money, and the other committee might decide that he was insane as to land.  This absurdity has been cured; but the error from which it arose has not been cured—­the error of having two supreme courts, to both of which as time goes on, the same question is sure often enough to be submitted, and each of which is sure every now and then to decide it differently.  I do not reckon the judicial function of the House of Lords as one of its true subsidiary functions, first because it does not in fact exercise it, next because I wish to see it in appearance deprived of it.  The supreme court of the English people ought to be a great conspicuous tribunal, ought to rule all other courts, ought to have no competitor, ought to bring our law into unity, ought not to be hidden beneath the robes of a legislative assembly.

The real subsidiary functions of the House of Lords are, unlike its judicial functions, very analogous to its substantial nature.  The first is the faculty of criticising the executive.  An assembly in which the mass of the members have nothing to lose, where most have nothing to gain, where every one has a social position firmly fixed, where no one has a constituency, where hardly any one cares for the minister of the day, is the very assembly in which to look for, from which to expect, independent criticism.  And in matter of fact we find it.  The criticism of the Acts of late administrations by Lord Grey has been admirable.  But such criticism, to have its full value, should be many-sided.  Every man of great ability puts his own mark on his own criticism; it will be full of thought and feeling, but then it is of idiosyncratic thought and feeling.  We want many critics of ability and knowledge in the Upper House—­not equal to Lord Grey, for they would be hard to find—­but like Lord Grey.  They should resemble him in impartiality; they should resemble him in clearness; they should most of all resemble him in taking a supplemental view of a subject.  There is an actor’s view of a subject, which (I speak of mature and discussed action—­of Cabinet action) is nearly sure to include everything old and new—­everything ascertained and determinate.  But there is also a bystander’s view which is likely to omit some one or more of these old and certain elements, but also to contain some new or distant matter, which the absorbed and occupied actor could not see.  There ought to be many life peers in our secondary chamber capable of giving us this higher criticism.  I am afraid we shall not soon see them, but as a first step we should learn to wish for them.

The second subsidiary action of the House of Lords is even more important.  Taking the House of Commons, not after possible but most unlikely improvements, but in matter of fact and as it stands, it is overwhelmed with work.  The task of managing it falls upon the Cabinet, and that task is very hard.  Every member of the Cabinet in the Commons has to “attend the House”; to contribute by his votes, if not