’Virtus autem, quae est per se ipsa laudabilis, et sine qua nihil laudari potest, tamen habet plures partes, quarum alia est alia ad laudationem aptior.  Sunt enim aliae virtutes, quae videntur in moribus hominum, et quadam comitate ac beneficentia positae:  aliae quae in ingenii aliqua facultate, aut animi magnitudine ac robore.  Nam clementia, justitia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo in periculis communibus, jucunda est auditu in laudationibus.  Omnes enim hae virtutes non tam ipsis, qui eas in se habent, quam generi hominum fructuosae putantur.  Sapientia et magnitude animi, qua omnes res humanae tenues et pro nihilo putantur, et in cogitando vis quaedam ingenii, et ipsa eloquentia admirationis habet non minus, jucunditatis minus.  Ipsos enim magis videntur, quos laudamus, quam illos, apud quos laudamus ornare ac tueri:  sed tamen in laudenda jungenda sunt eliam haec genera virtutum.  Ferunt enim aures bominum, cum ilia quae jucunda et grata, tum etiam ilia, quae mirabilia sunt in virtute, laudari.’  De orat. lib. ii. cap. 84.

I suppose, if Cicero were now alive, it would be found difficult to fetter his moral sentiments by narrow systems; or persuade him, that no qualities were to be admitted as virtues, or acknowledged to be a part of personal merit, but what were recommended by The Whole Duty of Man.]

We need only peruse the titles of chapters in Aristotle’s Ethics to be convinced that he ranks courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, modesty, prudence, and a manly openness, among the virtues, as well as justice and friendship.

To sustain and to abstain, that is, to be patient and continent, appeared to some of the ancients a summary comprehension of all morals.

Epictetus has scarcely ever mentioned the sentiment of humanity and compassion, but in order to put his disciples on their guard against it.  The virtue of the Stoics seems to consist chiefly in a firm temper and a sound understanding.  With them, as with Solomon and the eastern moralists, folly and wisdom are equivalent to vice and virtue.

Men will praise thee, says David, [Footnote:  Psalm 49th.] when thou dost well unto thyself.  I hate a wise man, says the Greek poet, who is not wise to himself [Footnote:  Here, Hume quotes Euripedes in Greek].  Plutarch is no more cramped by systems in his philosophy than in his history.  Where he compares the great men of Greece and Rome, he fairly sets in opposition all their blemishes and accomplishments of whatever kind, and omits nothing considerable, which can either depress or exalt their characters.  His moral discourses contain the same free and natural censure of men and manners.