its inadequacy; by developing a new motive-power, which men’s moral consciousness could take living hold of, and could move in sympathy with.  What was this but an importation of Hellenism, as we have defined it, into Hebraism?  And as St. Paul used the contradiction between the Jew’s profession and practice, his shortcomings on that very side of moral affection and moral conduct which the Jew and St. Paul, both of them, regarded as all in all—­ ("Thou that sayest a man should not steal, dost thou steal? thou that sayest a man should not [190] commit adultery, dost thou commit adultery?")+—­for a proof of the inadequacy of the old rule of life, in the Jew’s mechanical conception of it, and tried to rescue him by making his consciousness play freely around this rule,—­that is, by a, so far, Hellenic treatment of it,—­even so, when we hear so much said of the growth of commercial immorality in our serious middle-class, of the melting away of habits of strict probity before the temptation to get quickly rich and to cut a figure in the world; when we see, at any rate, so much confusion of thought and of practice in this great representative class of our nation, may we not be disposed to say that this confusion shows that his new motive-power of grace and imputed righteousness has become to the Puritan as mechanical, and with as ineffective a hold upon his practice, as the old motive-power of the law was to the Jew? and that the remedy is the same as that which St. Paul employed,—­an importation of what we have called Hellenism into his Hebraism, a making his consciousness flow freely round his petrified rule of life and renew it?  Only with this difference:  that whereas St. Paul imported Hellenism within the limits of our moral part only, [191] this part being still treated by him as all in all; and whereas he exhausted, one may say, and used to the very uttermost, the possibilities of fruitfully importing it on that side exclusively; we ought to try and import it,—­guiding ourselves by the ideal of a human nature harmoniously perfect at all points,—­into all the lines of our activity, and only by so doing can we rightly quicken, refresh, and renew those very instincts, now so much baffled, to which Hebraism makes appeal.

But if we will not be warned by the confusion visible enough at present in our thinking and acting, that we are in a false line in having developed our Hebrew side so exclusively, and our Hellenic side so feebly and at random, in loving fixed rules of action so much more than the intelligible law of things, let us listen to a remarkable testimony which the opinion of the world around us offers.  All the world now sets great and increasing value on three objects which have long been very dear to us, and pursues them in its own way, or tries to pursue them.  These three objects are industrial enterprise, bodily exercises, and freedom.  Certainly we have, before and beyond our neighbours, given ourselves [192] to these three