is 50,000 pounds to this great country?  Is this a time for cheese-paring objection?  Our industry was never so productive; our resources never so immense.  What is 50,000 pounds in comparison with this great national interest?” The members who are for the expenditure always come down; perhaps a constituent or a friend who will profit by the outlay, or is keen on the object, has asked them to attend; at any rate, there is a popular vote to be given, on which the newspapers—­always philanthropic, and sometimes talked over—­will be sure to make enconiums.  The members against the expenditure rarely come down of themselves; why should they become unpopular without reason?  The object seems decent; many of its advocates are certainly sincere:  a hostile vote will make enemies, and be censured by the journals.  If there were not some check, the “people’s house” would soon outrun the people’s money.  That check is the responsibility of the Cabinet for the national finance.  If any one could propose a tax, they might let the House spend it as it would, and wash their hands of the matter; but now, for whatever expenditure is sanctioned—­even when it is sanctioned against the Ministry’s wish—­the Ministry must find the money.  Accordingly, they have the strongest motive to oppose extra outlay.  They will have to pay the bill for it; they will have to impose taxation, which is always disagreeable, or suggest loans, which, under ordinary circumstances, are shameful.  The Ministry is (so to speak) the bread-winner of the political family, and has to meet the cost of philanthropy and glory, just as the head of a family has to pay for the charities of his wife and the toilette of his daughters.

In truth, when a Cabinet is made the sole executive, it follows it must have the sole financial charge, for all action costs money, all policy depends on money, and it is in adjusting the relative goodness of action and policies that the executive is employed.