their name was suicide.  Then not a life-preserver had been brought.  This neglect was another shock to the members of the party and their friends.  Stanton was urged to take one for himself, but he declined to provide this advantage over the other men.  Since then he has been disposed to blame Powell for not telling Brown that life-preservers are a necessity on the Colorado.  It was also said that Powell declared to Brown that they were not imperative and consequently he is censured for the subsequent disasters.  There was certainly a misunderstanding in this, for Powell, knowing the situation from such abundant experience, never could have said life-preservers were not necessary, though on his first trip there was but one.  In this connection Thompson writes me:  “The Major sent for me at once when Mr. Brown called at the office.  I think we talked—­we three, I mean—­for half an hour, then the Major said, ’Professor Thompson knows just as much about the river as I do, and more about what is necessary for such a trip; you talk with him.’  I took Mr. Brown to my room and we had a long talk.  I think the next day Mr. Brown came again.  I had two interviews with him alone.  I told him distinctly that life-preservers were necessary.  I probably told him we did not wear them all the time, but I told him we put them on at every dangerous rapid, and I showed him the picture in the Major’s Report where we were wearing them.  I clearly remember telling him to have one arm above and one below the preserver.  I am positive about this, for after we received word of the loss of Brown we talked it over and I recalled the conversation.  He impressed me as thinking we exaggerated the dangers of the river.  He made a memorandum of things I said.  I think he also talked with Hillers, and I have no doubt the latter told him to take life-preservers.  But he had the Report, and there is no excuse for his neglecting so indispensable an article of the outfit.  He was warned over and over again to neglect no precaution.  I distinctly remember that the Major told him in so many words, ’not to underestimate the dangers of the river, and to never be caught off guard.’” On a previous page I have remarked that proper boats and a knowledge of how to handle them are more important than life-preservers, but that does not mean that a party should leave the life-preservers behind.  In descending the Colorado every possible precaution must be taken.  The first of these is the right kind of boats, second, proper arrangement as to food-supplies, and, third, life-preservers, etc.  The New York Tribune, after the collapse of this Brown expedition, quotes Powell in an interview as saying that he would not have ventured in the boats Brown selected and that he thought Brown “failed to comprehend the significant fact that nothing can get through the Colorado Canyon that cannot float.  Boats are repeatedly upset and inferior boats are mashed like egg-shells.”  Brown, undoubtedly, was rather inclined to look upon the descent somewhat lightly.  Being a brave, energetic man it was hard for him to believe that this river demanded so much extra prudence and caution, when Powell had successfully descended it twice without, so far as the water was concerned, losing a man.  However, the ill-fated expedition went on its way.